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Editor - Captain H. GARBETT, R.N. (Retired),
To whom all communications should be addressed.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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ERRATUM.

Owing to a regrettable blunder on the part of the printers, the blocks of H.M.S. "Agamemnon" and the S.S. "Great Eastern," on Page 392, of the March "Journal" were misplaced.

For H.M.S. "Agamemnon" read S.S. "Great Eastern."

For S.S. "Great Eastern" read H.M.S. "Agamemnon."



THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

VOL. LII.

APRIL, 1908.

No. 362.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]

SECRETARY'S NOTES.

1. ROYAL VISITS.

Her Majesty the Queen, Her Imperial Majesty the Empress Marie Feodorovna of Russia, and Her Royal Highness Princess Victoria, honoured the Institution by a visit to the Museum on Thursday, 12th March.

2. CHAIRMAN AND VICE-CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL.

Admiral of the Fleet the Lord Walter Kerr, G.C.B., has been appointed Chairman of the Council for the ensuing year. Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I., has been appointed Vice-chairman.

3. OFFICERS JOINED.

The following Officers joined the Institution during the month of March:—

Captain W. K. E. Jameson, R.F.A.

Commander F. E. Massy-Dawson, R.N.

Captain W. L. Foster, R.H.A.

Captain J. H. D. Costeker, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

Captain Hon. A. M. Henley, 5th Lancers.

Captain M. L. Wilkinson, R.G.A.

Captain S. G. R. Willis, R.F.A.

Captain E. J. Bridges, 14th Hussars.

Captain J. W. Skipworth, R.E.

Captain J. W. K. Dianey, R.G.A.

Rev. R. J. D. Oliver, Army Chaplain.

Lieutenant J. J. Astor, 1st Life Guards.

Lieutenant D. T. Graham-Browne, R.N.

Lieutenant F. O. Grenfell, 9th Lancers.

Major Hon. A. R. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, K.R.R.C.

Lieutenant C. F. H. Greenwood, 20th Middlesex V.R.C.

Captain C. J. Newton, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.

Second-Lieutenant J. B. S. Bourne-May, Coldstream Guards.

(No Officers of the Militia, Imperial Yeomanry, or Royal Naval Reserve joined the Institution during the month.)

4. ADDITIONS TO THE MUSEUM.

a. The Shoulder-belt Plates of the following regiments:—57th Foot, 18th Royal Irish, 9th or East Norfolk.—Given by the Curator (Lieut.-Colonel A. Leetham).

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d. Bronze Medal of King George II., commemorative of the victories of his reign.—Given by W. Sills, Esq.

e. Bronze Medal for the battle of Dunbar, 1650.

This medal was struck by order of Parliament to commemorate the victory over the Scots at Dunbar, where Oliver Cromwell commanded in person. It was issued in gold, silver, and bronze for both officers and men.

Obverse:—Bust of Cromwell in armour; in the background the battle; “Lord of Hosts, word at Dunbar, Septem. y. 3. 1650,” on the arm, “Tho Simon F.E.”

Reverse:—Parliament assembled; oval.—*Given by Miss E. Hall.*

f. Bronze Medal of Saint Helena, presented by Napoleon I. to his Companions in Arms, from 1792 to 1815, dated 1821.—*Given by the Assistant-Curator (B. E. Sargeaunt, Esq.).*g. A Water-colour Drawing of H.M.S. *Charles Galley*, commanded by Captain Joseph Taylor, engaged with four French galleys in the calm off Nisa, from 7 in the morning to 10, the 28th of May, 1705.—*Given.*h. Geographical Plan of the Island and Forts of Saint Helena, by Lieutenant R. P. Reid, published 1815.—*Given.*

i. Colours of the 102nd Regiment or Queen's Royal Volunteers. This regiment was raised in October, 1760, and was first commanded by Major David Wedderburn, an officer associated with Vellinghausen. It was disbanded in 1763.

The above-named regiment must not be confused with Rowley's 102nd Regiment, which was raised in Ireland in March, 1780, when large demands were made for troops for North America, the West Indies, and the East Indies. This regiment, like the Royal Queen's Volunteers, had only a short existence, being disbanded at the close of the war with Tippoo Sahib. It formed part of the force under Colonel Fullarton, previous to its surrender as part of the Garrison of Bednore in the same year. Neither of these regiments are in any way associated with the Madras European Regiment, afterwards the 102nd Foot, and now the Royal Dublin Fusiliers.—*Given by The Officers, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Naas.*

5. "WEAPONS."

The Council has granted permission for the sale of this book at the Institution. It is written by the Assistant-Curator (B. E. Sargeaunt, Esq.), and contains an account, with numerous illustrations, of all the weapons in the Museum other than fire-arms. The price is 2s. 6d.

6. CHANGE OF ADDRESS OR RANK.

Notification of change of address or rank must reach the Secretary not later than the 7th of the month, for correction for the following JOURNAL. Members are reminded that it is essential that such changes should be made in writing; if these changes be not notified members will be themselves responsible if their JOURNALS fail to reach them through being wrongly addressed.

7. REPAIRS.

H.M. Office of Works are carrying out extensive repairs to the exterior of the north end of the Banqueting House, and a new gateway is to be erected at the public entrance of the Museum.

8. ARMY PROMOTION LECTURES.

Officers are reminded of these courses which are now in progress. The dates were announced in the previous JOURNAL.

9. RECEPTION.

The Council proposes holding a Reception at the Institution one evening early in the London Season. Further details will be circulated in due course.

10. LIBRARY CATALOGUE.

The new Library Catalogue will be ready early in May, price 2s. 6d. Applications for copies to be addressed to the Secretary.

THE BEST WAY OF ORGANISING AND MAINTAINING A RESERVE OF EFFICIENT BRITISH OFFICERS FOR THE BRITISH FORCES AT HOME AND IN INDIA, INCLUDING THE INDIAN ARMY."

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By *Lieut.-Colonel A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN, Reserve of Officers, Oxfordshire Light Infantry.*

Motto:—

"Carpe Diem."

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- IV. Modern Requirements.
- V. Possible Sources of Supply.
- VI. A Reserve of Officers for the Combatant Arms of the Regular Army at Home.
- VII. A Reserve of Officers for other Services at Home and in India.
- VIII. Conclusion: Summary of the Scheme.

APPENDIX.

Statistics connected with the existing deficiency of Officers.

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE object of the maintenance of a Reserve of Officers is to supply material wherewith to meet the requirements of war, i.e., to complete the commissioned ranks of the Regular Army from the peace to the war establishment; and, as the war progresses, to make good casualties. By studying the statistics

of past campaigns, we can arrive at a fair estimate of the wastage begotten of war, not only by battle but also by disease; and it may be said that twelve months of modern warfare is likely to reduce the numbers of the original Expeditionary Force by at least 80 per cent. Knowing this, we can at once realise the vital necessity for being prepared beforehand with a Reserve. A death-bed repentance will not avail; for efficient officers cannot be recruited at a moment's notice.

In order to be ready for war, Great Britain spends vast sums on the upkeep and training of her army; yet, for years, it has been well known that the deficiency in officers leaves the army but half ready. Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley, in his evidence before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, summed up the situation in the following words:—
"We cannot consider ourselves properly prepared for war when we have not got the officers we know we shall want in war."

It is common knowledge that, a few years ago, a deficiency in the reserve of ammunition brought about the downfall of a Government; but the more glaring deficiency, viz., that of officers to command the men intended to use that ammunition, escaped notice. The problem was full of intricacies; and it became a veritable nightmare to successive Secretaries of State. None found a solution for it; possibly because each one feared to ask for the money which he knew was alone capable of clearing up the situation. Consequently, the matter was secured with red tape, docketed, and placed in a pigeon-hole, until there should be leisure for its consideration. There it remained until a few months ago, when a War Office Committee was appointed to deal with the whole question; and there is every reason to hope that the labours of that Committee will bear good fruit.

Still, it is to be feared that, however much in earnest the present Secretary of State may be, however much he may strive to cope with the difficulty, he will fail to convince the nation that it is as impossible to create a Reserve of Officers without money, as it is to make an omelette without eggs.

Aware of such facts, it would be an obvious waste of time for anyone to formulate a model scheme for the organisation and maintenance of a Reserve of Officers, and, at the same time, to disregard the cost. In any scheme put forward, the cost must be most carefully weighed; for on it depends entirely the feasibility of the scheme. Above all things, there must be economy. It is necessary to work on the most cheese-paring lines, obtaining for nothing all that is possible, paying the minimum for such services as cannot be obtained gratis, and securing for a pittance the best article one can. This, nowadays, is what a business nation considers sound business. But is it business-like to be content to live in the present, and to refuse to build for futurity? Other nations do not think so; and were it not for the fact that, in military as well as in many other affairs, Great Britain prides herself on her "splendid

isolation," she might gain enlightenment from the methods adopted by her Continental neighbours or by her war-experienced ally of the Far East.

An organisation which is good enough for other armies might be good enough for our own army. At any rate, we could pick our neighbours' brains, assimilate their views, and thus construct from their experience a scheme suited to our own requirements. Unfortunately, Great Britain is debarred from acquiring knowledge from foreign nations in most matters of military organisation, because a machinery created for conscription, or for universal military service, cannot be wholly applied to a system of voluntary service. Where every able-bodied man has been trained as a soldier, the organisation of a Reserve is simplicity itself—especially when service in it can be made compulsory; but, where trained soldiers outside the Regular Army are scarce, it is necessary to look about for men, who either have been professional soldiers, or are capable and desirous of being trained up to the level of professional soldiers.

As things are, we learn from foreign armies only one item of value relating to a Reserve of Officers, viz., the minimum initial training considered to be necessary for a Reserve officer, in order to fit him to take his place in the commissioned ranks of the Regular Army, on mobilisation for war. Conditions, of course, vary in the different Continental armies, and in the Japanese Army; but, in all, a man must have served for at least one year *in the ranks* of the Regular Army before he is deemed eligible for a commission in the Reserve.

It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the subject of this essay should have been selected for this particular year, since the military system of Great Britain is, at the present moment, in process of reconstruction, and full details of its future have not yet been made public. Under such circumstances, it is by no means easy to devise a scheme likely to fit in with a system, the particulars of which are only partially known. At the same time, it would be futile to discuss organisations which are certain, within a few months, to be obsolete; and it would be equally futile to strike out an entirely new line and launch a scheme based on no existing or prospective system of organisation.

The best scheme, I take it, is that one which has the greatest likelihood of being, sooner or later, adopted by the military authorities. But here, again, a difficulty arises; for a body of experts has recently presented, to the Secretary of State for War, a scheme for the organisation of a Reserve of Officers for the Regular Army at home, and we do not know whether it has been accepted in its entirety, or what parts, if any, have been rejected.

Taking all these matters into consideration, I have decided, in my proposals, to steer a middle course, neither drifting before the wind of other people's opinions, nor defying the current of military re-organisation.

II.

THE PAST AND THE PRESENT.

In discussing the means of solving any military problem, it is usual to quote from history, in order to show to what extent the writer's views are supported by the teachings of the past. But history is of assistance only when similar situations can be compared, and in the case of a British Reserve of Officers, is of little real practical value, because, strangely enough, a Reserve for the British Army is a comparatively modern innovation.

From the infancy of the Army until 27 years ago, there existed no official Reserve of Officers for the Regular forces. In days gone by the want of officers does not appear to have been seriously felt, and in subsequent ages England was never called upon to put out all her strength. Seldom do military chroniclers record any great dearth of officers for a British Army in the field. Even in the long struggle in the Peninsula, where bloody encounters were by no means infrequent, and where the rigours of campaigning ploughed deep into the ranks of the officers, Wellington did not complain about a paucity of officers, so much as about the lack of men for his officers to lead to the front. Yet, in the days of the Peninsular War and Waterloo, there was no Reserve of Officers (known as such); and the reason is not far to seek, for there were more officers on the active list of the army than, in the natural course of events, could possibly be used up. Each battalion on active service had a feeding battalion at home, kept up to full strength in officers of all ranks, so that for every officer at the front there was another officer of the same standing in England, ready, at a moment's notice, to take his place. It was certainly an expensive system, though otherwise it proved, on the whole, a success. At the same time, it must be admitted that, had a serious reverse necessitated the despatch of these feeding battalions to the seat of war, the system might well have proved a failure. As a matter of fact, it was never really put to the test, except in 1809, when several of the feeding battalions took part in the expedition to Walcheren, which, however, only lasted for a few months, and except when, as occasionally did happen, both battalions of some regiments were fighting in the Peninsula at the same time.

But the maintenance of a true Reserve of Officers was not then thought of. Indeed, all that took place was what would take place to-day, if Great Britain were engaged in a small war, and could ensure that every infantry battalion on service had her sister battalion, or a dépôt battalion, in England, prepared to make good casualties.

In the earlier Victorian wars and campaigns, since no attempt was made prior to the outbreak of war to provide for wastage, when officers were urgently needed to complete establishments, they were sent, as attached officers, either from other Regular regiments, or from the Auxiliary Forces. Fortunately,

until 1899, the military resources of Great Britain were never severely taxed, and officers could be spared for these duties. Nevertheless, the system was a bad one, the attached officers being strange to the men whom they commanded, and knowing nothing of the traditions of the regiment with which they were serving.

In 1880, a Reserve of Officers was first formed. It consisted of :—

- a. Officers retired on retired pay or gratuity from the Regular Army, and compulsorily placed in the Reserve of Officers.
- b. Officers retired from the Regular Army without retired pay or gratuity, and officers retired from the Militia, joining the Reserve of Officers voluntarily.
- c. Officers of Yeomanry and Volunteers voluntarily joining the Reserve of Officers, while still serving with the Yeomanry or Volunteers; and similar officers permitted to remain, under certain conditions, in the Reserve on retirement from the Yeomanry and Volunteers.
- d. Officers retired from the Indian Military Forces, voluntarily joining the Reserve of Officers.

The above officers held in the Reserve the rank in which they last served in the Regular Army or Militia; and in the case of Yeomanry and Volunteers, the rank of captain or subaltern according to age. It is unnecessary to enter more fully into the conditions of service, or qualifications required from officers joining the Reserve voluntarily, except to mention that officers who had not served in the Regular Army were forced to undergo annually, at their own expense, one month's training with a Regular unit.

The age fixed for compulsory retirement from the Reserve of Officers was for field officers, riding-masters, and quartermasters, 55; and for captains and subalterns, 50.

Later, an alteration was made in the case of Volunteer officers, who were not permitted to join the Reserve until after retirement from the Volunteers; and in 1903 service in South Africa with Imperial Yeomanry, Volunteers, etc., was accepted as a qualification for a commission in the Reserve, viz., for the rank of captain: not less than 12 months' service in South Africa, with the temporary rank of captain in the army; for the rank of lieutenant: not less than 6 months' service in South Africa, with the temporary rank of captain or lieutenant in the army. Previous to the institution of this service qualification, an ex-Auxiliary officer was required to have served seven years in the Auxiliary Forces to become a captain in the Reserve, and two years to become a lieutenant or second-lieutenant.

This, then, was the system which remained in force until this year (1907). That the authorities recognised the necessity

for maintaining a Reserve of Officers was something; but it is extraordinary that, although the shortcomings of the Reserve were fully appreciated, a quarter of a century was permitted to elapse before the matter received serious attention.

For twenty years the Reserve had been allowed to go to sleep, and few officers belonging to it imagined that they would ever be called out for service. Indeed, some ex-Regular officers were not even aware that they had been placed in the Reserve. Then came the war in South Africa, and the consequent drain on the resources of the Regular Army. For the first time, the want of an efficient Reserve of Officers was brought home to the authorities, and it is interesting to note what occurred.

Immediately prior to the outbreak of war (October, 1899), the number of British officers on the active list of the Regular Army, including cavalry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, infantry, and various departments, amounted to a total of 9,173, of which only a proportion were available for South Africa, the remainder being with their units on foreign service. The Reserve of Officers, of all ranks and branches of the service, at that time numbered 1,803.¹

From "Parliamentary Return CD., 900,"² we gather the following information concerning the employment in South Africa of Regular officers (exclusive of staff):—

In South Africa on 1st August, 1899	-	-	318
Reinforcements, 1st August, 1899 to 11th			
October, 1899 (outbreak of war):—			
1. From Home	-	-	280
2. From India	-	-	259
Further reinforcements from 11th October,			
1899, to end of July, 1900:—			
1. From Home and Colonies	-	5,748	
2. From India	-	-	132
Further reinforcements from 1st August,			
1900, to 30th April, 1901:—			
From Home and Colonies	-	1,157	
Further reinforcements from 1st May, 1901,			
to 31st December, 1901:—			
1. From Home and Colonies	-	1,244	
2. From India	-	-	108
Further reinforcements from 1st January,			
1902, to 31st May, 1902:—			
1. From Home and Colonies	-	777	
2. From India	-	-	69
Total			
	-	-	10,092

¹ "Official History of the War in South Africa." Vol. 1.

² Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence, p. 97.

When the Expeditionary Force was mobilised in the first instance, a great many officers were required to complete it up to war strength. Officers were taken from staff appointments at home, in order to fill vacancies on the headquarter and divisional staffs of the Expeditionary Force; seconded officers threw up their appointments, and many students at the Staff College abandoned their studies, so that they might accompany their regiments on active service. Additional officers were required for mounted infantry and special service of various kinds. But, since it was thought that within six months the Expeditionary Force would have returned to England, no serious dislocation of the machinery at home was anticipated.

So soon, however, as it was discovered that large reinforcements would be required, the paucity of officers presented grave difficulties. The Staff College was closed, thus setting free some 50 officers; Woolwich and Sandhurst furnished, from time to time, batches of partially trained cadets to officer the junior ranks; officers at regimental dépôts were ordered to join their units, on being relieved by Militia officers and officers of the Reserve; and lastly, when Militia battalions were mobilised, and when every Volunteer and Yeomanry officer of any value had gone to the front, the last available officer of the Reserve was called up, and commissions in the junior ranks of the Regular Army were given, without examination, to practically any young gentleman who could obtain a certificate of good character from his schoolmaster. The source of supply was well-nigh exhausted, and had the war continued for another twelve months, would, in all probability, have run dry.

Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, speaking before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, said:—"The administration of the army at home, outside and apart from the War Office, practically ceased in the war because we had no officers left."

The figures quoted above with reference to the strength of the Reserve of Officers on the outbreak of war, are misleading. Nominally there were 1,803 officers, but they were of all ranks and ages, and even if all of them had been willing to answer the call to arms, the services of a great many could not have been utilised. The majority of the officers of the Reserve were ex-Regular officers, compulsorily drafted into the Reserve on retirement. To retire on a gratuity, an officer was required to have at least 12 years' service; to retire on retired pay, at least 15 years. But the number of Reserve officers in these categories was small. Few retired before they had 20 years' service, and many after they had commanded battalions. Consequently, there were no subalterns, and very few captains, while field officers (and especially lieut.-colonels and brevet-colonels) abounded. But field officers were the officers least wanted for regimental duty, as casualties in the higher ranks would, of course, always be filled up by promotion in the regiment.

Again, although an officer was entered on the list of the Reserve as a captain or lieutenant, according to his rank on retirement from the Regular Army, it did not follow that he was still capable of performing the duties of a captain or subaltern. For instance, he might have retired as a captain when 35 years of age, and be called out as a captain when 48 years of age, without ever having seen a soldier in the interval. Several officers of this description were actually called up in 1900, and sent to regimental depôts for duty, finding themselves junior to officers who had not joined the army when they themselves retired from it.

There were also other defects in the system. There was on paper a Reserve of Officers, consisting of ex-Regular, ex-Militia, and ex-Volunteer officers of varying ranks and ages. There were very few ex-Auxiliary officers, and practically the Reserve available was composed of officers retired from the Regular Army, with a liability to remain in the Reserve up to the age of 50 if a captain or subaltern, and up to the age of 55 if a field-officer. But, even although the officers' names were on the list, and they could be ordered to come up for duty, the means of enforcing the order were deficient. Certainly, the Secretary of State for War could withhold an officer's retired pay, for failure to fulfil his engagement; but, in the case of an officer retired on a gratuity, the money might have been spent. On this subject, Sir Evelyn Wood, before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, said:—

“ We called up many men against their will, and some men used to come, or send piteous appeals, that they were in business of various kinds, and they had been called back and were being ruined. These men were not likely to work well. . . . They were supposed to drill soldiers, train them in outpost duties, and, in fact, fit them for war; and many of them had not been to war for a great number of years practically there were no subalterns in the Reserve, only captains and majors.”

From this statement it is evident that the War Office considered that the Reserve of Officers was a broken reed. Many officers, of course, responded to the call willingly enough, and did yeoman service in helping to keep the military machinery at home in working order; but they constituted in no sense of the word a Reserve for war. A few, *i.e.*, the younger men, who had been but a short time in the Reserve, went to South Africa, and it was of that stamp of man that the greater part, if not the whole, of the Reserve should have been composed.

From Mr. Haldane's Memorandum, issued as a Parliamentary Paper, on the 22nd August, 1907, it would seem that a certain number of Militia officers below the rank of lieutenant-colonel are, in future, to be known as Regular officers, presumably to form part of the Reserve of Officers for the Regular Army. What their duties are to be is not made clear, but possibly they are intended only to be used with reinforcing

drafts from their Militia battalions, or with their battalions, if employed as units in war. In reality, this does not affect the issue, until the Expeditionary Force has gone abroad, and until it has used up all available Regular reservists of the rank and file. If there were an absolute certainty that the Militia battalions would not be required to reinforce the Expeditionary Force, then perhaps the services of some of these officers might be utilised with Regular battalions or dépôts at home. Should the names of these officers appear in the Army List, as forming part of the Reserve of Officers for the Regular Army, it may lull the public into a false sense of security, but it will not add one more true and efficient Reserve officer to the list. And, after all, what number of officers will it be possible to thus name Regular officers? The Military Secretary stated, at the beginning of this year, that in the infantry battalions of the Militia there were only 1,823 officers of all grades; and the Secretary of State does not propose to make Regular officers of more than one-half of the majors and captains, or of "anything like one-half of the subaltern officers."

Of greater interest, however, than this proposal to utilise the services of Militia officers, are the recommendations of the War Office Committee recently appointed to consider the problem of the organisation of a Reserve of Officers.

III.

THE WAR OFFICE COMMITTEE OF 1906-1907.

In August, 1906, a Committee was appointed by the Army Council, the following being the Terms of Reference:—

1. To consider the various schemes for the creation of a Reserve of Officers which have been submitted to the Army Council, and to report upon the methods best suited to supply the large deficiency of Officers now existing.
2. In formulating the report particular regard should be paid to the effect upon the Auxiliary Forces (and more especially upon the Militia) of any proposals for the formation of a Reserve of Officers liable to be called up and to serve abroad in case of emergency, and to the necessity of completing these arms of their proper establishment of officers.

In February, 1907, the Committee issued their Interim Report, from which we learn the conclusions at which they arrived. To anyone engaged in planning out the details connected with the creation and maintenance of a Reserve of Officers, this Report is not only of great assistance, but also of vital consequence; because, even if the recommendations of the Committee be not adopted by the Army Council *en bloc*, some of

them will certainly be adopted. It is, therefore, necessary to take cognizance of the Committee's proposals, and thus avoid the possibility of running counter to them. I propose first to give a summary of the contents of the Report, and then to offer a few remarks on such matters as appear to me to be likely to benefit by revision.

The Report opens with a statement of existing deficiencies, which are made clear by two tables.¹ One, prepared by the Military Secretary, deals with the deficiencies in the commissioned ranks of the Regular Army, on the mobilisation of an Expeditionary Force; while the other shows the shortage of officers in the peace establishment of the Militia and Volunteers.

Then follows a brief account of the systems adopted by foreign Powers (Russia, Germany, France, and Japan), and it is pointed out that, except in France, the main source of supply for the Reserve of Officers is the "One-year Volunteer."

The Committee accept the general principles of the methods in force in foreign armies, "but with material modifications due to the special circumstances of our case," and they state their opinions as follows:—(1) That the organisation of the British Army differs from that of foreign armies, in that the Auxiliary Forces do not feed the Regular Army automatically, but the two forces stand side by side, and consequently both must be recruited from the same source; (2) That under a voluntary system Reserve officers must serve as commissioned officers from the first, and not in the ranks; inducements must be offered to them, and everything must be done to make their training as easy and elastic as possible; (3) That School Cadet Corps and University Volunteer Corps present a valuable means of training prospective Reserve officers.

These school and university corps form the basis of the Committee's proposals, and the greater part of the remainder of the Report is occupied in explaining how an efficient Reserve of Officers can be organised from this source.

The term "Reserve of Officers," it is suggested, should be abolished, and for it "The Supplementary List" substituted, an officer of the Reserve being called a "Supplementary Officer."

Supplementary Officers to undergo one year's preparatory training with a unit, followed by a period of liability to recall, viz. :—a fortnight at annual or biennial intervals; to undertake to serve, on the occurrence of a national emergency, in whichever branch of the Service they select; and to be supplementary to the permanent officers of a specified regiment, corps, or department.

Exemptions from the full year's preparatory training to be as follows:—A certificate of proficiency obtained in a school cadet corps as equivalent to four months' training; a further certificate obtained from a University corps as equivalent to a further four months' training. Thus, the holder of the one

¹ Reprinted in the Appendix hereto.

certificate would have to perform eight months' training with a Regular unit, while the holder of the two certificates would have to perform only four months' preparatory training.

Proceeding to elaborate the scheme for utilising the school and university corps for the development of a proper system of progressive military instruction, the Committee propose to reconstruct these corps into an Officers' Training Corps, of which the following is an outline:—

The Officers' Training Corps to be a distinct body, unconnected with the Auxiliary Forces or county organisations; to be divided into a Senior Division, consisting of University Corps, and a Junior Division, consisting of School Cadet Corps; but each such corps to retain its individuality, name, and traditions.

School Corps to remain, as at present, under the control of the Headmaster, who should report direct to the War Office; endeavours to be made to improve and standardise the military training; and Certificates A to be granted to school cadets who pass satisfactory examinations, showing that they have attained to a degree of proficiency equivalent to that of an efficient second-lieutenant of Volunteers.

University Corps to continue the work begun at the Public Schools, and all Universities and University Colleges to establish Schools of Instruction, for theoretical training; the members of these corps to have the status of cadets at Woolwich and Sandhurst, and Certificate B to be granted to those, who, having obtained Certificate A, and being "efficient" for two years, pass examinations in practical and theoretical subjects up to the standard required of Sandhurst cadets after six months' residence.

A system of registration to be established, so that members of School Cadet Corps may not be lost sight of on leaving school; and persuasion to be used to induce holders of certificates to eventually join the Supplementary List or the Auxiliary Forces.

Having arranged the details of organisation of the Officers' Training Corps, the Committee proceed to deal with the question of the formation of the Supplementary List (Reserve of Officers).

All Supplementary Officers to belong to the Supplementary Establishment of particular regiments, corps, or departments, whose commanding officers should be held responsible for their selection.

No Supplementary Officer to be required to bind himself for long periods of liability, or to perform more than very brief subsequent periods of training.

The Committee recommend the following general terms with regard to the cavalry, infantry, and artillery:—

Age of entry, 19 to 25.

The Supplementary Officer to agree to be liable for one year from the completion of his preliminary training; such

liability being renewable, from year to year, up to the age of 35.

On joining, to be gazetted second-lieutenant on probation, the commission being confirmed at the end of the training.

To wear the uniform of his regiment or corps, but not to be called upon to pay the authorised mess contribution.

"Refresher" trainings of a fortnight, annually, for the first four years, biennially afterwards.

Promotion from second-lieutenant to lieutenant after five years, and to captain after ten years.

Retaining fee of £20, payable on completion of each year of liability.

Outfit allowance of £40, on joining.

Compensation allowance of £50, in the event of being called out for active service on emergency.

In addition to the above, a holder of the two Certificates (A and B) to receive a gratuity of £35, at the end of his first training.

Furthermore, the Committee suggest the advisability of granting permanent commissions in the Regular Army to Supplementary Officers, if called out on mobilisation, and if recommended by their commanding officers. Such permanent commissions to be in the rank which the Supplementary Officer holds at the time, and to be given after the supply from Sandhurst, Woolwich, and the Universities has been exhausted.

The pay of Supplementary Officers, when training with Regular units, to be that of officers of the Regular Army of the same rank, with mess allowance at four shillings a day, as well as the usual allowances for lodging, fuel, and light, and field allowance, as paid to Regular officers.

Worked out in detail, the cost of a second-lieutenant on the Supplementary List for the first year would be as follows:—

(a) If trained for 12 months £214
(b) If holding Certificate A £156
(c) If holding Certificates A and B £133

The same officers attending subsequent "refresher" courses would cost £30 per annum each.

Rough estimate of the approximate annual cost of the training machinery for Supplementary Officers at Public Schools and Universities, £23,200.

The Committee calculate that, when the scheme has been in working order for eight years, the average cost per annum will have amounted to £180,000, for which sum the following will be forthcoming:—

Supplementary Officers ... 2,000

Auxiliary Officers ... 5,000

And in addition:—

Under training at Schools and Universities, and of an age to serve at once, 2,400. Men trained in the

Officers' Training Corps and who have not joined the Supplementary List or the Auxiliary Forces, 5,200.

As concerns the Supplementary Officers alone, 2,000 will be turned out in six years, at an average cost of £130,000 per annum.

With regard to the Technical and Administrative Services, it is proposed to follow the same general system as above for Supplementary Officers for the Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps, and Royal Army Medical Corps, some slight modifications being suggested in each case.

A candidate for the Royal Engineers to be required to undergo special instruction, and, if necessary, an extra four months' course as a Supplementary Officer.

Candidates for the Army Service Corps to be selected from men possessing a business training, in which case their preliminary training as Supplementary Officers need not exceed two months, and their "refresher" courses a fortnight every three years. The outfit allowance to be reduced to £10.

For the Royal Army Medical Corps a candidate to be specially trained and to take a special certificate at the University in military medical administration; as a Supplementary Officer, to be attached to a regular hospital or medical unit for not more than two months (less one quarter for Certificate A, or less one half for Certificates A and B). No "refresher" courses; but, before promotion at the end of five years, to undergo a two months' course at the Royal Army Medical College, London. £10 outfit allowance, but no mess allowance.

Supplementary Officers of the Army Veterinary Corps to be selected from Veterinary Colleges or from duly qualified veterinary surgeons. To enter at the age of 21, and retire at 35. To undergo two months' course of instruction at Aldershot, or elsewhere. £10 outfit allowance, but no mess allowance.

Officers of the Regular Army, who have retired without retired pay or gratuity, to be eligible to join the Supplementary List up to the age of 35, on the same conditions as other Supplementary Officers in the matter of the retaining fee and "refresher" courses, but not to receive any gratuity or outfit allowance. To join in the rank which they held on retirement.

A certain number of pensioned warrant and non-commissioned officers to be permitted to register their names for commissions as quartermasters on mobilisation. To receive a retaining fee of £5 per annum.

Units of the Auxiliary Forces to be permitted to guarantee a quota of their officers for service with the Regular Army in war, not to exceed four captains and subalterns per battalion of Auxiliary infantry, and subject to the condition that the Auxiliary unit is able to recruit a corresponding number of captains and subalterns supernumerary to establishment.

REMARKS ON THE SCHEME OF THE WAR OFFICE COMMITTEE.

The task set the Committee was to evolve a scheme whereby 4,400 junior officers could be provided for the Regular Army in the event of war; as well as 4,000 for the Auxiliary Forces, to complete to the authorised peace establishment.

Had the Committee not been called upon to consider the question of the Auxiliary Forces, they would possibly have offered somewhat different suggestions; but, in any case, they would doubtless have adhered to the statement that "the number of officers required can only be produced from the growing manhood of the nation."

The Committee's Report makes no mention of the existing Reserve of Officers (principally retired Regular officers, liable to service on emergency); and it may be assumed, since they are included as available in the Military Secretary's return, that the Committee intended them to remain liable, as hitherto.

A footnote in the Interim Report explains the reason for the preference of the term "Supplementary List" to the term "Reserve of Officers." It is a small matter, with which little fault can be found; but, perhaps, it might be possible to invent for the officers some name less cumbrous and more attractive than "Supplementary Officers."

The idea of the creation of an Officers' Training Corps in two divisions is excellent, and, if brought to perfection, must, in the course of time, produce valuable results. There is, however, to my mind, a weak point in the scheme, viz.: that it will not reach maturity for *six years*, and at the end of that time it will only yield 2,000 Supplementary Officers. Now, six years is a long life for any military scheme, and in estimating the cost some shorter period should have been taken. Money cannot be voted or set aside for six years, and used as required. £130,000 (the estimated *average* annual expenditure) will not go anywhere near covering the cost of the working of the scheme in any one of the first few years; so that it would run the risk of being wrecked for want of money.

Assuming that the money and the men will be forthcoming, there are still two matters of detail which are open to criticism—the pecuniary inducements, and the periods of training.

Taking the case of the Supplementary Officer who holds no certificates and who is required to put in twelve months' preparatory training, we find that his pay and allowances will amount to £214 for the year, *i.e.*, more than double what is paid to a second-lieutenant of the Regular Army. Moreover, the Supplementary Officer will not pay the mess contribution or the various subscriptions required to be paid by other officers of the regiment. It may be argued that he cannot be obtained for a lower wage. That may be so. Nevertheless, the fact will remain that an amateur, learning his work, will be paid £214, while a professional soldier, who may have seen service in the field, will be drawing less than £100. But, apart from the evident injustice thereby inflicted on the Regular officer, this pecuniary

inducement is a dangerous experiment. It is quite possible that it may lead to the establishment of a new class of what may be termed "undesirable," resulting in the defeat of one chief object of the scheme, viz.: to secure efficient officers. One must remember that, each year, a large number of candidates fail, in the educational test, to obtain commissions in the Regular Army, by way of both Sandhurst and the Militia; and, since they never had any other profession in view, their failure leaves them stranded. Now, there will be nothing to prevent these men from joining the Supplementary List. Hard pressed for something to do, they will be only too willing to accept the offer of commissions as Supplementary Officers, more especially as they will be paid considerably more during their first year than they could hope to earn in any other profession.

This, of course, can be obviated by the introduction of an educational test for the prospective Supplementary Officer.

The length of training suggested by the Committee is, I think, inadequate, unless the preparatory period spent with a Regular unit be divided into special and rigorous courses of instruction in various subjects. The value of attachment to a Regular unit for four, eight, or twelve months, as the case might be, would depend entirely on the service which the unit happened to be performing at the time. An infantry battalion, for instance, broken up into small detachments in Ireland, would be capable of affording little useful instruction to a young, attached officer. Furthermore, the fortnight's "refresher" course is wholly insufficient.

Before concluding these remarks, I would draw the reader's attention to the fact that the Committee were not required to deal with anything beyond the provision of officers to supply the existing deficiencies in the Reserve of the Home Army and in the Auxiliary Forces, and that consequently they did not consider the question of Reserve officers for the British Forces outside the United Kingdom, or for the Indian Army. They did, however, express a hope that the Colonies would co-operate in the scheme, and they proposed that Colonial officers should be posted, as Supplementary Officers, to units and corps of the Home Army.

IV.

MODERN REQUIREMENTS.

From what has already been said, it is evident that under existing regulations there are, in the Reserve of Officers as now constituted, plenty of senior officers, but an insufficient number of officers of junior rank. For the present, therefore, we need only consider the matter of the junior officers.

First, what numbers are required? Every two captains and subalterns of the Regular Army should have in the Reserve a "waiting-man," prepared, in time of war, to take the place of an officer who becomes a casualty; and immediately he is called

out to join the Regular Army another officer should take his place in the Reserve.

It is not easy to arrive at definite figures. We cannot tell beforehand how long a war will last; we cannot even say whether it will last for months or for years; we can do no more than approximate the monthly wastage. The suggestion of one junior officer in reserve for every two junior officers at the front may, at first sight, appear to be excessive, but it must be remembered that it allows for the promotion in a regiment of junior officers to make good casualties in the senior ranks, and it, therefore, covers all wastage. Moreover, in thus calculating, we include in the term wastage, officers taken away from the regiment for Staff and other duties at the seat of war.

Hence, to be efficient in numbers, the proportion of the Reserve of Officers in the junior ranks must be as one to two of the Regular Army. But it is not enough for the grand total to reach this proportion; each department and each regiment must have its own reserve intact and in this proportion.

Let us accept the figures of the Military Secretary as set forth in the Interim Report of the War Office Committee referred to above. On mobilisation, 4,965 officers are required for the Expeditionary Force; 2,826 for Depôts, &c., at home; and 572 other officers for Staff and miscellaneous services. Therefore, 8,363 officers of all branches of the Service are required at the actual moment of mobilisation, and the Military Secretary estimates twelve months' wastage at 2,875 officers. Total required to maintain the Expeditionary Force in the field for one year, 11,238 officers.

From the same source we learn that there are available (with units and depôts at home), 5,283 officers. So that the deficiency of officers in the Regular Army, if an Expeditionary Force were mobilised to-morrow, and if twelve months' wastage had to be provided for, would amount to practically 6,000. To meet this deficiency there is the existing Reserve of Officers, estimated to produce 1,536, which leaves a net deficiency of about 4,500 officers.

Now, these figures are based on the assumption that the Home Army alone is concerned in despatching and feeding the Expeditionary Force. Let us suppose, however, that war threatened on the outskirts of the Empire; that, for instance, India had to strain every effort to meet a European foe in Central Asia. How would such an event affect the British Army at home, and thus the Reserve of Officers? War with a European Power would, of course, necessitate the mobilisation of every available unit, and the calling up of every possible Reserve, since it is highly improbable that the theatre of war would be restricted to Central Asia. In the estimate of the deficiency in officers on mobilisation, no account was taken of the British troops in India, or of the British officers (serving with the native troops) of the Indian Army. Yet the wastage there can only be made good from home, and no estimate, therefore, can

be considered accurate, unless it includes officers required for India. Calculating in the same way as for the home Expeditionary Force, and allowing for twelve months' wastage, at least 2,000 additional officers would be required for India, irrespective of any additional units sent out as reinforcements. This brings the total deficiency of officers of the Regular Army in England and of the forces in India up to 8,000, *i.e.*, that number of officers, over and above those now on the active list, would be required forthwith, if, for example, India were threatened with a Russian invasion.

In a similar manner, by working out the possibilities of simultaneous embarrassments in two or more parts of the Empire, one might continue to multiply the requirements in officers, but to do so would perhaps serve no end other than to appal the reader, and make him think that any endeavour to meet the requirements will be hopeless.

Before dismissing the matter of numbers, however, it is necessary to arrive at something definite as to the bare requirements to enable the Expeditionary Force to keep its head above water. Turning again to the Military Secretary's figures, we discover the following facts concerning majors, captains, and subalterns of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery of the Expeditionary Force :—

Required to complete to war establishment	2,200
Allow for six months' wastage	... 1,300
Total required	... 3,500

For technical and administrative services there would be required on mobilisation 875 officers, with an additional 225 to meet six months' wastage; total, 1,100.

Therefore, if 4,600 Reserve officers for all branches of the service can be provided, the Expeditionary Force will be up to strength, and can be maintained at war strength for six months. But this still leaves India unprovided for.

Nor will quantity alone suffice. There must be quality also. Better an empty house than a bad tenant, and better a dearth of officers than a full supply of useless ones.

In this somewhat democratic age, perhaps it will be considered bold to state that officers must be drawn from a special class. The statement will be combated by the production of a list of distinguished British officers who have risen from the ranks. We all know that the marshal's baton is said to be hidden away in every soldier's knapsack; yet, if careful inquiries be made, it will be found that the majority of those who have hitherto obtained combatant commissions from the ranks, and have eventually become field officers, have been, by birth, of the same class as that from which the ordinary officer is drawn. It is not from "snobbishness" that one is forced to the opinion that the officer should be the social superior of the rank and file. Human nature has to be taken into account, and it is a

well-established fact that discipline is far better maintained in the British Army, even among old soldiers, by a mere boy who is an educated gentleman, than by a man of years, whom the soldier considers to be "no better than himself."

Writing of the American Civil War,¹ Colonel Henderson says, "The men resented obedience to those who were superior neither in social standing nor professional knowledge to themselves." Again, in more modern times, we have an object lesson given to us by the Boers. "Jealous of their democratic rights, conscious of their own individual value in a community so small, the rank and file were too ignorant of war to perceive the necessity of subordination."² On the other hand, there are some who see in the Swiss system a perfection of organisation—one in which the civilian is sunk in the soldier, and in which social position counts for nothing. There all begin as privates, and the officer gains his commission solely by military merit. But the Regular Army of Great Britain, with all its glorious traditions, can never accept the Swiss militia, excellent though it be, as a model. The British Reserve officers must be obtained from the class which supplies, and always has supplied, the commissioned ranks of the Regular Army.

The next requirement is efficiency. The Reserve Officer must be as efficient in every respect as the officer whose duties he may be called upon to perform. His age must be suitable; he must be physically fit; and in general education and in military knowledge he must be up to a high standard. Furthermore, if he be intended to fill a vacancy, or to replace a casualty, in one or other of the technical or administrative branches, he must be possessed of the requisite technical or administrative qualifications.

In the case of the Reserve of Officers for the cavalry, artillery, and infantry, a proportion should be of mature age and of military experience, in order that they may be able to replace captains of regiments. Otherwise, in the event of a protracted war, or of a severe engagement during a short campaign, a regiment might suffer so heavily in casualties among its majors and captains that the commands of companies, and similar units, would have to be relegated to very junior and inexperienced officers.

The profession of arms can no longer be treated lightly. War has become a science, and no nation can afford to entrust the lives of her soldiers to untrained and inexperienced officers. This is no new idea; for, upwards of a hundred years ago, those who thought at all about their profession began to see, in the haphazard commissioning of young gentlemen and in their lack of military training a source of weakness, and they made strenuous efforts to improve matters. Of this school of thought the master-mind was Sir John Moore, and to his untiring energy,

¹"The Science of War."

²"Official History of the War in South Africa." Vol. I.

in the early part of the nineteenth century, was undoubtedly due the change which came over the officers of the British Army. In his camps on the Kentish coast, he trained, for war, officers and men so methodically and so thoroughly, that his teachings, although devoted continuously to only three regiments, soon spread throughout the Army. What he did to improve the British officer is insufficiently realised, yet it requires but a little research to discover that he established the fact that previous training ensures success in war. Napier, the historian of the war in the Peninsula, has placed it on record that the officers of the three regiments trained by Sir John Moore proved by their subsequent achievements to what extent they benefited by their early training.

Under Moore's system, the officers, and more especially those of junior rank, learned not only their drill as soldiers, but also how to command and handle their men, and how to use their own judgment. They were trained by Sir John during the years 1803, 1804, and 1805, and they attained to so high a standard of efficiency that for the next ten years they were the finest body of officers in Europe. This is no idle boast, for they withstood the test of six years of warfare. "Their most marked characteristics were that when they were left alone, they almost invariably did the right thing; that they had no hesitation in assuming responsibility; that they could handle their regiment and companies, if necessary, as independent units; and that they consistently applied the great principle of mutual support."¹

I lay stress on this training of a century ago, for the reason that there are few other examples of the results attainable from continuous instruction, and for the reason that there seems to be a mischievous idea gaining ground that residence in barracks for a few days of the year will convert a civilian into a competent officer. Fitness for war cannot be thus produced; and, even though organisers, ever anxious for numbers, are careless of efficiency, the veriest tyro in the military art understands full well that previous training is essential to success, that lack of it is liable to lead to disaster, and that an untrained officer is no officer at all.

Some theorists there are who maintain that the science of war is not for officers of junior rank; and that, as far as infantry officers are concerned, commanders of small units, such as sections and companies, in modern warfare, will be called upon to do little more than obey orders and handle their men within a very limited area. It is asserted that in a battle front of thirty or forty miles, they will merely play the part of the fly on the wheel, and that for such work no very high training is necessary. Yet, it is impossible to believe that this can be so. Rather does the extension of the battle-front point to the belief that the junior British officer in future wars will have a far wider

¹ Henderson's "Science of War."

scope for the display of initiative, and a far wider area within which to manoeuvre his company, than he ever had before. However, not to labour the point, let us assume that company officers must be trained at any rate sufficiently to be able to look after their men in every possible situation—on the march, in the fight, on outpost duty, in camp, and so forth. And not only to look after them, but also to know them, and to lead them.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the multifarious duties of the officer of the Regular Army, on the courses which he is required to attend, or on the examinations which he is required to pass. Suffice it to say that he is always learning—not by fits and starts, but continuously. Each year, the number of text books increases; each day, new theories are ventilated, and call for deep study. But mere book study and barrack routine will not of themselves teach him to command men in the field. Only by constant practice, and by long intercourse with his men, can the officer hope to acquire that self-reliance which is necessary in order to be able to inspire with confidence those whom he would lead. By what method—short of enchantment, is it possible to take civilians, and suddenly transpose them into leaders of men? To attempt anything of the kind is the height of folly. Few civilians have opportunities of dealing with bodies of men, and nothing is more noticeable at field manoeuvres than the want of self-confidence displayed by volunteer officers in handling their companies.

It is in this matter of efficiency that the principal difficulty of organising a Reserve of Officers for the Regular Army lies. A high standard of excellence may never be reached by those officers of the Reserve who have never been soldiers by profession, but to aim at anything less than a high standard for all would probably result in no standard.

Against all this, students of military history may be inclined to quote the case of the officers who fought in the American Civil War. True, hundreds of civilians without military experience were given commissions, and were required to learn their duties in the rough school of war. Many, certainly, became leaders of the highest merit; but many more proved absolute failures, being unable to enforce discipline, and equally unable to inspire their men with confidence. Those who survived this severe test had to suffer many bitter experiences; they learned only in the face of the enemy what a trained officer would have learned in peace-time, and, doubtless, had occasion to regret their want of knowledge over and over again. The lesson taught in this particular by the Civil War is how *not* to officer an army.

To sum up the requirements: Treating the present Reserve of Officers as non-existent, the number of officers (of and below the rank of major) required is approximately as follows:—

1. To complete to war strength an Expeditionary Force despatched from home :—

For cavalry, infantry, and artillery	...	1,625
Additional for staff, miscellaneous services, etc.	...	575

Total cavalry, infantry, and artillery...	2,200	
Technical and administrative branches ...	875	_____

Grand total required to make good existing deficiencies ...	3,075	_____

2. Allowance for twelve months' wastage :—

For cavalry, infantry, and artillery	...	2,414
Technical and administrative branches ...	461	_____
Total for twelve months' wastage ...	2,875	

3. Total additional officers required to mobilise and keep in the field for twelve months an Expeditionary Force :—

For cavalry, infantry, and artillery	...	4,614
Technical and administrative branches ...	1,336	_____
Total for all services ...	5,950	

All these officers must be duly qualified as to age, physique, general and military education, and all must be ready, willing, and medically fit to take the field at once.

To devise a scheme by which such weighty requirements can be met necessitates a careful survey of the possible sources of supply.

V.

POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SUPPLY.

We now know what we want. We know the number of officers we require, and the purposes for which they are required; we know also the degree of efficiency to which they should have attained before being considered fit to hold commissions in the Reserve of Officers; and, lastly, we know that there is but one class from which they can be drawn. The sources of supply are, therefore, somewhat limited; yet it is certain that they contain ample raw material of the right sort, requiring only to be dug out and worked into shape.

The first source of supply—and hitherto the only one exploited—is the professional soldier. Were it possible to obtain a sufficient number of Regular officers of suitable rank and age, then all difficulties in the matter of a Reserve of Officers would be overcome. But the numbers that can be counted on as available from this source are no more than a drop in the ocean. We are told that the existing Reserve of Officers, of and below the rank of major, is good for 1,536 officers. I have already

remarked that these figures are erroneous, as they include majors superannuated from the Regular Army at the age of 48, majors who attained that rank 21 years ago, captains who have been in the Reserve for 25 years, and many others whose positions in the Reserve are an anomaly. It will be found, also, on referring to the Army List that many officers of the Reserve hold commissions in the Militia, are employed in Record Offices, as military clerks in the War Office, and in other Government appointments, from which their services could not be spared in time of war. Such men cannot be considered as available to make good casualties in the junior ranks of the Regular Army; some of the older men might be employed at depôts at home, and so set free younger men of the Regular Army. But to count on more than 1,000 men from this source would be a false reckoning. Let us say that we can depend upon 1,000 ex-Regular officers always being available for the Reserve of the cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and of course available forthwith to form a nucleus for the Reserve.

Further on I shall explain certain suggestions which I have to make with a view to increasing the number of Regular officers in the Reserve; but in order to obtain anything like the number of Reserve officers required it is necessary to go far afield and beat up every hedgerow.

In looking about for potential officers for the Reserve one has to consider the exigencies of the Auxiliary Forces. One must avoid as far as possible tapping any sources from which they obtain their officers. The Militia and Volunteers have never been able to complete up to even the peace establishment of officers, and at the beginning of this year there was a deficiency of some 4,000 officers. The Volunteers do not so much concern us as the Militia, for the Volunteer officer as a rule, is a business or professional man who, in a measure impelled by patriotism, regards volunteering as a recreation. He has no intention of exchanging his civil occupations for a military life; but at the same time, and to his credit be it said, he feels it to be the duty of every citizen to serve the State. He is willing to devote a certain amount of his leisure to military training, but he is unwilling to abandon at a moment's notice a profession or business on which he and his family are dependent for a living. It is, therefore, fair to assume that the men who until now have become officers in the Volunteers, and who will under the new system become officers in the Territorial Force, are not the men who would otherwise seek commissions in the Reserve of Officers.

With the young Militia officers, on the other hand, matters are different. Before joining the Militia they have no idea of entering business or of taking up any civil profession; and, in the generality of cases, they obtain commissions in the Militia for one or the other of the two following reasons: A very large percentage use the Militia merely as a stepping-stone to entering the Regular Army; many of these have failed

to pass the necessary examinations for Sandhurst or Woolwich within the prescribed limit of age, and, by joining the Militia, obtain, as it were, a new lease of life. As the number of commissions in the Regular Army offered to Militiamen is, however, limited, there are a great many unsuccessful candidates, of whom some few remain on in the Militia, while the rest drop out. It is obviously inadvisable to utilise the services of these failures for the Reserve of Officers, for they have proved their shortcomings in the matter of military knowledge as well as their deficiency in general education. The other junior officers in the Militia are, for the most part, men of means and leisure, who, either voluntarily or by persuasion, accept commissions in the Militia for patriotic or for county reasons. These recruits, however, are not as numerous now as formerly, and since their principal object in joining the Militia is, perhaps, to meet their county friends at the annual training, they would not be likely to be attracted towards the Reserve of Officers in preference to the Militia.

As the War Office Committee pointed out, there is but one fountain-head from which issues the stream of young men destined to become officers of the Regular Army, of the Militia, and of the Reserve of Officers. This fountain-head is the public school. The officer in the making is there, and if the lad is not intended for a commission in the Regular Army, then it should be impressed upon him from his earliest youth that it is his bounden duty to serve his country in the event of a national emergency; that, consequently, he should strive to fit himself for such service, and thus render himself worthy of the heritage which great Englishmen have built up for him. Fortunately, of late years, school corps have become popular, and by means of them much can be done. I need not go over the same ground as that trodden by the War Office Committee, for they arrived at their conclusions after the most careful deliberation, and after taking an immense amount of evidence. I am in full accord with their recommendations concerning the establishment of an Officers' Training Corps and certificates of efficiency; but I join issue with them over certain matters, to which I referred in my remarks on their proposals.

To return, however, to the point. What numbers are likely to be forthcoming for the Reserve of Officers from the Officers' Training Corps when in working order? No estimate of numbers from this source can be anything more than purely conjectural—a fact frankly admitted by the War Office Committee itself, although they formed a rough estimate of possibilities as follows:—

- 2,000 members of public school corps will leave school each year, after having taken Certificate A.
- 1,000 of these will go on to the Universities, and 600 will eventually take Certificate B.
- 1,000 will proceed direct into business or some profession, without having the opportunity of taking Certificate B.

But this estimate is not enough for our purpose. We want to discover the approximate number of ex-public school men, of suitable age, who would be willing to accept commissions in the Reserve of Officers *at once*, so as to be able to make a start with their training. I have little doubt that a notice in the Press, offering commissions to ex-public school men between the ages of 19 and 25, upon certain terms (say twelve months' training and £150), would meet with a wide response; and I am convinced that 1,000 eligible candidates could be selected in this manner. These 1,000 men would represent what has been lost during the past four or five years for want of a scheme. Subsequently, when the Officers' Training Corps was established, as advocated by the War Office Committee, the Reserve of Officers could be gradually expanded, until it ultimately reached its required strength.

The outcome of the War Office Committee's proposals is the provision of 2,000 men from this source within six years, which, added to the numbers now estimated as available for the three arms in the existing Reserve of Officers, *viz.*, 1,391, will yield, six years hence, a Reserve of 3,391 officers from all sources. But who can promise Great Britain six years of peace, during which she may set her house in order?

Now, I am sanguine enough to think that it will be possible to create, within one year, a Reserve of Officers for the cavalry, infantry, and artillery of the Regular Army to the number of 4,000; and I believe that by adopting a scheme similar to that set out by the War Office Committee we can increase that number by some 200 or 300 per annum. To obtain more than that number of efficient Reserve officers, without affecting the commissioned ranks of the Auxiliary Forces, I consider to be impracticable.

It remains to discuss the sources from which can be obtained Reserve officers for what are termed the technical and administrative branches of the Army. Each of these is distinct, and must be considered separately.

Reserve officers for the Royal Engineers require special qualifications and special training, but there must be hundreds of ex-public school men studying in the great workshops and laboratories for every branch of civil engineering, and it should not be difficult to induce a sufficient number of these men to accept commissions in the Reserve of Officers.

To complete the Army Service Corps, very few officers are needed, and they can be drawn from the same sources as supplies the combatant arms, being selected as suitable for special training with Army Service Corps units.

In the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, although it is necessary to find nearly 1,000 officers, the difficulty of organising and maintaining an efficient Reserve is likely to be caused only by the lack of sufficient inducement. There is an over-manned civil profession to draw upon, and hundreds of young doctors, before settling down to regular practice, consider it to

be part of their education to see the world. Passenger-carrying ocean steamers are eagerly sought for by these young medical men, who willingly give their services as ships' doctors for a voyage or two in return for accommodation, food, and, perhaps, out-of-pocket expenses. In all probability many of them would be equally willing on similar terms to be attached to military hospitals or medical units, and for a small retaining fee engage to come up, in case of emergency, within a fixed number of years.

For the Army Veterinary Corps the small number of Reserve officers required should be easily obtainable from young veterinary surgeons with limited country practices, or from graduates on leaving the veterinary colleges. Attachment to large military centres would doubtless be regarded as a means of acquiring professional knowledge, and thus welcomed by any who had not ready-made practices to step into.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to set forth the requirements for the creation and maintenance of a Reserve of Officers for the Regular Army, as well as the various sources of supply from which these requirements may be met. I say "may be" advisedly, for, with the exception of the nucleus derived from the existing Reserve of Officers, there is no certainty that any suggested source will prove equal to the demands with which it is desired to saddle it.

VI.

A RESERVE OF OFFICERS FOR THE COMBATANT ARMS OF THE REGULAR FORCES AT HOME.

In attempting now to arrive at conclusions and divulge what seems to me to be a rational scheme, I am confronted with two principal difficulties. In all schemes of military reform and reorganisation it is necessary, as I have pointed out before, to consider first the existing organisation, and secondly the cost of the new proposals. One cannot dig out fresh foundations and build up an entirely modern edifice. One is forced to be content with patchwork—with additions and repairs. Time will not permit of everything being begun *ab initio*, while the cost interferes with solid building.

Were anyone given a free hand and a blank cheque he could easily build up for the nation a Reserve of Officers which would never be found wanting, and which, moreover, would be ready for any emergency at once. Miserable fact though it be, money—or rather the want of it—hampers the carrying out of the most simple set of ideas. One arranges the details of an ideal organisation; then comes the calculation of its cost—and instantly one's dream vanishes.

In my scheme I assume that if the nation decides that the maintenance of a Reserve of Officers is necessary, it will be prepared to pay something for it. Exactly how much I cannot

say, for hitherto no sum has been set aside in peace time for the purpose. The only guide I have is the fact that the recent War Office Committee made mention of an annual expenditure of £130,000. Without tying myself down to so small a sum, I accept the figures as the maximum that will be granted willingly. It is necessary first of all to create a Reserve of Officers, and afterwards to consider how it can be expanded and maintained. Moreover, it is in my opinion essential that the newly-created Reserve should be available immediately, *i.e.*, within twelve months from the time that the scheme is first started.

I propose to divide the Reserve of Officers for the cavalry, artillery, and infantry of the Regular Army into two classes, *viz.* :—

Class A, to consist entirely of professional soldiers, *i.e.*, men who hold, or have held for five years, commissions in the Regular Army.

Class B, to consist of men, not included in the above category, who have received a certain amount of training, and who have reached a certain standard of military efficiency.

On the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force both classes would be called up at once, the officers of *Class A* being available, if required, to complete their units of the Regular Army up to war strength, while those of *Class B* would join for duty, either their own regiments if not forming part of the Expeditionary Force, or otherwise their regimental depôts. In the latter case they would be drafted out to their units on service as casualties occurred.

The chief merit claimed for this organisation is that, on mobilisation, the commissioned ranks of the Regular Army will be completed at the outset with professional soldiers, and at a cost which can hardly be considered excessive. I now proceed to discuss the scheme in detail.

CLASS A.

Strength, 2,500 officers (majors, captains, and subalterns).
Estimated cost, £91,000 per annum.

I.—*Officers Retired from the Regular Army on Retired Pay.*
Estimated number, 1,000.
Cost, *nil*.

These would, as now, be liable to re-call in times of emergency, unless on retirement or subsequently they were employed in Government appointments. The retired pay should be considered to be a retaining fee, at any rate up to a certain age or for a certain number of years. The existing regulations require considerable revision, for it is absurd to call up a man of 54 years of age who retired as a major at the age of 40 and set him to do the work which he did fourteen years before

and has never done since. Five years absence from military duty is sufficient to produce rust; and if a man desires to remain on the strength of the Reserve of Officers after that he should be required to go through a "refresher" course.

There is an idea that men serving by compulsion are likely to prove bad servants. Undoubtedly there will be some who, having retired to go into business, will be unwilling to come up, and will endeavour to evade their liability, but I am convinced that the majority of officers who have served in the Regular Army long enough to earn a pension are men who, in a national emergency, may be relied on to serve their country to the best of their abilities.

The officers coming under this head include major-generals, substantive colonels, brevet-colonels, lieut.-colonels, majors, and captains of not less than fifteen years' service.

Brevet-colonels and lieut.-colonels should be removed from the Reserve list five years after retirement from the Regular Army, unless in the meanwhile they have been employed with troops in the field or have done duty for at least a month with troops at peace manœuvres. In either of these cases the military authorities should have the power to permit the officers to remain in the Reserve at their own request for five years from the termination of such duties, provided that they are still under 55 years of age.

All these brevet-colonels and lieut.-colonels should be on one general list, and as far as possible should have allotted to them definite appointments, which on mobilisation for war they would take up, in order to set free men of the Regular Army on the active list. They should not be included, as heretofore, in the regimental Reserves, because it would be impossible to employ retired officers of this rank with regiments.

I have made mention of them, since under present regulations they are liable to re-call. But as it is improbable that appointments will be found for many of them, I do not include any of these senior officers in my scheme.

A major should be removed from the Reserve five years after retirement from the Regular Army or at the age of 48, whichever occurs first. During this period he should remain on the Reserve list of the Regular regiment in which he last served; but if, on the completion of his five years in the Reserve, he were still under 48, he should be allowed to present himself for the tactical examination for the rank of lieut.-colonel, on passing which he should be eligible for promotion to lieut.-colonel in the Reserve. He would then, if promoted, pass into the general list of brevet-colonels and lieut.-colonels of the Reserve of Officers, in which he would be able to remain voluntarily for a further period of five years.

Captains, like majors, should be removed from the Reserve after five years or on attaining the age of 45. But, if previous to whichever of these events occurred first, he had duly qualified for the rank of major, and had done duty with Regular troops

for one month of the five years, he should be eligible for promotion to the rank of major in the Reserve of his regiment.

2.—Officers Retired from the Regular Army on a Gratuity.

This class of retired officer has now practically ceased to exist. Under former regulations an officer whose first combatant commission bore date previous to the 26th August, 1889, could retire after 12 years' service on a gratuity of £1,200. Under existing regulations no gratuities are granted, but an officer with fifteen years' service may be permitted to retire on £120 per annum. Some few officers who retired on a gratuity may still, however, be within the limit of age for employment with the Reserve of Officers. Any such who have not yet been five years in the Reserve should be required to continue their liability to serve on the same conditions as officers retired on retired pay.

3.—Officers Retired from the Regular Army without Retired Pay.

Estimated number, 300.

Estimated cost, £12,600 per annum.

There must be many ex-Regular officers who retired without retired pay or gratuity, and who are still of an age suitable for the Reserve of Officers. Many of these are shown in the *Army List* as holding voluntary commissions in the Reserve, but inducements should be offered for the purpose of re-claiming as many as possible. The conditions for their appointment to the Reserve should be, that they are medically fit for active service, that they had served for at least five years as officers in the Regular Army, that they are under the age of 35, and that they do not hold commissions in the Auxiliary Forces.

They should be required to perform one month's duty per annum with a Regular regiment, and during that month should receive the pay and allowances of their rank, and a retaining fee of £30 per annum. The cost of 300 such officers per annum would be: pay, about £3,600, and retaining fee, £9,000. Total, £12,600.

4.—Officers of the Regular Army Seconded for Service in the Reserve of Officers.

Estimated number, 1,000.

Estimated cost, £70,000 per annum.

I consider it to be absolutely essential to the efficiency of a Reserve that it should contain a strong proportion of young officers, who are neither amateurs nor compulsory servants. I therefore propose to institute a system, the adoption of which appears to me to be likely to overcome the difficulty of obtaining a sufficiency of trained officers for the Reserve.

My suggestion is as follows:—

An officer of the Regular Army, who has completed not less than five years' service, and who is not eligible for retired

pay, to be permitted to be transferred to the Reserve of his regiment for a fixed period of not less than two nor more than five years, retaining his place in his regiment, and being seconded as for any other extra-regimental appointment.

The conditions for transfer would be :—

1. Recommendation of his commanding officer, who would certify that the applicant was in every respect a thoroughly capable officer.
2. The officer to have passed all necessary examinations for promotion to the next higher rank.

While seconded for service with the Reserve, the officer would be required to do duty with his regiment for one month each year, and would receive pay, if a captain, £80, if a lieutenant, £60 per annum, with the addition of the usual lodging, fuel, light, and field allowances during his month's annual training.

Under this system, the Reserve of Officers would receive a valuable supply of trained captains and lieutenants—professional soldiers. They would be part and parcel of their regiments, with which they would remain in touch.

5.—*Officers of Auxiliary Forces who Served in South Africa.*

Estimated number, 200.

Estimated cost, £8,400 per annum.

Although five years have elapsed since the conclusion of the war in South Africa, any officer in this category, who, at the present time holds a commission (under Article 649, R. W., 1906) in the Reserve of Officers, should be permitted to continue to serve in the Reserve, provided that he has been attached to a unit of the Regular Army for a month's training annually since joining the Reserve, and provided that he is under 35 years of age.

Such officers should receive, during their month's annual training, the pay and allowances of a Regular officer of their rank, and a retaining fee of £30 per annum.

Pay, about £2,400. Retaining fees, £6,000. Total, £8,400.

The above constitute Class A of the Reserve of Officers; and, as will have been noticed, this class is composed entirely of what may be termed professional soldiers. The advantage of encouraging these men, in preference to training civilians to do the same work, is, that one is able to do without the lengthy, and, consequently, costly, preliminary training, which must prove a stumbling-block to readily obtaining the requisite numbers.

The backbone of Class A is the seconded Regular officer, whose value to the Reserve cannot be over-estimated. By employing him, efficiency is ensured at the outset, and if he can be obtained for the suggested expenditure, the money will be

well spent. Unfortunately, it is impossible to foretell the numbers that would accept the proposed terms of service in the Reserve. It might be necessary to limit the numbers; or it might, on the other hand, be necessary to add to the inducements. If six officers per battalion of infantry, and other arms in the same proportion, were permitted to be seconded with the Reserve, the yield from this source would be about 1,000 officers. The annual cost would be, approximately, £70,000.

There is one drawback to this proposal, viz.: that to call away 1,000 officers at once might seriously affect the peace establishment of the Regular Army. But, after all, *ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*, and in preparedness for war the Regular Army would not suffer. 1,000 young officers would be required to take the place of those seconded in the first instance. Just at the present time this would create no great difficulty, since, owing to recent reductions of certain battalions, there are numbers of officers awaiting absorption, and the lack of vacancies in the junior ranks of the army has, for some little time past, necessitated cadets from the military colleges being kept waiting three or four months for commissions. In all probability, within six months, matters would right themselves; and even if it took longer, any temporary inconvenience experienced by regiments would be more than compensated for by the feeling that, in the event of emergency—however sudden—there was a solid Reserve in the background.

The policy of maintaining a Reserve of the rank and file up to a fixed strength has long since proved itself to be thoroughly sound, and I am convinced that it would be an equally sound policy to maintain a Reserve of professional officers, also up to a fixed strength.

To sum up Class A. The numbers and annual cost are approximately as follows:—

1,000 officers retired from the Regular Army on retired pay (including a few retired with gratuity). Cost, *nil*.

1,000 officers of the Regular Army, seconded for the Reserve of Officers. Cost, £70,000.

300 officers retired from the Regular Army without retired pay or gratuity. Cost, £12,600.

200 officers of Auxiliary Forces with South African service qualifications. Cost, £8,400.

Total, 2,500 officers. Cost, £91,000 per annum.

These 2,500 officers are sufficient to complete all requirements of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery on the mobilisation of an Expeditionary Force, both for the Regular Army at home and for the British units in India, if necessary.

Thus, Class A provides for immediate necessities; and Class B, as will be seen, provides for wastage for a certain length of time.

CLASS B.

Strength, 1,500 officers (second-lieutenants). Estimated cost, £150,000 for the first year, and £40,000 per annum subsequently.

In the formation of this class, it is necessary to take the raw material and work it up into an article which shall satisfy the requirements. The War Office Committee dealt fully with this matter, but the success of its scheme depends entirely on the preparatory training which it is proposed that the embryo Reserve officer shall receive. Even supposing that this preparatory training is carried out with all thoroughness, at its conclusion the young officer is but an amateur soldier, and fit only to perform the duties of the most junior second-lieutenant. Neither, as he goes on, will the two weeks' annual training benefit him to such an extent as to enable him to take the place in his regiment which his years and length of nominal service should demand. A Regular officer, with, say, three years' service, will look askance at an amateur coming in over his head in time of war. It is for such reasons as these that I am driven to the opinion that it is unsafe to rely entirely on the non-Regular officer for feeding the Reserve of the Regular Army in war.

As a second line, to be utilised for active service in the field only when the officers of Class A have been exhausted, these men of Class B will be invaluable. Moreover, between mobilisation and the exhaustion of Class A, they would be able to learn much by being attached to dépôts or other units at home. And they are an absolute necessity, for without them it is impossible to obtain the numbers required for an efficient Reserve.

I have already enumerated the principal sources from which these men may be expected to be obtained; but it is necessary to consider the time within which they will be forthcoming, and their cost.

Class B would include the following:—

1.—*Aspirant Regular Officers.*

Estimated number, 500.

Cost, *nil.*

These are Woolwich and Sandhurst cadets who have undergone six months of their course of instruction, and Militia candidates who have passed their educational test, and have served for two trainings. I estimate that 500 such men will always be available at the moment of mobilisation.¹ The transfer of the Militia candidates to the Regular Army would, of course, affect the Militia units to a slight degree; but since they are known to be birds-of-passage, their services with the Militia can never

¹ It must be remembered that war stops all voluntary retirement, and thus, ordinary peace wastage is reduced to a minimum.

be counted on after they have completed two trainings. The places of the Woolwich and Sandhurst cadets at those establishments would be filled up at once.

2.—Ex-Public Schoolmen, Specially Recruited.

Estimated number, 1,000.

Estimated cost, £150,000 for the first year, and £40,000 per annum subsequently.

I referred to these men when mentioning the sources of supply. They are necessary for the raising of a Reserve of Officers, and must form a part of it for the next six years or so. In the future, *i.e.*, when the Officers' Training Corps (as foreshadowed by the War Office Committee) has developed sufficiently to provide the requisite numbers, these men will no longer be recruited.

The terms and conditions which I suggest are as follows:—

- a. A candidate to be between the ages of 19 and 25, and not to be holding a commission in the Auxiliary Forces.
- b. To pass a medical examination and to produce a certificate of good conduct from his public school or university.
- c. To engage to serve for one year with a Regular unit, and to remain liable to be called up during the second year.
- d. After the second year, to re-engage, if he wishes, for a year at a time.
- e. To serve during the second, and in each subsequent year, with his Regular unit for one month, either continuously or in two periods of a fortnight each.
- f. To be gazetted second-lieutenant (on probation for six months) in a specified unit, and to wear the uniform of that unit.
- g. To receive, whenever serving with his unit, the pay and allowance granted to a Regular officer of his rank.
- h. Outfit allowance of £40 on first appointment.
- i. For each completed year, subsequent to the first year, to receive a retaining fee of £30.
- j. To be permitted to remain in the Reserve of Officers, if approved, up to the age of 35, receiving promotion to lieutenant after four years, and to captain after ten years, on passing the usual qualifying examinations.
- k. £50 compensation allowance if called up on mobilisation.

The cost of each officer for his first year would be: Outfit allowance, £40; pay and allowances (say), £110. Total, £150.

To sum up. Under this scheme for the first formation of a Reserve there will be available for the combatant arms in twelve months from the commencement :

Class A, 2,500.

Class B, 1,500.

Total, 4,000 trained officers, at a total cost of £241,000 for the year of formation.

These 4,000 officers would probably be sufficient to complete the Expeditionary Force to war strength, and to make good wastage for six months, as well as to feed the British units in India if necessary.

What loopholes for failure are there in this part of the scheme? The critic will doubtless point out many. He will say, as he has said of many another scheme, that it is optimistic, that it is based wholly on the hypothesis that the men will be forthcoming in the required numbers. I acknowledge that that is so, and under a voluntary system it must always be so. There is no absolute certainty; but, as I have shown, there is a very strong probability that the 4,000 officers will be obtained.

In one possibility of failure, however, I will disarm criticism by pointing out where the scheme may break down. I freely admit its liability to break down, but I deny that it can do so unless those responsible for its proper working are negligent.

It is essential for the success of the scheme that a careful watch be kept over the distribution of the 4,000 officers, in order to make certain that they are in the correct proportion to each of the three arms of the Service; and, furthermore, that each unit of cavalry and infantry always has its complement of Reserve officers. Responsibility for this should rest with the officer commanding the unit, who should report to headquarters whenever his Reserve list shows a deficiency. For the artillery Reserve there would be three lists: horse, field, and garrison, with perhaps a special list for ammunition columns. I regard it as a matter of great importance that every Reserve officer below the rank of lieut.-colonel should belong to, and should feel that he actually forms part of, a definite branch of the Royal Artillery, or a definite regiment of cavalry or infantry, and that he should, as far as possible, always train with his own regiment in order that he may know and be known by the officers and men with whom he will serve when called up on mobilisation. Furthermore, I am of opinion that the Monthly Army List should show the Reserve officers under the head of their regiments or corps. The names of those seconded could be printed in italics, with the prefix "i.e.s.," in their proper places in the regiment, while the other officers could appear in a separate list at the end of the active list of each regiment.

So far I have dealt only with the first step in the organisation of a Reserve for the combatant arms, and I have calculated

for the barest necessities. It is now necessary to find a means of expanding the Reserve, so that it may be capable of meeting at least twelve months' wastage; and for this expansion it is impossible to do better than accept the general principles of the War Office Committee's recommendations. Some of the details of their scheme, however, I would alter, and I propose that the terms and conditions for the Reserve officer emanating from the Officers' Training Corps shall be similar to those, as set forth a few pages back, for the 1,000 ex-public schoolmen, with the addition of the £35 gratuity to the holders of Certificates A and B.

These officers will belong to Class B of the Reserve of Officers, and whether holding certificates or not should be trained annually for one month. Their individual cost for the first year will be as follows:—

a. If trained for twelve months £150
b. If holding Certificate A £115
c. If holding Certificates A and B £112

In subsequent years the cost of all officers will be the same, viz., about £40 per annum each.

Now, as it must take some little time to inaugurate the Officers' Training Corps, it would be unwise to reckon on any trained officers being available from this source until the end of the second year from the commencement of the system. From that time it should be possible to obtain, each year, sufficient officers to expand, within six years, the Reserve for the combatant arms up to the numbers required to complete for twelve months' wastage (viz., 4,614).

Of the 600 officers thus obtained it may be assumed that 300 will have undergone the twelve months' course, 150 the eight months', and 150 the four months'. Under my scheme the cost of these 600 officers will be: for the first year of their training, £79,050, and for each of five subsequent years, £24,000,¹ which gives an expenditure, spread over the whole six years, of £199,050. The average annual cost of training the 600 Reserve officers will be, therefore, £33,175, to which must be added the annual cost of the maintenance of the Officers' Training Corps, as worked out by the War Office Committee, viz., £23,000; total, £56,175.

RECAPITULATION.

Numbers and Cost of the Reserve of Officers (Combatant Arms).

At the end of the first twelve months, 4,000 officers; cost, £241,000.

¹ In reality, this sum of £24,000 would be reached only in the last year of the period, but after that it would become constant, so long as the Officers' Training Corps was maintained.

At the end of six years, 4,600 officers; cost, £1,233,048. Average annual cost of 4,600 officers, £205,508 (approximately).¹

It will be remembered that the total number of officers required to complete the combatant arms on the mobilisation of an Expeditionary Force, and to make good wastage for twelve months was estimated to be 4,614. It may therefore be said that the scheme which I have endeavoured to explain above provides that in six years time the Reserve of Officers will be capable of meeting those requirements.

There must, of course, be some internal wastage from year to year, but when the Officers' Training Corps is well established, it should certainly yield more than the 100 trained combatant officers per annum, and in estimating the cost I have allowed a wide margin for men dropping out before completing six years.

VII.

A RESERVE OF OFFICERS FOR OTHER SERVICES AT HOME AND IN INDIA.

Technical and Administrative Branches.

In these are included Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, and Army Veterinary Department, for each of which special qualifications are necessary.

According to the Military Secretary's return, previously mentioned and printed in the Appendix, on the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force the active list of these corps is inadequate to meet the demands to the following extent:—

Army Service Corps, 65.

Royal Army Medical Corps, 761.

Army Veterinary Department, 50.

While the Royal Engineers is up to strength.

In addition to the above numbers the following would be required to meet twelve months' wastage:—

Royal Engineers, 103.

Army Service Corps, 94.

Royal Army Medical Corps, 215.

Army Veterinary Department, 32.

I have already spoken of the sources from which these men may, in the course of time, be obtained. The immediate need is a plan whereby the Expeditionary Force may be completed for war and maintained at war strength for even a few months. With the exception of the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, the difficulties do not seem to me to be insurmountable;

¹ For purposes of comparison, I have adopted the plan of the War Office Committee in striking an average for the six years.

and by adopting the same system as recommended for the combatant arms it should be possible to produce at the end of a year sufficient Reserve officers for the Royal Engineers and Army Service Corps to provide for at least six months' wastage. I estimate as follows :—

Royal Engineers.

Class A—Retired officers, serving in the Reserve compulsorily (as now), 25; cost, *nil*.

Seconded officers, 15, at £100 per annum; cost, £1,500. Total in Class A (professional soldiers), 40; cost, £1,500 per annum.

Class B—Ex-public schoolmen, specially recruited until the Officers' Training Corps is in full working order, 25.

These men would receive during their first year's training the usual outfit allowance of £40, and pay and allowances (including engineer pay) of a second-lieutenant—about £185 altogether. Total cost for the first year, £4,625.

In subsequent years their cost would be £1,125 per annum.

Average annual cost for each of the whole six years, £3,208 for the whole 65 officers.

Army Service Corps.

Class A—Retired officers, as above, 15; cost, *nil*.

Seconded officers, 5, at £80 per annum; cost, £400.

Total in Class A (professional soldiers), 20; cost, £400 per annum.

Class B—Ex-public schoolmen, specially recruited, 55; Cost for the first year, £10,450 (outfit allowance, pay, allowances, and corps pay).

Cost in subsequent years, £2,475 per annum.

With regard to the expansion of the Reserves of these two corps, the few officers required to complete up to the estimate for twelve months' wastage would doubtless be forthcoming within six years from the Officers' Training Corps, viz., for Royal Engineers, 38, and for Army Service Corps, 75. Their cost would be: for their first year, Royal Engineers, £7,030; and Army Service Corps, £14,250; and for each subsequent year, £1,710 and £3,225 respectively.

Therefore at the end of twelve months from the initiation of the scheme there will be in the Reserve of the Royal Engineers 65 officers, costing up till that time £6,125, and in the Reserve of the Army Service Corps 75 officers, costing £10,850.

Again, within six years the Royal Engineer Reserve will have reached (by means of the Officers' Training Corps) the

total of 103 officers and the Army Service Corps Reserve 150 officers. The full cost of the former for the whole six years will be £35,274, and the cost of the latter £56,196, or an annual average cost of £5,879 and £9,366 respectively.

Leaving the Royal Army Medical Corps to be discussed last, I will now deal with the Army Veterinary Department. In this case we can depend on no retired or seconded officers, and the deficiencies must be made good entirely from outside the Army, *i.e.*, from civilian veterinary surgeons.

I propose that the full number required for mobilisation and twelve months' wastage (viz., 82) should be obtained at once by advertising the following terms and conditions:—

Candidates to be between the ages of 21 and 30, to have taken a degree at a Veterinary College, and to engage to serve for a specified period, say two years.

To join the Army Veterinary Reserve as lieutenants (on probation for the first year), and to be eligible for promotion to the rank of captain after five years.

To be attached (for veterinary duties) to a military centre for six weeks during the first year, and for a fortnight annually afterwards.

To receive the pay and allowances of their rank in the Army Veterinary Department whenever attached for military duty, and £10 outfit allowance (service dress) on first appointment, as well as a retaining fee of £20 at the conclusion of each year's training, including the first year.

To retire at the age of 35.

The cost for the first year would be: Outfit allowance, £820; retaining fee, £1,640; pay and allowances, £2,440; total, £4,900. For each year afterwards the cost would be £2,450.

Calculating that each officer will continue to serve for six years, the total cost of the 82 Army Veterinary Reserve officers for that time will amount to £17,150, or an average annual cost of £2,858.

I now come to the Reserve for the Royal Army Medical Corps. The numbers required are very great, although, according to the Military Secretary's Return, we can reduce them by 342, as that number of civilians can be employed (presumably at depôts, etc., at home). After that deduction has been made it is necessary to provide 420 Reserve officers to complete the Expeditionary Force alone.

My proposals are as follows:—

I adopt the same system as for the combatant arms, employing a certain number of trained military men, and obtaining the remainder from outside.

Class A.

1. Retired officers, compulsorily serving in the Reserve (as now), 50; cost, *nil*.
2. Seconded officers, under conditions similar to those suggested for the combatant arms, 150, at £80 per annum each; cost, £12,000.
Total in Class A, 200 officers; cost, £12,000 per annum.

Class B.

350 to be obtained forthwith by making known the needs of the service, and the following conditions and terms:—

Candidates to be under 30 years of age, to have taken a medical degree at a University, and not to be holding commissions in the Auxiliary Forces.

To engage to be liable to serve for two years.

To join the Royal Army Medical Corps Reserve as lieutenants (on probation for one year) and to be eligible for promotion to the rank of captain after five years.

To be attached to a military hospital or a military medical unit for two months during the first year and for a fortnight each year subsequently.

To receive the pay and allowances of their rank whenever attached for duty as above; £20 outfit allowance on first joining, and a retaining fee of £25 a year at the conclusion of each year's training, including the first year.

To retire from the Reserve at the age of 35.

The cost of the first year for the 350 officers would be: Outfit allowance, £7,000; retaining fee, £8,750; pay and allowances, £14,700; total, £30,400. For each subsequent year the cost would be £12,250.

Calculating, as before, on the assumption that each officer will serve for six years, the total cost of Class B for the six years would be £91,650, or an average annual cost of £15,275.

In this manner 550 Reserve officers will be obtained for the Royal Army Medical Corps at an annual expenditure of £27,275, and these will be available within twelve months of the commencement of the scheme.

Such numbers would, however, only be sufficient to complete the Expeditionary Force and to meet wastage for about six months. Moreover, I have assumed that 342 civilian doctors, *i.e.*, local practitioners, can be obtained on the outbreak of war for hospital work at home, without interfering with their civil practice.

Even then the numbers for which I have estimated are inadequate to meet the requirements of a war lasting for more than six months; but it is fair to presume that another 200 officers will be available in the course of time from the Officers' Training Corps.

These 200 would cost in their first year of training £17,370, and for each year afterwards, £7,000. Average annual cost, if serving for six years, £8,728 per annum.

It is, perhaps, true that it is unnecessary to estimate for so large a number as 750 Reserve officers for the Royal Army Medical Corps, since the experience of the war in South Africa points to the probability of a great number of civilian doctors coming forward in the event of a national emergency. Yet, to trust to these gentlemen offering their services at the last moment is not to be prepared for war, for although they may be thoroughly efficient doctors, they would lack a knowledge of military matters and be ignorant of the characteristics of the British soldier.

Quartermasters of British Units.

I do not think it necessary to expend any money on the upkeep of a Reserve for quartermasters of the Regular Army, as casualties among those officers are best filled by the promotion of regimental warrant or non-commissioned officers. The fact, however, that the quartermaster of an infantry dépôt is also quartermaster of a Militia battalion might cause serious inconvenience to the dépôt in the event of the Militia battalion being mobilised and sent away from the dépôt. To overcome this difficulty I propose that on mobilisation the officer commanding the Militia unit shall be empowered to promote one of his permanent staff to the rank of quartermaster.

British Units Serving in India.

There are in India neither superfluous British officers nor other Englishmen available to replace casualties among officers of the Regular Army. Consequently, the only plan for supplying material to make good the wastage is to treat the British troops in India as part of an Expeditionary Force despatched from home.

As the Indian Government defrays the cost of its British garrison and pays for a fixed complement of serviceable officers, presumably the British Government is under a liability to provide for all casualties, and this can be done by transferring officers from the home battalions and dépôts, which in their turn would have to be filled up from the Reserve of Officers.

I confess that I see no other way of meeting the difficulty, although I admit that the feasibility of this plan is questionable in the case of a battalion in India having its sister battalion serving outside the United Kingdom. For instance, had the

forces in India been called upon to take the field against a European foe in Central Asia while the war was in progress in South Africa (1899-1902), the home authorities would have been hard-pressed to feed the Indian battalions with officers. When, however, England finds herself thus embarrassed, the breakdown of the voluntary system will become rudely apparent, and it may remain for the Colonies to save the Empire.

The Indian Army.

Worse still is the plight of the Indian Army, which has practically no Reserve of European Officers, and under present arrangements no means of forming a Reserve.

The officers of the Indian Army are, as a rule, men with little or no private means, who cannot afford to live in a British regiment, and who must therefore serve in India long enough to earn a pension sufficient to keep them for the rest of their lives. A Reserve formed of retired officers would therefore be composed entirely of senior officers. So that the officers most wanted, viz., captains and subalterns, would be very few—in fact, probably only those who had been forced to retire on account of ill-health.

The difficulty of establishing a Reserve of Officers for the Indian Army is much greater than is the case in the British Army, because not only must the Indian officer be as efficient in every respect as his brother officer of the British Service, but he must also have expert knowledge of native soldiers and be able to speak their languages. For this reason it is not possible to utilise the sources of supply which are available for swelling the commissioned ranks of the British Reserve; neither is it possible to find in India any civilians who, even if they could be spared from their civil occupations, would be suitable leaders of native troops.

The existing Indian Reserve of Officers, such as it is, is a negligible quantity, and there can be no idea of seconding officers, as proposed for the British Reserve, except at a prohibitive rate of pay. Again, a scheme such as the Officers' Training Corps is inapplicable to the Indian Army.

There remains, then, but one sound plan, viz., to augment the numbers of junior officers of all native regiments. This can only be done very gradually, otherwise the junior commissioned ranks of British units would be depleted, for under present arrangements Sandhurst and British corps in India furnish the young officers for the Indian Army, and the resources of Sandhurst are limited.

If 1,000 officers were added in this manner the cost to the Indian Government would be, roughly speaking, £200,000 per annum. And in my opinion by no cheaper method can a Reserve of Officers for the Indian Army be created.

Auxiliary Forces.

As the Auxiliary Forces are now being reorganised, and as their functions have not as yet been clearly defined, it is impossible to enter into details concerning the provision of a Reserve of Officers for the Militia and the projected Territorial Force.

According to the statistics given in the Appendix, the deficiency of Militia officers at the beginning of this year (1907) amounted to 1,000, and it may be regarded as fairly probable that in whatever way the Militia is reorganised, this deficiency will not be suddenly wiped off. It is, moreover, not a deficiency like that of the Regular Army, arising out of mobilisation requirements, but a solid shortage in the peace establishment. Until, therefore, the commissioned ranks of the Militia can be completed up to the bare peace time requirements it would be premature to talk of a Reserve.

The same may be said of the Volunteers, who at the beginning of the year were short of some 3,000 officers.

VIII.

CONCLUSION.

I do not pretend that the scheme which I have outlined in the foregoing pages contains anything very original, for in a circumscribed matter of this kind one cannot stray far from the beaten track. As I have shown, there are certain sources from which alone Reserve officers can be drawn. The sources are limited, and by no ordinary or extraordinary process can one squeeze out of them more than a certain number of officers. I have not been able to gather any reliable information concerning the average annual output from the public schools of the United Kingdom; but whatever it may be, it is certain that there must be a large percentage of boys who, for one reason or another, can never join any branch of the Home Army or Indian Army. There are, for example, the men destined to take Holy Orders, and the large number who go to the Colonies. From the remainder who might be available for commissions in the Reserve of Officers one must eliminate those who, by reason of physical or educational disabilities, are unfitted for a military life; those who intend to become officers of the Regular Army or of the Auxiliary Forces; and those who take up Government civil appointments, which they could not vacate in times of national emergency.

In my estimate of numbers likely to be forthcoming from the civil population I have relied on the figures furnished by the War Office Committee, whose members had exceptional opportunities for arriving at their conclusions. I have also followed the Committee's method of calculating expenditure.

Summarised in tabulated form, my scheme is as follows :—

I.—THE IMMEDIATE RESERVE.

Available Within One Year from the Adoption of the Scheme.

Branch of the Regular Army.	Number of Officers provided.	Approximate cost for the initial year.
Combatant Arms	4,000	241,000
Royal Engineers	65	6,125
Army Service Corps	75	10,850
Royal Army Medical Corps	550	42,400
Army Veterinary Department	82	4,900
Total	4,772	305,270

Details of Sources of Supply for the Above.

Source of Supply.	Combatant Arms.	Royal Engineers.	Army Service Corps.	Royal Army Medical Corps.	Army Veterinary Department.	Total.
Officers retired on retired pay ...	1,000	25	15	50	—	1,090
Officers retired without do. ...	300	—	—	—	—	300
Officers with S.A. War qualifications	200	—	—	—	—	200
Seconded Regular Officers ...	1,000	15	5	150	—	1,170
Aspirant Regular Officers	500	—	—	—	—	500
Ex-public Schoolmen (specially recruited) ...	1,000	25	55	—	—	1,080
Civil Surgeons (specially recruited) ...	—	—	—	350	—	350
Civil Veterinary Surgeons (do.) ...	—	—	—	—	82	82
Total ...	4,000	65	75	550	82	4,772

II.—THE PERMANENT RESERVE.

Available Within Six Years from the Adoption of the Scheme.

Branch of the Regular Army.	Number of Officers provided.	Average annual cost during the six years.
Combatant Arms	4,600	205,508
Royal Engineers	103	5,879
Army Service Corps	150	9,366
Royal Army Medical Corps	750	36,003
Army Veterinary Department	82	2,858
Total	5,685	259,614

Details of Expansion from the Immediate Reserve to the Permanent Reserve.

Source of Supply.	Combatant Arms.	Royal Engineers.	Army Service Corps.	Royal Army Medical Corps.	Army Veterinary Department.	Total.
Officers Training Corps	600	38	75	200	—	913

Now, of the 5,685 officers thus provided, 1,090 are officers retired on retired pay and 500 are aspirant Regular officers, so that the actual number of Reserve officers who will be paid as such amounts to 4,095. The cost of these 4,095 officers will be £259,614 per annum, or, in round numbers, 4,000 officers for £260,000, *i.e.*, £65 per annum per head¹—the identical amount arrived at by the War Office Committee.

It may be of interest to compare my scheme with that of the War Office Committee. I am not vain enough to imagine that my ideas are superior to those of the experts whose Interim Report was placed in the hands of the Secretary of State some months ago. Very possibly they weighed and considered every recommendation which I have put forward, and rejected many of them; but of that I know nothing. It may be that they were tied down to a certain annual expenditure, and that they were therefore forced to cut their coat according to their cloth. Yet the matter of cost cannot be more than a mere approximation, and the method of striking an average for six or eight years is, I think, far from satisfactory. However, that is really of very little consequence, the main point being that the Committee require £130,000 per annum to carry out their scheme, while I require £260,000 to carry out mine for the provision of double the number of officers. In the matter of *pro rata* cost, therefore, the two schemes stand on a level, and it rests with the nation to decide whether it will find the money for a complete Reserve of Officers or whether it will be content to remain only half prepared for war.

It will have been observed that I suggest that the annual "refresher" course shall last for a month instead of for a fortnight, as recommended by the War Office Committee. I consider this to be absolutely necessary for efficiency, and I

¹ The War Office Committee remarked in their Interim Report that it was a curious coincidence that the average cost per head of Supplementary Officers, trained for a whole year with their regiments, worked out at £65, and that Supplementary Officers trained through the eight months' and four months' courses also worked out at £65. Still more curious is it that my figures, arrived at in a totally different manner, should accidentally result in the same average cost per head, *viz.*, £65.

do not think that the additional fortnight will deter any man worth having from joining the Reserve. It is essential that the Service should be taken seriously, and not regarded merely as a pleasant holiday to be passed in the officers' mess.

But the great difference between my scheme and that of the War Office Committee is that I provide a Reserve of 4,772 officers for all branches of the Service at the end of *one year*, as against some 1,700, and that I provide within six years a Reserve of Officers to the full number required to complete the Expeditionary Force to war strength and to meet twelve months' wastage, whereas by the War Office Committee's scheme the reserve in six years' time will still show a deficiency of 2,000 officers.

The formation of a strong Reserve of efficient officers for immediate eventualities is, I maintain, of the greatest importance, and to "stiffen" that Reserve with professional soldiers is equally important.

In conclusion, I would remark that I have purposely omitted from my scheme all mention of Colonial officers, because I think that all Reserve officers for the home army should be resident in the United Kingdom, and because, in my judgment, it would be a weak policy to draw away the youth of the Colonies from the Colonial Forces. At the same time, I am fully alive to the necessity of bringing the Colonial troops more in touch with the Army of the mother country, and I would gladly see Colonial officers attached to regiments of the home army. To reckon them, however, as part of the Reserve of Officers for the Regular Army might lead, in the event of grave national emergency, to serious embarrassment.

We require when an emergency comes—and who can say that it may not come to-morrow?—to be able to muster on the spur of the moment the requisite number of trained officers. A long list of names on paper will not suffice, unless we know that each man will answer his name, and will be able to fall into his place forthwith.

"For want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For want of a horse the rider was lost,
For want of a rider the battle was lost."

APPENDICES.

I.

Table Prepared by the Military Secretary to Show the Deficiency in Officers of the Regular Army.

	Cavalry	Infantry	R.H. & F. A.	R.G.A.	R. E.	A. S. C.	R. A. M. C.	A. V. D.	A. O. D.	Total.
<i>Numbers required on Mobilisation :—</i>										
(a) For expeditionary force	327	2,256	668	36	263	354	1,873	114	74	4,965
(b) For depôts, &c., at home	238	1,294	265	289	194	51	382	13	100	2,826
Add wastage for 12 months...	227	1,764	401	22	104	94	215	32	16	2,875
<i>Total requirements</i>	792	5,314	1,334	347	561	499	1,470	159	190	10,666
<i>Numbers available</i>										
(a) With units at home	410	1,935	643	320	397	340	494	77	158	4,774
(b) At depôts at home	3	368	48	20	61	9	509
(c) Reserve of Officers ¹	219	988	71	113	35	17	70	...	23	1,536
<i>Total numbers available</i>	632	3,291	762	453	493	357	564	77	190	8,819
<i>Deficiency</i>	... ²	160	2,023	572	...	68	142	906	82	3,953
<i>Excess</i>	106	106
								Net deficiency	...	4,847

¹ Of this number 342 may be civilians.

² Only Officers of and below the rank of Major are included in these figures, which represent the estimated numbers that will be available.

³ No allowance is made in the figures given for Cavalry, for the Yeomanry contingent that will accompany the expeditionary force.

⁴ N.B.—In addition to the above deficiency provision must be made for the following services :—

- (a) Additional Officers required for the staff of the expeditionary force 45
- (b) To replace at home the staff that will accompany this force, etc ... 327
- (c) For miscellaneous services, e.g., remount purchasing officers, conductors, etc., say 200

572

Giving a total deficiency of 4,419 Officers.

II.

Auxiliary Forces.

The commissioned ranks of the Auxiliary Forces are also very much below their authorised establishment, as the following table shows :—

	Yeomanry.	Militia.				Volunteers.				Grand Total.		
		Artillery.	Engineers	Infantry.	R.A.M.C.	Total.	Artillery.	Engrs.	Infantry.			
Authorized establishment of Officers, exclusive of permanent staff	1,538	537	114	2,746	34	3,431	2,198	896	7,861	350	11,305	16,274
Existing numbers ...	1,232	395	98	1,823	24	2,340	1,663	701	6,243	194	8,801	12,373
Deficiency	306	142	16	923	10	1,091	535	195	1,618	156	2,504	3,901

In the tables* given in the two preceding paragraphs the figures for all the commissioned ranks are added together; the deficiencies may, however, be treated as deficiencies in the junior ranks, *i.e.*, in those of captain and subaltern, since the vacancies in the higher ranks would be filled by promotion.

* Reprinted from the Interim Report of the War Office Committee, referred to in the body of this paper.

THE HAGUE CONFERENCE AND NAVAL WAR.

*By the Rev. T. C. LAWRENCE, M.A., LL.D., Admiralty
Lecturer on International Law at the Royal Naval War
College, Portsmouth.*

On Wednesday, 5th February, 1908.

Rear-Admiral A. A. C. GALLOWAY, in the Chair.

THIS afternoon I have to deal in one short hour with the larger part of the proceedings of a great international assembly, which sat for more than four months. In order to perform this task, I propose first to give a short summary of the rules adopted at the Hague which have met with almost universal approval, and, secondly, to spend the greater part of our time on the provisions which are more or less disputable or incomplete. I must leave out entirely questions, like the immunity of private property from capture at sea, on which opinions were so hopelessly divided as to render a Convention or Declaration impossible. All the Hague Conventions are open for signature till June 30th, 1908, and a year longer is allowed for that which creates an International Prize Court. Great Britain has at present signed none of them; but there can be little doubt that she will accept the greater number. The rejection of one or two is, however, probable, unless she receives meanwhile assurances on some important points. I will lay special stress on these matters in the hope that a discussion here will help to clarify opinion, and assist those on whom the responsibility of a final decision rests.

But before we commence to consider them it is necessary to perform the pleasanter task of summarising those regulations which the civilised world welcomes with practical unanimity.

THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

First among them I place the wholesome provision that "hostilities must not commence without previous and explicit warning."¹ There is no subject in the whole length and breadth of International Law on which more hopeless nonsense has been spoken and written than that of declarations of war. Here at last we have sober sense joined with a due regard for the

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), p. 70.

obligations of honour and justice. What it is necessary to prevent is a treacherous attack—a bolt out of the blue launched by a Power which has not previously stated its grievances and intimated that it will use force if they are not redressed. A mere declaration of war would not necessarily give sufficient warning; for it might accompany, or even follow, the first act of hostility. Neither would its absence imply bad faith; for the State which struck the first blow might have informed its opponent diplomatically that it was about to resort to force. The Hague Conference went straight to the point when it made a previous warning obligatory, and provided that the warning "might take the form either of a reasoned declaration of war, or an ultimatum with conditional declaration." No rule was made that a certain fixed interval of time must elapse between the warning and the first act of hostility; but, as the German official memorandum points out,¹ the wording of the Convention forbids a complete surprise, provides for a clear indication of the date when a state of war supersedes a state of peace, and secures that reasons for the war shall be given formally and officially. Notice to neutral Powers is required, and they are not held bound by the obligations of neutrality until they receive such notice, or are aware otherwise of the existence of a state of war.² It is quite clear that these regulations do not deprive a well-prepared navy or army of the advantage of striking the first blow. Notice to your adversary that you are tired of negotiation and mean to fight is by no means the same thing as notice that on a given day and at a given hour you will attack at a given place.

ENEMY MERCHANTMEN AT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

When maritime States come to blows, the question at once arises whether the departure of such enemy merchantmen as may be found in their ports at the outbreak of hostilities is to be allowed, or whether they are to be seized. About the right to seize them there can be no doubt. As long as capture of private enemy property at sea is allowed at all, belligerent ports are among the properest places for effecting it. But for more than fifty years the interests of commerce have qualified the severities of warfare, and at the commencement of hostilities belligerents have granted, as an act of grace, a period during which enemy merchantmen might leave their ports in safety, if already in them, or, if on their way to them, might enter and leave. The extent of the grant has varied from time to time, as regards both the length of the period of grace and the completeness of the protection accorded to ship or cargo. But it has always been regarded as a favour, and not a right. The British view that it ought to remain on this footing prevailed

¹ German White Book of December 6th, 1907, pp. 5-6.

² Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 70-71.

at the Conference, though a proposal was made to render the concession obligatory. But while States in the future will retain their liberty of action according to varying circumstances, the first Article of the Convention on the subject strengthens the force of existing custom by insisting strongly on its desirability. The other Articles lay down rules which modify the old right of confiscation. They give instead a right to detain till the end of the war without compensation, or to requisition with compensation, in the case of

1. Merchantmen of the belligerent Powers who are found in the enemy's ports at the outbreak of hostilities, and are not allowed to leave unmolested.
2. Merchantmen of the belligerent Powers who left their last port of departure before the commencement of the war, and are met on the high seas by enemy cruisers while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities. These vessels may be not only requisitioned, but even destroyed, on payment of compensation.
3. Enemy cargo found on board any of the vessels referred to above.

The Convention very properly adds that these provisions do not apply to "merchant ships whose build shows that they are intended for conversion into war-ships." It would be an act of supreme folly to allow such vessels to escape and reach the enemy, and in their case the old right of capture is retained in full vigour.¹

NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS : BALLOONS.

We will now proceed to deal with naval bombardments, and the closely connected subject of the launching of projectiles from balloons. The Conference of 1899 failed to solve the difficulties connected with the first; but it found a temporary settlement of the second in a declaration which bound the signatory Powers "to prohibit for a term of five years the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other new methods of a similar nature."² The Conference of 1907 renewed this declaration "for a period extending to the close of the Third Peace Conference."³ Germany has recorded her dissent,⁴ but Great Britain, who stood out in 1899, has expressed her willingness to sign on the present occasion. With regard to bombardments we have to chronicle a much more notable achievement. What

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 16, 101.

² Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1899), p. 337.

³ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), p. 161.

⁴ German White Book of December 6th, 1907, pp. 17-18.

the First Peace Conference failed to settle, the Second has dealt with in a most satisfactory manner—a fact which might well be borne in mind by writers who taunt these Conferences with futility because the last was unable to accomplish the whole of its somewhat ambitious programme. Coast warfare retained an unenviable reputation for barbarity long after other naval operations had been affected by the growing sentiment that private vengeance and personal ferocity ought to be eliminated from what is a solemn national appeal to force. Now its turn has come, and it has been subjected to regulation by the common consent of all the civilised nations of the world. "Undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings," may not be bombarded by naval forces; and a hostile squadron is specially forbidden to use such means in order to compel the payment of money contributions. The right to requisition provisions and supplies is limited to what bears a reasonable proportion to the local resources, and is "necessary for the immediate use of the naval force before the place." And that force may not bombard until its demand has been refused by the local authorities, and then, as a rule, only after "due notice." The prohibitions against bombardment do not extend, however, to warships in the harbour, or to stores, works, establishments, and plant, "which could be utilised for the needs of the hostile fleet or army." These may be cannonaded if the local authorities do not destroy them on demand, and if all other means of destruction are impossible. When bombardments do take place "sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected," must be spared as far as possible. But they lose their immunity if use is made of them for military purposes, and they are to be indicated by conspicuous signs consisting of "large, stiff, rectangular panels, divided diagonally into two coloured triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white."¹ The entire Convention on "Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War" deserves the highest praise for skilful drafting and careful consideration of the subject in all its bearings. It combines, in a most happy manner, humanity to harmless non-combatants, with freedom to strike hard blows at the military resources of the enemy. Its one defect is to be found in the provision that a port is not to be regarded as defended, and therefore subject to bombardment, "solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour." Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan entered reservations against this curious rule.

POSTAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Consideration must now be given to certain immunities and exemptions, which are either entirely new, or render obligatory humane customs not hitherto of universal observance.

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 115-116.

The little group of these reforms is headed by the rules which the Conference adopted with regard to postal correspondence. For nearly three-quarters of a century a desire to lay hands on the enemy's despatches has struggled in the minds of belligerents with a growing consciousness that the domestic and commercial correspondence of the world ought not to be interfered with because some of its maritime Powers happen to be at war. The result has been a number of concessions whereby the more enlightened States strove to mitigate the severity of the right to search all mail-bags and seize all noxious communications. But as a condition of these grants they demanded guarantees against the carriage of hostile despatches. Sometimes the guarantees were so stringent that the concessions were worth very little. Sometimes the immunities were great and the guarantees futile. Neutrals were never secure, for what was granted to them varied from time to time and from belligerent to belligerent. Moreover, it was matter of grace and favour, and could be revoked at any moment by the Power which had given it. And all the while the growth of international commerce, and the extension of travel and social intercourse, was every day adding to the bulk of sea-borne correspondence, and making its interruption more intolerable. At last, in recent years, came submarine cables and wireless telegraphy, and the advent of these things sealed the doom of the old severity by making it no longer necessary. Belligerents made little use of posts or steamers, but instead sent their warlike messages under the sea or through the air. The civilised world was then ripe for a declaration of the inviolability of sea-borne correspondence, whether neutral or belligerent, whether official or private, whether on board a neutral or enemy ship. This was the rule advocated in the instructions of the British delegation, and adopted by the Second Hague Conference on the proposal of Germany. It will be noticed that it confers inviolability on mail-bags, not on the mail-boats which carry them. These latter, however, are not to be searched except when absolutely necessary, and if the ship is detained the correspondence must be forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay.¹

FISHING BOATS.

At the same time wider immunities were conferred on in-shore fishing boats, and "small boats employed in local trade" (les bateaux exclusivement affectés à la pêche côtière ou à des services de petite navigation locale). With these were joined "vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions." All these, with their appliances and cargoes, were entirely exempted from capture, but only on condition that they took no part in hostilities. Belligerent rights remain unimpaired in the case of deep-sea fishing boats. The immunities

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), p. 131.

we have described existed in germ long ago. But they have been made more complete by the Conference, and turned from customs it was discourteous to break into obligations it is lawless to disregard.¹

MERCHANT SAILORS.

Last among the reforms we are now considering may be placed the new regulations with regard to the crews of merchant ships captured from the enemy in time of war. Hitherto they have been held as prisoners on the ground that if allowed to go free they might enter the hostile navy. The validity of this plea is less now than it used to be in a not very distant past; for the warships of to-day are such masses of complicated machinery that an ordinary seaman requires long and careful training before he is an effective combatant. Bearing this in mind, the Conference was able to free the crews of captured enemy merchantmen from the prisoners' lot, on condition that they undertake, when subjects of the enemy State, not to engage while the war lasts in any hostile service. Neutral subjects are simply set at liberty, if common sailors. If officers, they must first promise in writing not to serve again on an enemy ship before the conclusion of peace.²

RED-CROSS WORK AT SEA.

The First Peace Conference produced a Convention on the extension to sea warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, which had provided years before for the proper treatment of the sick and wounded in land warfare, and the protection of those engaged in their service. The work of 1899 was revised and improved in 1907, the result being an excellent humanitarian code which supersedes its predecessor. It divides hospital ships into two classes — those provided by the belligerent States, and those provided by private persons, or recognised relief societies, whether of belligerent or neutral nationality. But ships equipped by neutrals are to be placed under the control of one of the belligerents, just as neutral ambulances on land are so placed by the revised Geneva Convention of 1906. The names of the hospital ships attached to each side are to be notified by it to the enemy. All are to be indicated by distinctive flags and special painting. None are to be used for any military purpose. The belligerents have a right of control over them, even to the extent of detaining them, ordering them off, putting a Commissioner on board them, or making them take a certain course; but they are not to be captured as long as they observe the conditions imposed on them, and the presence of wireless

Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 128, 131.

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), p. 131.

telegraphy apparatus on board "is not a sufficient reason for withdrawing protection." If neutral merchantmen, yachts, or boats rescue sick, wounded, or ship-wrecked men, they cannot be captured for having such persons on board, though they remain liable to seizure for ordinary violations of neutrality. A belligerent man-of-war may take these persons out of any hospital ship, or any neutral yacht or merchantman, which has rescued them, but not out of a neutral man-of-war. Those who have found asylum on board it must be prevented from taking part again in the operations of war, which will generally mean in practice that they are interned in the neutral country. In my humble judgment, internment should have been the lot assigned to all who are rescued by neutrals. Under the Convention as it stands, if they are taken from the custody of their rescuers by a war-ship of their own side, they will, when fit for service, be put back into the fighting line; while on the other hand, if the vessel which demands them is an enemy, they will be made prisoners of war. Each fate seems inconsistent with the fundamental principle that no proceedings of neutrals should assist either side in a war. The British representatives at the Conference opposed the action of Germany and France in pressing forward the solution I have ventured to criticise, but gave way at last to ensure unanimity. When one belligerent has seized and held as prisoners any of the ship-wrecked, wounded, or sick of the other, he may "send them to a port of his own country, to a neutral port, or to an enemy port." In the last case they must not serve again while the war lasts. The second course cannot be followed until the local authorities of the neutral port give their consent, and should they do so, internment is to take place, "unless an arrangement is made to the contrary between the neutral State and the belligerent States." Whenever members of a belligerent's fighting forces are interned and cared for in a neutral country, the expenses incurred thereby are to be a charge on the State to which they belong. The religious, medical, and hospital staff of captured ships cannot be made prisoners of war, neither on the other hand can they leave at their pleasure. They must continue to perform their services as long as there is need of them; and when their task is finished they cannot depart without permission from the commander-in-chief. The signatory Powers bind themselves to bring the Convention to the knowledge of their naval forces, and to propose to their legislatures any laws that may be necessary to secure the observance of its provisions and punish breaches of them. The duty of seeing that they are properly carried out is laid upon the commanders-in-chief of belligerent fleets.¹

CONVERSION OF MERCHANT-SHIPS INTO WAR-SHIPS.

We can now pass on to subjects which are of a more controversial character, not so much among ourselves as between Great

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 123-126. German White Book of December 6th, 1907, pp. 11-12.

Britain and some other States. The Conference of last year laid down a number of excellent rules on the subject of the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war. No exception can be taken to the provisions that the converted ship must be placed under the direct authority and immediate control of the power whose flag she flies, and must bear the external signs of a war-ship of her nationality. It is equally right and reasonable that her commander must be a duly commissioned officer in the service of the State, her crew subject to military discipline, and her operations conformable to the laws and customs of civilised warfare. On all these matters the Powers were able to agree; but so marked a difference arose between Great Britain on the one hand, and Germany and Russia on the other, as to whether the conversion should be allowed to take place in the waters of the converting State only, or on the high seas as well, that the preamble of the convention had to contain the naive confession that "the question of the place where such conversion is effected remains outside the scope of this Agreement."¹

AN ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE RULES TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

This was only one sign out of many of a tendency on the part of several Powers to manipulate the rules of naval warfare in such a way as to deprive Great Britain of the advantages springing from her vast maritime resources and the wide geographical distribution of her possessions. They may not always have been conscious of it, and doubtless it was mixed even in its most open manifestations with ideas of equity; but it existed, it was active, and in some cases it was openly avowed. We cannot, therefore, ignore it, and are under the necessity first of giving examples sufficient to show its character and power, and then of enquiring into its justice.

When we come to examine the question whether conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war should be allowed on the open ocean, it seems clear that so high an act of sovereignty should be performed only within the geographical limits of a State's dominions; and these end at the boundary of its territorial waters. The Japanese proposal to add ports under the military occupation of a belligerent might possibly be reconciled with sound principle, since the authority exercised by a State over parts of the enemy's territory in the firm possession of its forces includes many matters of Government, and is little restricted in affairs connected with the conduct of war. But when it comes to giving full liberty of conversion in the open seas of the whole world, principle seems to have receded to vanishing point, and nothing but expediency is left. But for whom is such a wide freedom of action expedient? Clearly for those who have few ports in distant seas, and would sometimes be com-

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 105-106.

elled to send their trading vessels on long and dangerous voyages before they could reach their own territorial waters. It would be so much simpler to arm and commission them at once on the first free league of ocean. It is true that neutrals would not know of the change till some of their vessels had been captured by ships hitherto deemed peaceful. It is also true that a neutral port might have sheltered the converted ships from an enemy cruiser a short time before its conversion and given it unlimited refitments and supplies. But what of that? The great thing is to get as much as possible on a footing of equality with the one Power whose ports are found on every sea, even though neutrality itself is wounded in the process. That these words do not over-state the case, other instances will show. The Convention relating to the days of grace generally given at the outbreak of hostilities exempts from confiscation "enemy merchant-ships which left their last port of departure before the commencement of the war, and are encountered on the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities." It then goes on to add that they, together with their cargoes, may be detained during the war and restored at its close without compensation, or be requisitioned, or even destroyed, on payment of compensation. This is a valuable concession; but not startling, still less quixotic, in its generosity. Moreover, it is consistent with the other provisions of the Convention, which would indeed have been incomplete without it. But Germany and Russia have made reservations, and decline to be bound by the Article in question. If we ask why, the answer comes in the words of the German Memorandum on the work of the Conference: "The detention or requisition of such ships benefits those nations only who have naval bases in different parts of the world, where such ships may be kept. Nations who have not such naval bases can make no use of this right."¹ Exactly so. And it is also true that nations who have no army can make no use of the right of military occupation, and nations that have no navy can make no use of the right of search. Yet no one proposes to abolish either. But in the case before us the inference seems to be that the right ought not to exist, though it is just and good in itself, and relieves peaceful commerce while safeguarding belligerent interests. The only reason for this strange conclusion is that Great Britain, as a belligerent, might profit by it more than any other Power, because she happens to possess all over the world port after port in which sequestered vessels could lie in safety during a naval war.

NEUTRALITY.

But the most striking example of what can be done under the influence of the frame of mind we are discussing is to be found in the Convention concerning the rights and duties of

¹ German White Book of December 6th, 1907, p. 9.

neutral Powers in naval war. Little fault can be found with the Articles which regulate the behaviour of belligerents in neutral ports and waters, except that one of them by implication relieves a neutral Power of any obligation to demand restoration from the captor State when a ship has been seized in its territorial waters and then removed from its jurisdiction. The latitude thus allowed is brought into much greater prominence in the Articles which relate to the behaviour of neutral States towards belligerents. These form the bulk of the Convention, and, while many of them are fairly satisfactory, several are not only weak, but retrograde. Prominent among these last is the eleventh, which permits neutral Powers to allow the use of their pilots to belligerent warships. I am glad that Germany has entered a reservation against it. But this permission is unimportant compared with a group that follow. The fullest freedom is reserved to neutral Powers to allow belligerent men-of-war to remain in their ports and waters for an unlimited time and in unlimited numbers. The general custom of permitting a stay of twenty-four hours and no more is indeed prescribed as a rule; but it is to come into force only "in the absence of special provisions to the contrary in the legislation of a neutral Power," and even with this loophole it is so distasteful to Germany that she has made a reservation against the Articles which embody it. Similarly the ordinary rules about the exclusion of prizes are laid down, and then a means of nullifying them is set forth in the provision that prizes may be admitted without stint or limit when they are brought in to await the decision of a Prize Court. The rules about fuel are little better. No notice is taken of what may be the immediate purpose of the vessel which demands the supply. The cruiser which is laying in wait for an unsuspecting enemy, the fleet which is on its way to a battle, is put on the same footing with the ship which requires coal for the ordinary purposes of navigation. The restrictions as to the amount and frequency of supplies, which were first imposed by Great Britain in her Neutrality Regulations of 1862, are adopted in Articles XIX. and XX. By these it is provided that belligerent warships may take at any one time in a neutral port enough fuel "to enable them to reach the nearest port of their own country," and may not receive a fresh supply within three months in a port of the same neutral. But instead of embodying in the Convention any of the further restrictions we have since introduced, such, for instance, as that of 1904, which enables us to name some neutral destination nearer than the nearest port of the visiting vessel's own country, and grant no more fuel than is sufficient for reaching it, the Conference weakened the effect of its own limitation by adding the proviso that neutrals may, if they please, allow belligerent men-of-war "to fill up their bunkers built to carry coal." Even so the regulations were not sufficiently elastic to satisfy Germany, who carried her dislike of the three-months rule to the point of making a reservation against the Article which embodies it.

Here, then, we have a group of provisions devoted apparently to the purpose of enabling neutral Powers to make their neutrality unreal. The foundation principle set forth by Bynkershoek in 1737, and generally adopted since, is ignored. The great Dutch jurist laid down the duty of entire abstinence from whatever might assist the operations of either party. Neutrals were to hold aloof entirely from the war. They were not to do such service to one belligerent as would injure the other.¹ No doubt the theory here set forth has often been very imperfectly observed in practice, but nevertheless one of the most marked features of the last century was the simultaneous growth of respect for neutral rights and insistence upon the full performance of neutral duties. At The Hague last summer the former were magnified to the extent of allowing them to eclipse the latter. The only explanation that can be offered is that to which so impartial an authority as Professor Westlake has been driven. In a most able and judicial article in the current number of the *Quarterly Review* he says: "Such a negation of all recognised principle is, of course, only to be explained by jealousy of the advantages which recognised principle gives to a great naval Power having coaling stations of her own all over the world." The idea seems to be that equality of opportunity must in some way be brought about. When a State has plenty of naval bases of its own, those States who are without them must be allowed to find what they lack in neutral ports. And the neutral is absolved from too strict a regard for its duties of impartiality and non-assistance, in order that it may take part in the strange attempt to redress the balance of natural and acquired advantages. Great Britain cannot be expected to acclaim these new doctrines. They are in themselves contrary to sound principle, and in their applications they are directed against her sea-power. In opposing them at the Conference she was supported by Japan and some of the smaller States. It is my hope, and I trust yours also, that the British Government will refuse to sign and ratify the instrument which contains them. We shall then be rid of them altogether, for the provisions of the Convention "do not apply except to the contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to them." I do not think a series of reservations would meet the case, for the idea we condemn permeates the Convention through and through, and is not confined to a few Articles which we might except from a general approval. By withholding our signature we shall lose little and gain much. What is good in the Convention is in the main a restatement of rules already to be found in the customary law of nations. While observing them ourselves

¹ *Horum officium est, omni modo cavere, ne se bello interponant. . . . Si medius sim, alteri non possum prodesse, ut alteri noceam.*—Bynkershoek, *Quæstiones Juris Publici*, Lib. I., cap. 9.

we could insist on their observance by others in cases where we were concerned. And we should be quite free to apply accepted principles to the new questions which are sure to arise as change follows change in the conditions of naval warfare, and for which the Articles of the Convention make no provision. Our representatives at The Hague withdrew from the final votes on this unsatisfactory Convention, and officially reserved to our Government the right to form an opinion upon it. The more unequivocally adverse the opinion the greater will be the chance of the emergence of a satisfactory code of State neutrality from the deliberations of the next Conference.¹

SUBMARINE MINES.

But we have yet to consider the most conspicuous of the cases where the feeling that the laws of naval warfare ought to be used to equalise advantages all round influenced the decisions of the Conference to the detriment of Great Britain. I refer to the Convention on Automatic Submarine Contact Mines. In discussions on this subject it is often forgotten that mines which operate beneath the surface of the sea are of three kinds. There are observation mines, which are connected by wire with an electric station on shore, and fired by pressing a button when the person in charge of the station sees that an enemy ship is within the field of the explosion. These are not mentioned in the Convention. No restriction on their use has been proposed. Properly managed they are not a source of danger to neutral vessels, and they afford a cheap maritime defence to weak and poor States who prefer not to rely on submarines and torpedo craft. In addition to them there are contact mines, whose peculiarity is that they explode automatically directly they receive a blow from any substance sufficiently heavy to strike them with considerable force. Of these mines there are two varieties—those which are anchored and those which are allowed to drift. The recent Hague Conference discussed them both, and after long controversy drew up regulations for their use. These were simplicity itself. Anchored contact mines were forbidden unless they were so constructed as to become harmless as soon as they broke loose from their moorings. Drifting contact mines were forbidden unless they were so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after they ceased to be under the control of the person who laid them. Contact mines of either kind were forbidden when the intention was to lay them "off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping."

Here we have a code of the kind justly dear to naval officers. It is short, it is terse, and it is free from legal techni-

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 157-160.
German White Book of December 6th, 1907, pp. 15-17.

calities. But unfortunately its third article is useless, and the force of the other two is sadly diminished by a subsequent proviso. He must, indeed, be a curiously simple-minded naval commander who cannot think of some other reason for laying a cordon of mines off an enemy's port than that of intercepting commercial shipping. Even if there be no gun-boat, however aged and rotten, reposing on the mud of some interior creek, or no naval store, however ill-furnished and depleted, hidden in some remote corner, there always remains the resource of alleging that the enemy's war-ships must be prevented from gaining the shelter of the harbour. Germany saw this and made a reservation against the regulation on the ground that "the belligerent has only to assert a different object in order to make it illusory."¹ But she objected to a British proposal to prohibit outright the use of contact mines for closing against commerce ports that were not being attacked from the sea, and her opposition was backed by France and Russia. The result is that, so far as the Conference is concerned, no restraint has been put on the activity of belligerents in this direction, though there is good reason for the assertion that it is absolutely contrary to the first principles of the law of blockade. As to the first two prohibitions, they were largely nullified by a later Article, which exempted "at present" from their operation the Powers which are unprovided with anchored mines that become harmless when released from their moorings, and drifting mines that cease to be operative after an hour's immersion. The Powers in question undertake "to convert the *matériel* of their mines as soon as possible," but no time is fixed within which they must make the change. The Convention, therefore, gives little immediate security against wholesale destruction of neutral shipping in crowded waterways, and the eventual security is by no means adequate. It was highly desirable in the interests of humanity that the original British proposals should have been adopted by the Conference. Put briefly, they forbade drifting mines altogether, and allowed only such anchored mines as became harmless the moment they broke loose. Even these latter were to be prohibited except in the attack and defence of fortified naval ports. But the absolute veto on the use of drifting mines was distasteful to some Powers, and others did not care to have the area within which they might use anchored mines so severely restricted. A strong opposition arose, led by Germany, but supported as to a greater or less number of points by Austria, France, Russia, and the United States. In the midst of the discussions we accepted on September 17th a German proposal to prohibit the use of drifting mines altogether for a period of five years; but it failed to obtain the necessary majority. In the end the omissions of the Convention became more significant than its prohibitions. As far as its Articles are concerned, a belligerent has full liberty

¹ German White Book of December 6th, 1907, p. 10.

to sow the seas with hidden terrors, and can escape all responsibility to neutrals for the destruction they may cause by jauntily alleging that it has not yet had time to make them conform to the requirements of the Conference. Taking the Convention as it stands, we must pronounce it a most disappointing and inadequate document, and support with all our hearts the declaration made by our second Plenipotentiary at the eighth plenary sitting of the Conference on October 9, 1907. The protest is too long for reproduction here; but the following sentences may be quoted as embodying the essence of it:—"The British delegation desires to declare that it cannot regard this arrangement as furnishing a final solution of the question, but only as marking a stage in international legislation on the subject. It does not consider that adequate account has been taken in the Convention of the rights of neutrals to protection, nor of humanitarian sentiments which cannot be neglected. Accordingly it will not be permissible to presume the legitimacy of an action for the mere reason that this Convention has not prohibited it. This is a principle which we desire to affirm, and which it will be impossible for any State to ignore, whatever its power."¹ The voice was the voice of Sir Ernest Satow, but the words were the words of England. Foreign Powers will do well to realise that we are determined to conform in our own actions to higher standards than those of the Convention, and to exact a similar conformity from others whose laxness injures us, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.

The explanation of the treatment accorded to the British proposals is not far to seek. We have no right to attribute to great and civilised peoples a conscious desire to go back to barbarism in naval warfare. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein's spirited vindication of the humanity of German naval officers in his reply to Sir Ernest Satow's protest was as superfluous as it was emphatic. No one had impugned their honour in this respect. No one impugns it now. We know them too well as a body of keen sailors and cultivated gentlemen. Yet we should be strangely blind and deaf if we did not feel sure that the directors of the German Navy desire to be free in the case of war with this country to lay chains of mines across the approaches to our great commercial ports. If this could be done quickly and secretly, and as the first act of hostility, British shipping, both warlike and commercial, might suffer enormous damage. But in all probability it would not suffer alone. The first victim might well be some great neutral liner, laden with a valuable and innocuous cargo, and crowded with a cosmopolitan throng of passengers. Here we see a new development of the design to manipulate the laws of sea warfare to the detriment of the great naval Power. The previous examples freed neutrals from restraints and obligations, but did not deeply affect them other-

¹ *Times*, October 10th, 1907.

wise. This instance involves a determination to inflict grave injury on them, rather than fail to strike a heavy blow at Great Britain when at war with her, and a further determination to expose her sea-borne commerce to new and terrible dangers in order to gain an advantage over an enemy in a war in which she is neutral. To overwhelm foes, friends may be badly injured; and the great object in view throughout is to reduce the advantages this country gains from her vast mercantile marine and her abundant provision of magnificent battle-ships.

INJUSTICE OF THE ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE RULES TO OUR DISADVANTAGE.

There is no support in reason or justice for these designs. The object of International Law is not to handicap States, so that they may all start equal in any struggle. It endeavours to impose just and merciful restraints on human passions and desires, and leaves natural and acquired advantages alone. When the laws of war on land were under discussion, no State or group of States endeavoured to diminish, through legal provisions, the advantages derived by the great military Powers from their size, their resources, and the sacrifices cheerfully borne by their populations. There was but one attempt at unfair discrimination under the guise of a general rule. These same great military Powers strove to secure a prohibition of levies *en masse*; but the small States proved conclusively that it would deprive them of their best means of defence against invasion, and succeeded in defeating the proposal. Precedent is against the attempt to penalise England because she has world-wide possessions and a world-wide commerce. We have discussed each separate instance on its merits, and found them extraordinarily small. If all were carried out, progress would be set back appreciably, and neutrals would lose in liabilities far more than they gained in liberties. What gives us advantages in some respects is disadvantageous in others; for scattered possessions invite attack, and a commerce that covers every sea can be raided more easily than if it were confined to a few routes. We must be taken as we are, like other Powers. Let the laws of war at sea be revised on the principles of respect for justice, and tenderness towards neutral interests, and we shall be content. But we are determined that they shall not be distorted to provide weapons against us.

BRITISH POLICY.

It seems to me that the championship of a just and impartial law of neutrality is imposed upon us by duty and self-interest. Doubtless we are the greatest naval Power in the world, and are possessed with the grim determination to remain so. But we are also the greatest commercial Power, and we are neutral at least six times for every single time we are at war. In both

capacities we are entitled, not, indeed, to dictate the law, but to have the most influential voice in reshaping it. Our great object should be to develop neutral rights, and to see that, while a belligerent is free to strike hard blows at his enemy, he is allowed to injure third parties as little as possible. Owing to the vast increase of commercial and social intercourse between different peoples, belligerent and neutral interests are often inextricably mingled, and where this is so the decision ought to be in favour of neutrals. In order to attain this end a vast quantity of antiquated legal *débris* should be shot into the sea. We have already expressed our willingness to throw overboard the whole law of contraband—a proposal which seems to me to savour of the extreme zeal of the neophyte, though I would cheerfully assist to jettison the mass of disputed rules which attempt to give effect to the notion that certain goods are sometimes noxious and sometimes innocent. Other changes should follow. We cannot, for instance, hope to maintain much longer against the rest of the world the right to search neutral merchantmen under the convoy of neutral men-of-war. Indeed, the whole law of search needs overhauling badly. If we lead the way in these matters, and at the same time insist that the duties of neutrality shall be as real and as far-reaching as its rights, we shall, I feel sure, rally round us an unexpected amount of support. Commercial interests, all the world over, will back us up. Humanitarian sentiment will be on our side. Captains and Admirals will acclaim the sweet simplicity of a code of naval warfare remodelled according to our suggestions. A future Hague Conference, properly prepared for by diplomacy, conducted according to stricter rules of procedure, and more disposed than the first to recognise the fact that preponderant power carries with it preponderant influence, will doubtless carry into effect many reforms which were not proposed, or could not win acceptance, in 1907.

AN INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT.

There remains the Convention which established an International Prize Court. All I can do in the few moments left to me is to express the strong wish that Great Britain may find herself able to sign it. The Court is to consist of fifteen judges, nominated by the Powers. Those appointed by Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, are always to sit, while the other appointees of the contracting parties sit by rota. In all cases arising out of a war the judges appointed by belligerent States are to take part. The law to be administered by the Court is to be derived from treaties applicable to the case, and the generally recognised rules of International Law. If there is no generally recognised rule applicable to the matter in dispute, "the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity."¹ In this sentence lies the stumbling-block. It

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), pp. 142-150.

does undoubtedly give the Court power in the last resort "to make the law," as was boldly stated in the Report of M. Louis Renault, the eminent jurist who was one of the Plenipotentiaries of France, and who added at the Conference the fame of a great statesman to the reputation he had already won as a brilliant teacher and a sound publicist. Some of our leading authorities argue that we must have given our assent to an International Code before we can agree to be bound by the decisions of a Court on which we shall have but one judge. Others of equal repute declare that we might accept the Court if it were agreed that in case of doubt the law of the captor's country was to prevail. With all submission I differ from both. If we wait for a Court until we obtain a Code the present unsatisfactory state of affairs may last for generations. Moreover, no code could deal with all the legal needs of a rapidly developing society like the family of nations. On the other hand, the application of the captor's law in the last resort would stereotype the present disagreements. I realise fully the dangers lurking in what Sir Edward Fry well calls the "very definite contrast" between "the views entertained by Great Britain and by certain other Powers on many questions of International Law."¹ Yet the points that are really vital for us are few. We could never, for instance, consent to have food regarded as absolutely contraband, nor accept the view that a belligerent may at his discretion sink neutral merchantmen at sea instead of bringing them in for trial by a Prize Court. But if the really essential matters were safeguarded by agreement between the maritime Powers, surely we might sign the Convention. We were informed last week that negotiations have been, or soon will be, initiated with this object in view. I venture to express a hope that they will be pressed to the utmost. In creating the International Prize Court the Conference not only provided machinery of the highest type for bringing order and uniformity out of disorder and disagreement, but also solved the almost insuperable difficulty of grading the Powers according to their real importance with regard to the matter in hand. To wreck such a work as this for the sake of anything short of vital national interests would be disloyalty to the cause of human betterment.

Commander Lord ELLENBOROUGH, R.N.:—I am sure that we are all very much obliged to the Rev. Dr. Lawrence for the very able manner in which he has summarised some of the results of the Hague Conference. The establishment of Courts of Arbitration for dealing with trifles, which, if allowed to continue to irritate, might bring on war, is of great benefit to mankind. But when the Conference proceeded to make laws for belligerents, its members got out of their depth. They forgot the old maxim, *Inter arma silent leges*. I also think that Dr. Lawrence takes the deliberations of that assemblage far too seriously. When I first read the Hague Blue-book, I began to think that I must have got hold of the rough draft of a comic opera by mistake. Persia, Haiti, the

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 1 (1908), p. 20.

Dominican Republic, and the protected States of Cuba and Panama, etc., had an equal voice with the United States, France, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, and those States are also to find judges who are to sit on Prize Courts. Why leave out Monte Carlo and the Republics of Andorra and San Marino? All so-called Rules of International Law are simply Gordian knots, which will be cut by the sword in time of war by every State that thinks itself strong enough to do so with impunity. If any one of our admirals allowed the supremacy of our Navy in the Channel or North Sea to be imperilled by a slavish obedience to a resolution of a Hague Conference, I think that he would either be dealt with by Judge Lynch, or else court-martialled and shot. I feel anxiety for my country on many points, but none on this, as I do not believe that we have an admiral on our Navy List capable of such insane folly. It would be madness for a nation to rely on Hague laws to protect its interests. Strong fleets and armies are the only safe-guards of the liberties of a nation. It is true that a small country may sometimes be able to remain independent for generations, through the mutual jealousy of its neighbours. But in such cases the small nation has generally been able to place the whole of its manhood under arms in case of necessity. It is very possible that in the next war some nations may declare that they intend to act on Hague resolutions. But if they do, they will always make important reservations. The rule that "Hostilities must not commence without previous and explicit warning" sounds very pretty and correct, but who is to enforce this rule? Who is to punish the belligerent who breaks it? Who is to bell the cat? Frederick the Great was in possession of a great part of Silesia before Maria Theresa knew that he meant war, and the Prussians, in 1866, secured the town of Harburg and the crossings of the Elbe before the King of Hanover received an ultimatum. If we relax our vigilance, we may receive an ultimatum with conditional declaration, after we hear of the crossing of the North Sea and of the capture of King's Lynn and Yarmouth. The movements of troops will not be described in such a case as meaning war, but merely as precautionary measures, i.e., precautions to prevent them from being drowned on their way to England. It would be madness to allow this provision of the Hague Conference to become a substitute for naval and military preparations against surprise.¹ With regard to balloons, the signatory Powers have prohibited for a term of five years the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons. I do not think that it matters much, as, during the next five years the man in the balloon will be in far greater danger than the man about the town that he wishes to bombard, and will continue to be so, until balloons can carry greater weights. I do not consider that dwellers in seaport towns can derive much benefit from the resolution concerning bombardments, as all coast towns contain provisions and stores that can be utilised for the repair of small vessels, so that an excuse for bombarding would always be available. Casablanca was bombarded by the French without notice while the Conference was sitting. Any British officer would have used shells to protect his men under similar circumstances. Article 23, p. 86, says, that it is forbidden "to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, surrenders at discretion." But how about a fleet action, during which it is impossible to take possession?

¹ In connection with this point, I may remark that the Chinese representative asked the Conference the following conundrum:—"When is a war not a war?"

One of Suffren's ships surrendered during a battle, but she was not taken possession of or sunk. She resumed her place in Suffren's line of battle, and he declined to surrender her to Admiral Hughes. Are we to allow surrendered troop-ships to haul down their colours, re-hoist them, and land troops in England the very next day? Fishing-boats and small coasting vessels must be interfered with occasionally, or their crews will act as spies. Merchant sailors in the Naval Reserve of a belligerent country must be kept as prisoners of war. Their promise not to serve would not be considered valid by their respective Governments. On the subject of the attempt to manipulate rules to the disadvantage of Great Britain, I am in entire agreement with the lecturer. I also agree with his views on neutral bases and with his strictures on Article 12 at page 158, which permits neutral Powers to allow belligerent men-of-war to remain in neutral ports for an unlimited time in unlimited numbers. Did the inland lawyers who invented these rules know anything about the exigencies of naval warfare? Did they ever think that Great Britain could ever permit a hostile fleet to lie unmolested for any length of time in Belgian or Dutch waters, sending out torpedo-boats, laying mines by night, and then claiming the protection of a neutral coast for them on their return? No naval officer would ever dream of respecting neutral waters to that extent. As regards mechanical mines, which are a danger to both friend and foe as well as belligerents and neutrals, I regret that it was possible to invent them. But we cannot undo the fact that they have been invented, and that they proved to be very deadly during the Russo-Japanese war. No flimsy resolutions of a Hague Conference will ever have the slightest effect on their employment. It is now perfectly clear that in case of war, attempts will be made to interfere with our food supply and with our commerce by strewing the seas that surround us with cheap mechanical mines. The sooner the various methods of destroying mechanical mines are carefully studied as the art of hitting a target, the better it will be for Great Britain. It was, however, more honest of Germany to oppose definite limitations of their use than to accede to resolutions that might have lulled us to sleep. Our Admiralty will now have no excuse if it is not fully prepared to deal with floating mines by the thousand when war breaks out. I therefore feel grateful to Germany for letting us know what we may have to expect. Forewarned, forearmed. Some people soothe themselves with the idea that neutrals would interfere and prevent Germany from laying down mines in the manner referred to. Now, the neutrals whose commerce would be chiefly affected by mines laid down on our coasts are Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and France. Serious remonstrances from any of the first three countries could hardly be expected. If made, they would form an excellent excuse for their occupation and eventual annexation. As regards France, we could scarcely expect her to throw down the gauntlet until we have an army capable of turning the scales in a Continental war. As long as she remained at peace her Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts would remain open to commerce. Other nations might suffer some inconvenience, but the addition of their navies to ours would not have much effect on Germany, as her own maritime trade would of course remain suspended until the conclusion of war. Once committed to a war with England, no alliance incapable of defeating Germany on land is likely to have much effect on her policy. I do not, however, feel grateful to Germany for having partially accepted our resolutions in favour of Prize Courts. When in history have impartial neutrals been found in time of war? Look for them on some other planet, not on this earth. Look at the set made

against us by foreign countries during the Boer war, some of whom owe their very existence to us. Could the tribunals that acquitted Sipido and Major Lothaire be trusted to try a British prize claim? There are some so-called experts in International Law whose maritime experiences consist solely of the suffering endured by them in the Channel on that memorable journey when they visited England for the first and only time. Theorists may consider that the case of the *Knight Commander* was settled by the payment of a sum of money some time after peace was made, and that therefore a principle having been established, such a case will not occur again. But that is not the way that the exigencies of war are dealt with. The *Knight Commander* was sunk for the purpose of discouraging neutrals from trading with Japan, and the Russian captain attained his object. Payment of compensation years afterwards had no effect on the war. The Russian captain cared nothing for any of Lord Stowell's decisions. Great Britain had Prize Courts and harbours available and Russia had not. So he made the quarter-deck the Prize Court of the future. As England did not insist on the Russian captain being treated as a pirate, she must expect that in future no officer will be deterred from following in his footsteps, if he thinks that the advantage of such a course is likely to outweigh the risk of annoying a neutral. Where the lawyers are wrong is that they take no account of the exigencies of war in their books and reports of cases. For instance, take the *General Armstrong*, another oft-quoted case. The object of the British captain was that that privateer should not capture any more British merchant-ships. This he obtained: the payment of a small sum of money more than thirty years afterwards was of slight importance. Again, in the case of the *Wachusett* and the *Florida*, both of which ships I came across during the Civil War. The *Florida*, after illegal capture in neutral waters, was sunk by a well-arranged accident, and though her crew were released, neither ship nor men ever had an opportunity of again injuring the United States. Naval officers of all countries will continue to make law on the quarter-deck, in defiance of all Hague Regulations, and their law will remain good if their country supports them and is strong enough to do so with impunity.

Major-General Sir THOMAS FRASER, K.C.B., C.M.G.:—I hope you appreciate the value of this excellent lecture and of the speech of Lord Ellenborough on the question which is before us to-day. I have heard a great many discussions in this Institution, but it seems to me this paper is one of the most important, as bearing on our Imperial interests, that we have had for many years. I must confess that I looked with great anxiety at the prospect of the meeting of the Hague Conference; but now it is over I feel it has been a great benefit to the people of these islands, because it has waked them up from the grave delusions that most have held about war, and has made them understand what Continental nations mean to do when they are at war with us. We ought, therefore, to be profoundly grateful to the Hague Conference for having roused us up from a condition of sleep to one, we may hope, of mental alertness. I think we have had a very admirable lecture from Dr. Lawrence, and on most of the points on which he has criticised the Hague Conference I am in entire agreement with him. There are, however, a few points to which I should like to draw your attention. With regard to the question of notice of war I am entirely in accord with Lord Ellenborough, that any precepts that the Hague Conference may have laid down have nothing behind them to cause their enforcement. We have no reason to suppose

for one moment that if war occurs, as it may occur at any time, we can count with certainty on getting even twenty-four hours' notice from the Power or Powers against whom we have to fight. War is now commenced by telegraph, and it is only declared and proclaimed by post; and you may be perfectly certain that those who tell you that there will be sufficient notice of war to enable you to make preparations beforehand, are living in a fool's paradise. I do not think the Hague Conference, which has forbidden a complete surprise, can carry out such an injunction in the absence of force. The only power that will lead men to do what is contrary to their success in war is armed force, and the *dicta* of the Hague Conference will be disobeyed just as similar *dicta* were disobeyed by Napoleon, Frederick the Great, and many other rulers and military commanders who did just what they liked, knowing that success would silence opposition. In connection with the question of balloons, Germany has refused to be bound by the arrangement that balloons are not to throw dynamite down for the interval between the last Conference and the next. That has this disadvantage, that Germany retains her freedom of action and we do not. As regards Germany itself, we should have, of course, a perfect right to use balloons; but it has this disadvantage for us, that we must keep up a complete equipment of balloon material in order to be on a par, in that particular case, with Germany alone. As to the question of bombardment, Lord Ellenborough, as a naval officer, has spoken on that subject with an authority to which I cannot pretend. I think the rules laid down are not at all definite, and the suggestion that only a "reasonable" requisition in the way of supplies for the use of the fleet alone may be asked for, involves the question, who is to decide what is "reasonable"? Is it the fleet that makes it, or the town, with its cordon of contact mines, that decline it? As to the question of the postal service, that may seem a small matter; but I do not quite agree with Dr. Lawrence, that it is entirely a matter of indifference to us. In this country there are a great many foreigners, and in time of war many of those men will be employed, as some no doubt are employed at present, as spies. The fact that mail correspondence is allowed to pass without capture will give them opportunities of communicating with the home base of operations, practically without risk; whereas, as things stood before, there was a chance of detection; so that I think the change is not to our advantage. It will be an advantage to other Powers in this way: that while we have telegraphic means of communication of a very complete nature all over the world, many other nations have not those means. Therefore, if we give an immunity to written correspondence, news will be conveyed by letter which could not be conveyed by telegraph, if we control our telegraphs properly. As regards merchant sailors, I think the theory is wrong, that because a war-ship has more complicated machinery than those of the Mercantile Marine, that therefore sailors of the Mercantile Marine are of no use as men on warships. Many of the great oceanic passenger ships consist of a box of engineering tricks almost as complicated as you find on a war-ship. The men are accustomed to electricity, hydraulics, pneumatics, and steam. To say that they are not useful on board men-of-war is, in my opinion, mistaken. I do think every sailor from a merchant-ship should be retained and interned. I entirely agree with what the lecturer has said with regard to submarine mines. The unjust stigma of "methods of barbarism" applied by their fellow countrymen to our own soldiers in South Africa can fairly be applied to the Continental intentions as to contact mines. But there is one point to which I wish particularly to draw attention, and that is, the remark made by Sir Ernest Satow on the occasion of a sort of protest

by the British representatives. He (we are told) said: "Accordingly it will not be permissible to presume the legitimacy of an action for the mere reason that this Convention has not prohibited it. This is a principle which we desire to affirm, and which it will be impossible for any State to ignore, whatever its power." That means to say, we will not permit these Powers to do what the Hague Conference has left them free to do. Then the lecturer continues: "Foreign Powers will do well to realise that we are determined to conform, in our own actions, to higher standards than those of the Convention, and to exact a similar conformity from others whose laxness injures us, whether as belligerents or as neutrals." If the above have any meaning, it means this: that we are not going to use such "methods" ourselves, and that we think that by dictating to the rest of the world that they are not to use them—they will obey us. That, it is submitted, is not common-sense. The only possibility of preventing others from taking the course which the Hague Conference permits them, and which they intend to take if they are at war, is that we defeat them in a war. To do so we must use these and all other methods that those who attack us will undoubtedly use, unless we prefer to be destroyed. To do otherwise would, I think, be nothing short of madness. We wished to put the question on a humanitarian basis, a laudable wish, but the rest of the world refuses to do so, just as they refused to disarm. In the latter case their refusal has not led us to tell them they must disarm, and for the best of reasons. So we must use the means that the Powers of Europe and America are going to use. Not to do so would be to commit national suicide. On one point I venture to disagree with the lecturer, and that is with regard to the question of the International Prize Court. We have had an object lesson from the Hague Conference. We find that the great and other Powers have no objection to meeting our wishes with regard to matters not opposed to their interest; but they have shown individually an absolute intention, when their own interests are concerned, to hamper us and to neutralise our great naval superiority by every means in their power. We have no right to assume that foreign nations do not think they are perfectly justified in doing that. These foreign nations may think that the best thing for them is, for instance, to debar us from the great advantage of our coaling stations as this Conference has done. They are perfectly entitled to hold that view, and I never expected them to take any other. But if that be the case, why on earth should national judges, who are elected by their countrymen, be expected by us to take an entirely opposite view of what are the rights of their nation to that taken by individuals of the nation itself? The judges of Germany and Russia and the United States will take the view that their own race have just shown that they take; you may be perfectly certain of that. And therefore I say it would be reckless of us to go into a Prize Court where the law is so crystallised and laid down beforehand in black and white, and where the judges will outnumber the single judge we should have by many to one. I hope Lord Ellenborough will agree on this.

Lord ELLENBOROUGH:—Hear, hear.

Major-General Sir THOMAS FRASER:—Law is not an experimental science to be discussed *in vacuo*, and even if we had the law laid down for the Prize Court, in my opinion it would be risky for us to accept it in the form settled by the Hague Convention, because, as we know in our country, in spite of the fact that nearly a sixth of the House of Commons are lawyers, the law is seldom what it seems; and it is not

always found to have the meaning that we supposed. Even with the law in black and white, written in English, we should incur great danger in going to this Prize Court, but where we have not got anything of that kind, where there is no law, and we are dealing with judges who quite honestly are bound to take a different view from ourselves, it would be nothing short of madness, in view of our immense interests, if we agreed to be bound by a Prize Court law in these circumstances. Liberty of action is much more important to us than the purchase of concord, at the price of our rights.

Commander W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R.:—While rules and regulations drawn up by Conferences, such as that which has recently taken place at the Hague, may look very pretty on paper, I quite agree with Lord Ellenborough and Sir Thomas Fraser that they possess little practical value, as there is no effective machinery in existence by which they can be enforced. It is as certain to-day as it was a thousand years ago that force—which is the absolute and only true meaning of war—will be the ultimate arbiter of what is lawful and what is unlawful during hostilities either by sea or by land. Of course, I do not suggest that many of the practices of bygone ages would ever be repeated, for the world's advance in the path of civilisation forbids any such idea; on the other hand, it is inconceivable that a nation that can prove itself victorious in war by ignoring rules laid down in time of peace will neglect its opportunities. Strongly opposed to the proposed immunity of private property from capture at sea, because it would seem that the disadvantages of such immunity to the British Empire, if it could *really* be brought about, would far outweigh the advantages, I am not sorry to know that upon that question there was a marked divergence of views among the delegates at the Hague. The lecturer has pointed out that at the Conference there was a tendency to manipulate rules to the disadvantage of Great Britain; but can that be considered an isolated instance? As to the justice she obtains in the matter of arbitration, for an object lesson one has only to go back to the Geneva Award, in the case of the *Alabama* claims, when she was adjudged to pay a preposterously excessive sum of money. In December, 1906, during the discussion of Lieutenant Bellaire's paper on "The Standard of Naval Strength," I made some not very appreciative remarks with regard to Peace Conferences and Peace Societies, and in the interim nothing has occurred to cause any modification of the views I then expressed.¹

¹ In the *Times* of February 20th, 1908, appeared the translation of a report upon the Hague Conference, drawn up by Chien Hsün, Minister to Holland, for the information of the Chinese Government. After mentioning the efforts made to regulate or abolish certain practices in war, His Excellency said: "But victory goes to the strong, and, though the weak may have a good case, his weakness will involve him in dangerous straits, so that in case of the stress of sudden hostilities, it is to be feared that none of the delegates would venture to hold more than a pious aspiration that every article of the Convention agreed upon would be faithfully observed." Again, with reference to the South African and Russo-Japanese wars, which followed the first Peace Conference, and the troubles between Japan and Korea and France and Morocco, which coincided with the second Conference, he remarked: "That wars never cease, and that the limitation of armaments is not to be hoped for; neither is the removal of the calamity of war an attainable prospect."—W.F.C.

Commander the MARQUIS OF GRAHAM, C.V.O. (Commanding the Clyde Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve):—I have listened with considerable interest to the paper that has been read by Dr. Lawrence, but there are one or two points in regard to which I am not sure what he means, and perhaps he will further elucidate them in his reply. The first point I would like to draw attention to is that I understand the Hague Conference agreed that a warning should be given before war was declared. I would like to know precisely if the warning will take the form of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration. I should like to know what that means. May a nation fire a shot within five minutes of the declaration of war?

Dr. LAWRENCE:—Certainly.

The MARQUIS OF GRAHAM:—For instance, may a fleet mobilise, victual, store, and sail from the home ports, lie off in the offing of the enemy's arsenal, and await the refusal of the ultimatum?

Dr. LAWRENCE:—Certainly.

The MARQUIS OF GRAHAM:—If the ultimatum is refused, then I presume an admiral can fire the first shot within five minutes. I should like to know definitely where war begins. Is the mobilisation, victualling, and storing of a fleet an action of war?

Dr. LAWRENCE:—Certainly not.

The MARQUIS OF GRAHAM:—I am satisfied with that. So long as we are free to strike hard and at once. The next point to which I wish to refer is that of bombardment and humanity in war. When we go to war I am all for fighting hard, and I believe that the bombardment of large and important towns or cities, or the prospect of such a bombardment may conduce to the surrender of a nation, and will cause people to think twice before they rush into needless war. I think it was one of our leading British admirals who said that the frontiers of England are the 'enemy's coast-line; but is it now to be limited to "the enemy's arsenal"? It is no doubt good strategy to be opposite the enemy's arsenal at the commencement of war, but at the same time I think the power of being able to bombard large cities is a proceeding which may conduce to early surrender. Then there is the question of the prospect of the conversion of steamers. I do not quite understand the position of a merchant steamer. If a collier was to leave a purely mercantile port, it might become a fleet auxiliary on the high seas. I would like to know if the Conference has agreed that merchant ships which may be converted into fleet auxiliaries may be seized in any port immediately on the declaration of war, even without a period of grace being granted. I suppose a fleet auxiliary comes within the pale of a war-ship. I imagine there are few nations that will even allow that an act of conversion merely takes place in the home ports of the enemy. Conversion can always happen on the high seas, and so long as that is possible I am convinced the right policy is to seize in any port every ship that may by any chance be converted into a fleet auxiliary. There is one point I should like to ask with regard to Prize Courts. Our lecturer said that in the course of the Hague Convention there seemed to be a kind of inclination on the part of foreign nations to approve of only those measures which handicapped the sea power of Great Britain. I understood from the tenor of the paper that it was rather unfair of these foreign nations to do that. Of course, they would naturally approve of anything that would handicap British sea power; but

at the end of the paper, in dealing with the question of Prize Courts, our lecturer says that Britain would never tolerate food being made contraband of war. But there we are just adopting the attitude of foreign nations in the matter of naval policy. Like them, we seek to preserve anything that will assist our sea power and handicap that of foreign nations, and therefore I do not think we need bother our heads about foreign nations approving only of those things that would handicap Great Britain, because we do likewise towards them when it comes to our turn. I think food ought to be contraband, because it may be useful for us on occasions as it may be harmful for us on other occasions. In my opinion, when Conferences like the Hague Conference seek to lay down the methods of war in any other direction than simply restricting the actions of neutrals they are seriously interfering with war and the disabilities of war, and I cannot agree with any legislation which will in any way handicap a nation from fighting for all it is worth. I am convinced that after all the greatest mercy is to bring war to an end in the shortest possible time by doing one's utmost to crush the enemy at the outset. If you lay down laws as to how you are to fight and so on, it is simply going into war with kid gloves on, and of this I do not approve.

The Rev. T. J. LAWRENCE, M.A., LL.D., in reply, said:—If I were to go through half the points which have been raised in the course of this most interesting discussion I fear I should detain you here till dinner-time, and finally find myself somewhere about eight o'clock talking to empty benches. I have no wish to go through that experience, and I am sure you have not either. Therefore, gentlemen who, like Lord Ellenborough, came carefully prepared with criticisms, must excuse me if I do not give those criticisms all the consideration that their importance and the position of their authors warrant. A very great deal of the criticism goes against the existence of any International Law at all. It is directed, if the critics will allow me to say so, towards going back to something like barbarism. The difference between the warfare of barbarians and the warfare of civilised men is that barbarians know no sort of restraint, that they act according to the passion and the view of the moment, whereas civilised mankind for hundreds of years have been slowly developing rules of war. We have been considering to-day the rules of war at sea, but mankind has developed rules of war on land which have now been codified in a way to gain almost general consent. Though the rules laid down for military purposes are not always observed with absolute accuracy and sincerity in warfare, in the main they do prevail. We do not slaughter prisoners; we do obey the rules that require them to be humanely treated. Yet if we go back less than three hundred years we find that even Gustavus Adolphus, in the Thirty Years' War, had to make special arrangements with the Austrians that the prisoners were not to have their throats cut. Some speakers have said that it is all nonsense to talk about restraints. Very well, it simply means going back to absolute, complete, and utter barbarism. There is another thing I should like to say. I have ventured pretty freely to criticise the Hague Conference as a body, and I hope to continue criticising it for a good long time to come. I do not regard it as sacred by any means; but it is a very important body; it is the first real Parliament of civilised mankind. Even our own Parliament sometimes does queer things, and why, therefore, should you say the Hague Conference is all nonsense because it has done certain things you deem objectionable? Almost absolute unanimity was the condition of anything going into the Conventions negotiated at the Conference, and that, I may say in passing, disposes

of the objection to the presence of representatives of Haiti and Santo Domingo and such small States. If they were there to vote down Great Britain, France, and Germany, I should say the thing was a farce; but they were there primarily to take part in the deliberations. Votes were weighed as well as counted. Unless a proposition received, I will not say absolutely unanimous support, but almost unanimous support, it was not put in the Conventions, and any Power, even if it signs a Convention, can put a reservation to any particular Article. So these Powers did not legislate for us; they were called into Council by us and other States in order to help us to obtain the general opinion of civilised humanity. The rules that were drawn up were subjected to the criticism of naval and military experts. Poor, silly creatures, parsons and jurists and lawyers and such like folk, did not make those rules off their own bats, although some of them were consulted. Where would you get a better naval expert than Captain Sir Charles Ottley, for instance, who was there to advise our delegation? Some of the plenipotentiaries of the Powers were generals and admirals. All those points that have been so strongly objected to by many speakers this afternoon were closely sifted, not merely from the humanitarian and legal point of view, but from that of those who know what war is, who are quite familiar with sea and shore hostilities. So far with regard to the general tone of the discussion. Now I will say a word about one or two specific points. There was, first, the question of notice of war. I thought I had made my standpoint pretty clear in my lecture; but I fear after the discussion that I have not. The Conference said that "Hostilities must not commence without previous and explicit warning." But it did not say that the warning must be given a certain length of time before the first act of hostility. It would be quite possible, as Lord Graham put it, to send your ultimatum in, and say that if you did not receive a satisfactory reply within twelve hours war would commence, while at the same time you were concentrating your fleet and putting it into a favourable position for striking the first blow. But you must remember that the enemy might send a declaration of war, saying that, as you were concentrating your fleet, he intended to begin at once, and then he would be free to begin the moment the telegraph informed him that his declaration had been received. The rules which are laid down clarify the practice of the best States, and simply guard against one State secretly preparing a force and then striking a blow at the heart of another, without even asking for the redress of any grievance or declaring what the quarrel is about. There have been one or two what we might call modern instances of that, but only one or two. After all, States have consciences, and when they meet together and agree upon rules of warfare, though there is no force to "run them in" if they disobey, they are in the position of gentlemen who are members of a club or of a profession or of a society which has made certain rules and who have come in on the understanding that they will accept them. Occasionally some very blackguardly person does break such rules, and he is expelled from his club, or people cut him, and in the end, though nobody may give himself the pleasure of kicking him down the stairs or horse-whipping him, the man is made to feel in a hundred and fifty different ways that he is a pariah. The same thing has happened in history, and would happen again, with regard to States that have set all rules at defiance. There was once a man named Napoleon who did this. He dominated Europe for a good many years, but ended his life as a disappointed, beaten, banished exile on the rock of St. Helena. Depend upon it, the opinion of the civilised world is a great force in the world, just as the opinion of society is a great force in society. Though

it is quite true that we have no International police, it is equally true that, as civilisation advances, we get more and more reality in the various rules that have been laid down for the conduct of International affairs. Then I must say a word or two on the question of mines, because it seems to me there is a good deal of misapprehension about them. We maintained that contact mines that were put adrift ought not to be used at all, and we wished strong restrictions to be placed upon the use of anchored mines. A gentleman who has spoken to-day has said that all the other Powers were against us in that matter. That is quite a mistake. Some very powerful States were against us. For instance, France and Germany wanted a larger use of anchored mines than we were prepared to allow; but instead of it being a case of Great Britain against the rest of the world, there were divisions and cross divisions, in all of which we obtained influential support. My own judgment is that when the matter is thoroughly ventilated, as it will be between now and the next Hague Conference, public opinion in the various States will be so strong in favour of these humanitarian restrictions that many and many a Government which would not consent to them last year will consent to them in the future. One may say that with regard to many matters connected with war. There was a great Conference at Brussels in 1874 to try and settle the laws of war on land. It failed; but a very large part of the proposed Brussels code was embodied in the code drawn up for war on land by the Hague Conference of 1899, and has been further developed by the recent Conference. The attitude of mind which lays stress on these things is of course quite different from that which puts forth the criticisms we have heard to-day. I appreciate their friendly tone, though a good deal of what I said was characterised as nonsense. I do not think I talked nonsense. I do not say that I was always right; but just as humanitarians ought to consider the exigencies of practical men who have to conduct war, so practical men who have to conduct war should realise that the world was not made for war and warrings, and that they have other forces than guns and bayonets to consider when they are drawing up practical rules about bombardments, for instance. It might possibly terrify a State if you went and bombarded a rich and important undefended town, where your shells would kill the women and children, but it would be equally likely to steel the heart and nerve the arms of every man who could hold a gun and make him fight to the bitter end. Should we be greatly awed if Brighton were bombarded by a French squadron? I think we should determine that the war should not finish until the enemies who had bombarded Brighton had been made to suffer for the women and children they had killed and the peaceful homes they had overthrown. Always strike hard in war, but strike at the enemy; strike at the forces arrayed against you, and make your rules so that you do not destroy non-combatants, or put an end to property which cannot be of use for a warlike purpose. You have men of commerce to reckon with, and they are very important and very powerful. Moreover, you have to take account of the humanitarian sentiments of the civilised world. It is quite possible that a belligerent who makes his own law on his own quarter-deck, unrestrained by any International rule, and laughing at it as mere nonsense, will find himself faced by a combination of powerful States and go down with a mighty overthrow.

The CHAIRMAN (Rear-Admiral A. A. C. Galloway):—I think we shall all unite in thanking our distinguished lecturer for his most able and valuable Paper, and also for the extraordinary amount of information condensed into its narrow limits. I venture to think that the keynote of Inter-

national Law is given in this remarkable sentence written by our lecturer, where he says there is a growing sentiment "that private vengeance and personal ferocity ought to be eliminated from what is a solemn national appeal to force." That I consider is a very fine sentence, which I have no doubt dominates us who are fighting men to a great extent. We are ready to go to war for our country when called upon, but we have no animus at all against the foreign Powers that we may have to encounter. We take as great an interest in foreign naval and military history as in our own; we respect the brave of all nations, and we are ready to extend our protection to those who are helpless, whether they belong to other nations or to our own. I think that is the feeling which seems to dominate International Law at the present moment. With regard to the question of the declaration of war, previous notice, I consider, is very much more necessary with navies than armies, as naval forces, especially torpedo craft, are always ready for instant action, and mobilisation is swifter. Certainly, in our case the land forces would take an appreciable time before they were in a position to fight. As regards the question of the enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of war, there is a curious tendency nowadays towards compensating the enemy with gold. Formerly we paid our friends in gold, but our enemies we paid with steel and lead. Next I want to say a few words with regard to the question of balloons. There is a very curious state of things at the present moment in connection with that subject. We have what is called the Maritime League, which extends three miles from our shores in a horizontal plane. Will that Maritime League ever have its analogue in an Aerial League, and if so, what will be the length of it? Does sovereignty extend to the zenith? Might a fleet of war aerials pass over a neutral country; if so, at what height? Those and others are questions that will have to be settled at some time or another. Weights can be dropped from any height, but shells will have to be projected about twelve times as fast as at present to soar completely clear of the earth's attraction. Fortresses might be protected by anti-balloon batteries, but not ships. I do not see at present how we are going to mount an armament in the vertical plane for use in men-of-war as we now have got in the horizontal plane. So that in the future it appears to me that our fleets will probably consist of, in the first place, aerials; in the second place, surface gun ships; in the third place, surface torpedo craft; and in the fourth place, submarines. An admiral in charge of a conglomeration like that will have his work cut out, and I have no doubt that International Law will have to be called in very frequently. When we come to the question of bombardment, it is very satisfactory to find that there is some sort of consensus of opinion that open towns should not be bombarded, as that is a question which has often worried senior naval officers. I can speak from personal experience that the question of bombarding an open town is occasionally a thorn in the side of the senior naval officer present. Perhaps I may be forgiven for mentioning one case where I had the happiness of stopping a bombardment of that sort. The town was in possession of the insurgents, and the Government sent a land force and also a ship to bombard it. It was an open town, which was built of wood and was level with the sea. If the ship had bombarded she would have set it on fire, and there would have been great loss of life. That very town had been bombarded and destroyed fifteen years previously, when one of our men-of-war and a foreign man-of-war were present. On this occasion it was stopped. Of course, International Law does not quite apply between Governments and insurgents—Municipal Law, I suppose, applies there. In this case we had to apply International Law "with the chill off." But it was a very

curious state of things. I hope I am not taking up too much of your time by narrating these personal experiences, but other gentlemen have spoken from the practical point of view, and practical statements sometimes are of use. A few months after that my ship was sent for in a great hurry to tranquillise Montego Bay, Jamaica, which was also in possession of insurgent negroes, who, to the number of some thousands, had marched on the gaol to the tune of "Onward Christian Soldiers," where they were received with magazine fire. The positions were identical in both cases, except that my parts were reversed. In one case I was the judge, and in the other case the culprit. In one case a man-of-war was not allowed to take steps to stop insurgents in his own town, and in the other case he was. That curious state of things came under my own notice. In both cases International Law, though not quite germane, was administered, though perhaps it cut both ways. The awkward point in the first case was that the would-be bombardier notified in writing—he wrote a most emphatic letter—that he intended to attack to establish the power of his Government over their own town. That was rather a hard nut to crack, but nevertheless the bombardment was not allowed. With regard to the question of fishing-boats and small craft, I would be inclined to say that they cannot exert any marked influence on the course of a war; but I am of opinion that they should never be allowed to come near a man-of-war in war time because of torpedoes. Then it says in the paper that "missions" should be allowed to proceed on their way. I think the word "missions" covers a very great number of sins. Missions, in my opinion, should be as closely watched as Nelson, when a captain, watched the frigate of his most Christian Majesty in the West Indies. When he weighed, Nelson weighed, and when he anchored, Nelson anchored. He did not go far from him. You will remember that Nelson said he did that in order to show proper respect to his Christian Majesty! As regards the question of postal correspondence, I should say from my little experience that the solemn overhauling of clumsy mail bags in war time would be a farce. It is inconvenient to stop the mails and for them to be stopped. The lecturer has well put it that as messages can be sent so much swifter and more subtly than formerly, to stop belated lumbering despatches is mere waste of energy. I do not think we should get much good out of it, and both belligerents fare alike. As regards merchant sailors, I incline to the opinion that clemency should always be extended to them if possible. One of the great qualities of Julius Caesar was his extreme leniency, and I think that leniency in this case is well deserved. These men deserve well of their countries respectively. I do not think they ever would exercise much influence on the course of war, and I think if our men are allowed to go free the enemy's men might be allowed to go free also. I do not think there would be much harm done in either case. Although merchant seamen, especially abroad, are often R.N.R. men, we probably gain as much as we lose by giving them liberty. Then we come to the question of Red Cross work. Fast hospital ships with wireless apparatus might often be as useful to an unscrupulous admiral as a spy or a good armoured cruiser. They might be made good use of in that way by the enemy. I do not suppose they would be, but they might be, and I therefore think they ought to be very carefully watched. The chaplain's and doctors' position does not seem to be improved if they can be detained by the hostile commander-in-chief at pleasure. That might be until the war ended. I might tell you another thing that came under my notice in this connection in regard to Red Cross work. A "certain" Power established a so-called hospital on a "certain island" off a "certain" port. The refusal of an offer to land a surgeon—I offered to send a

surgeon—to assist at operations confirmed suspicion, and it was found that the "hospital" was a coal store. *Verbum sapientibus.* I have not seen the humanity side of the question put much to the front; but it seems to me that, after what they have gone through, men saved from ships destroyed in an action might be interned if picked up by any class of neutral ship, as presumably they have fought well. So that I quite agree there with the lecturer that in that case they should not be prisoners. The points that I have alluded to so far have passed by general consent; but when we come to controversial matters we are on more delicate ground. With regard to the question of submarine mines, submarine mines are rather curious in some ways. Contrary to the usual opinion, under-water attack was hoary with age when the Pyramids were being built. The Chaldeans attached bituminous inflammables to the bottoms of hostile ships by divers; the Byzantines pumped Greek fire through submerged tubes against hostile vessels for three hundred or four hundred years; and when the Saracens at last discovered the secret they followed suit. Very soon after gunpowder appeared it went under water almost as soon as above it, and nothing but mechanical difficulties prevented the universal adoption of submarine mines. Although they have been in use for so long, it seems rather curious that it is only recently so much has been written about them, and they have caused so much fuss. Really they have been known for a very long time. Everyone is familiar with Giambelli's explosion vessels at the siege of Antwerp in 1585, and a naval officer in 1628, at the siege of La Rochelle, reported that he had of course poisoned all the wells. He looked upon that as a seamanlike precaution; but having done that he said that some "hellish" individuals belonging to the enemy had sent certain cases of explosives floating down against our ships. The point of view has been exactly reversed since then. Now we employ mines and do not like poisoned wells. It will be seen that we have advanced a good deal in two hundred and eighty years, though I think I remember that in the Soudan we filled in wells, and thus a man had a chance of dying of thirst instead of by poison; and International law would be maintained, so that no doubt he would die content.

Sir THOMAS FRASER:—It was not a well; it was a pond of rain water, and it was dry before we left it.

The CHAIRMAN:—Be that as it may, we allow the mines and we do not like the poisons. Mines are now a settled institution, and as they are a most powerful weapon, they should not be used indiscriminately. In my humble opinion, our talented lecturer is quite right in insisting that those who use mines must be held rigidly responsible, both by belligerents and neutrals, for any damage done by them to innocent shipping. We often see it stated that England loses by the pen what she gains by the sword; but if this be true, how is it that two small islands in the North Atlantic own more land than any other Power on the planet, and are probably not the least strong at sea? When we come to controversy we should remember that England has what other nations want, and who think they have as much right as ourselves to a corner by the fire. International Law recognises humanity, convenience, and vital interests. As regards the first two, we can give as well as take; but as to the third I feel sure that no Power in *extremis* would ultimately permit itself to go down through an altruistic adherence to academic arguments. It seems admissible to add that if we can find no line of least resistance through the weight of opposing opinions or no resultant combined from so many divergent views, we must then fall back on the naval position we hold

in the world, which has taken so much blood, so much treasure, so much time to build up, and say: "My friends, let us agree to differ; we will follow our views and you yours. We shall take all steps open to us to counter each hostile move and to prepare in peace for the victory we hope in war. Meet us then or not, but remember that naval power, which to you is a luxury, is to us a necessity." Once England lost command of the sea and found the Dutch in the Thames; again and dropped a continent; a third time may lose an Empire. I am not prepared to follow Dr. Lawrence into his eloquent appeal and remarks on the combination against us, but I do most firmly consider it requires the most careful thought. I will conclude by moving a most hearty vote of thanks to the distinguished lecturer, who has condensed into such a small compass so much thought, and has produced one of the most interesting and valuable lectures it has ever been my pleasure to hear.

THE NATIONAL HORSE SUPPLY AND OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

On Thursday, 20th February, 1908.

The Earl of DONOUGHMORE, in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN:—The task of a chairman upon occasions such as usually bring us together here is invariably an easy one, because it is his duty to get out of the way of the lecturer, and to confine whatever he has to say to the winding up of the debate later in the evening. But to-day, although we have no paper before us, I think my task is a specially easy one, because we are fortunate in having for discussion a very interesting subject, and in having amongst us a very large number of experts upon that subject. We are fortunate in having with us Colonel Granet, representing the War Office, who I will, in a few minutes, ask to open the discussion, and who will be able to inform us what the national needs are in the matter of horse supply. A large number of gentlemen, who are interested in the question of horse breeding, have also promised to come and speak on the question, and, therefore, I think we may look forward to a very practical and useful discussion. It is really only my duty to name what I conceive to be the main principles that we have to keep in view, and I have said that I hope the discussion will be essentially practical. I am almost certain we shall be told that there is at the present moment a very large deficiency in the matter of horseflesh, and, therefore, it seems to me it is our duty this afternoon to turn our attention specially to the production of the article here. Of course, it will not be out of order to discuss the production of the article from foreign countries and from the Colonies; but primarily, I think we must feel ourselves interested in the production of the article at home—not only the production of the article, but, going further still, the provision of stallions and the provision of brood mares. We have to consider the production of the article from the beginning until it finds its way into the ranks of the army. There is only one point I want to lay stress upon—it is only a matter of opinion, and it may be contradicted in the course of the afternoon; but I am convinced myself that any provision of the giant *haras*, or giant breeding establishments of foreign countries is, at the present moment, not practical politics in England. The needs

of the country are very great. I am not going to anticipate Colonel Granet's figures, but I remember that we required for the South African War alone something like over half-a-million horses; and if anything approaching such a demand as that is ever to be made upon us again, it is obviously impossible to contemplate that we should find horses to that number ready to hand in any Government breeding establishment that we could possibly contemplate now. Therefore, as I say, I do not believe that the provision of Government *haras* is, at the present moment, practical politics—I am using the word "politics" in the broadest possible sense. I hope this afternoon's discussion is going to be confined to practical remedies, of which I know there is one that will be submitted to you in detail. I believe the result of this meeting will be most beneficial to all who, like myself, have come here, not so much with the object of speaking as with the object of learning.

Colonel E. J. GRANET (Assistant Director of Remounts, War Office):—I will begin by telling you exactly the number of horses which we require to mobilise, not only our expeditionary force—by which I mean all our Regular troops at home—but our territorial forces. The total number required to bring all units up to the war establishment is 173,770. Of these, 59,000 are riding horses. The majority, therefore, are cavalry horses. We believe that we should want a reserve at once of about 10 per cent. to meet casualties, such as accidents in trains, deaths on board ship, and so on. Assuming, now, that the wastage in the war will be such that every unit will require to be completely re-horsed every six months—I may add that that is considerably less than our experience in the South African war, which we take as abnormal for obvious reasons—but assuming that every unit requires re-horsing at the end of six months, at the end of the year of such a war we should have taken from the available stock in the United Kingdom 332,000 horses, of which 180,000 would be riding horses. Now we come to our resources. It is extremely difficult for us to arrive at anything like an accurate estimate of what our military horse population is, if I may use that term; but by dint of a great deal of assistance from the Board of Agriculture, from Chief Constables, from Masters of Hounds, and so on, and a great deal of hard work by our remount staff officers in the districts, we have arrived at an approximate estimate of 1½ millions, and of these only about 150,000 are riding horses. Therefore, at the end of the year we should require 180,000 riding horses, whereas there are only 150,000 in the country. Unfortunately the birth-rate is a decreasing one. We are told by the Board of Agriculture that there were 10,000 fewer foals dropped in 1906 than in the year before, and of these we are told we may reckon that at least 75 per cent. would be horses suitable for military purposes. In Ireland there is also a serious decrease. In 1907 there was a decrease of 1,450 brood mares; there was also a decrease of 1,250 of what are classed by the Irish Board of Agriculture as "amusement or recreation horses," which are horses that would be suitable for army purposes. During the South African War we had a great advantage in that the whole horse population of the world was open to us. It is extremely doubtful whether we should enjoy any such advantage in a future war. I have only to add that the Secretary of State for War and the President of the Board of Agriculture have in hand an important scheme for the encouragement of

horse-breeding, and especially the breeding of a type of horse suitable for our requirements. I can also assure you that the War Office have a scheme well in hand to secure to us a larger reserve of cavalry horses than we have at present on mobilisation.

Mr. R. TILLING :—I think the resources of the country for the supply of horses in times of war can be best gauged by our ability to get horses for our business in times of peace. I think it will be conceded that we should be dependent as little as possible on supplies from abroad. During the South African war we drew very largely on foreign supplies. We are worse off now than we were before, for the following reasons. The horses which were taken during the South African war were the best that could be selected by the Army purchasers, and those which were least desirable were left behind. These selected horses were never returned to this country, and consequently we have been of late breeding from mares which were passed over by the Army purchasers. In purchasing horses for one portion of the business which I represent, we find that a much larger proportion of unsuitable animals are shown to our buyers. I attribute this to the fact that farmers buy and breed from mares which are purchased at a small cost, irrespective of their suitability for producing sound, serviceable animals. Farmers frequently complain that they cannot sell their horses at a profit, and the reason, I think, for this is that they do not produce a marketable animal. A very large proportion of the horses that are foaled are, I think, only fit to work on the farms on which they are born. Very few of them are fit for town work. I think you will find that the horse that is fittest for town work is the fittest for the needs of the Army. There is a growing tendency, I find, for the breeding of show horses. Since the introduction of mechanical traction the useful horse—the horse fit to do a hard day's work and a long journey—is becoming less required in trade. Therefore the horsey farmer—the man who breeds a horse and knows what will pay best—generally breeds a show horse. The horse that fetches the most money is the horse with the most action, and he is not always the most useful animal. There are a great many non-horsey counties in England, and these counties are not well supplied with a proper stallion; neither does the farmer know—he has not been educated to know—the class of mare and the class of stallion that should be used to produce a serviceable article. There does not seem to be any country—and I have bought horses from almost every country in the world—equal to the United Kingdom for the production of a sound, serviceable horse, if we only took the trouble to breed him. It is an open secret that the London jobmaster has had to resort to foreign supplies for some considerable time past, and the reason for that is that our foreign neighbours have been careful to produce the class of animal we want, and it is also well known that the stock to produce these animals has been drawn from this country. It seems to me that there has been a considerable deterioration of late in the size of the horse produced, and when we want a sound, serviceable horse of a fair size we generally have to look through a very large number and reject them because they are not big enough; they are dwarfed to what they used to be. It seems to me that what is lacking is some system, fostered by the Government, for the production of the right class of horse. It would appear that in this country we have guns, but we have no horses to draw them with if we were pushed, as we were during the South African war.

Lieut-General Sir EDWARD HUTTON, K.C.M.G., C.B. :—I hardly expected to be called upon to take part in this discussion at this early period,

inasmuch as what I propose to say is principally in reference to the horse supply of Australia and Canada. Colonel Granet has pointed out the enormous number of horses that will be required in time of war to complete existing war establishments. In the last fifteen years, during which I have been concerned in commanding and organising the military forces of Australia and Canada, I have endeavoured to the best of my ability, to bring this all-important question of horse-breeding prominently into the political and practical arena of these two countries. I endeavoured especially to do so in Australia on a recent occasion when I was asked by the Horse Breeders' Association to address them at Sydney upon the improvement of the breed of horses, with a view to the development of the horse trade generally and of military remounts in particular. The Australian horse during the last ten years has deteriorated to the most serious extent, and as it is upon Australia to a large extent that India now depends for its horse supply, and as it was also from Australia that a very large number of the horses upon which our troops were mounted in South Africa were obtained, it becomes a very important matter from the military point of view that the horse supply of Australia should be fostered to the greatest possible extent. The Indian Government in 1901 appointed a Commission to enquire into the whole question of remounts and report upon the condition of the Australian horse supply as regards the requirements of the Indian Army. The Commission arrived at the unanimous opinion that the Australian horse had most seriously deteriorated, and was still deteriorating from what it had been in past years. The reason is an obvious one. A well-bred, weight-carrying hunter class of horse is now no longer required for the cattle stations of Australia. The cattle stations of Australia, like the ranches in North America, are now broken up into wired-in paddocks, and it is therefore unnecessary for boundary riders and men employed on the stations to have a high-class horse to round-up their cattle. The consequence is that the demand for the class of horse which we soldiers specially require no longer exists, or only exists to a very small extent. The same arguments also largely apply to the Canadian horse, and especially to the horse which is bred upon the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains in the North-West Territories. During the period of my command of the troops in the Dominion of Canada—1898-1900—I endeavoured to do all in my power to get the breeders of Western Canada, and of the North-West Territories especially, to seriously consider the importance of developing and improving the class of horse which the ranches were then producing. The proposal I made to the Canadian Government, and also to the War Office was similar to that which I had previously made when commanding in N.S. Wales in 1893-6, and again recently when commanding the Commonwealth Army. It was that in the cases of both Canada and of Australia, a horse-purchasing agency and dépôt should be formed by the War Office in both those countries. In the case of Canada, I proposed that a dépôt should be formed at Calgary, N.W.T., in the centre of the best horse-producing district, and in the case of Australia, in one of the central States, either N.S. Wales or Victoria. The difficulties pointed out by Mr. Tilling are most strongly felt by the whole of the horse-breeders in Canada and Australia. They do not quite understand the standard of horse required which will bring them the greatest profit, and by establishing a horse-breeding agency at both these places many of the difficulties would be met. The actual expense of the formation of these agencies was carefully gone into in the reports made by me some years ago, to which I have referred. The cost of the agencies should in both places be practically covered by the cheaper supply of suitable horses.

Lieut.-General Sir JOHN FRYER, K.C.B. (Colonel, The Carabiniers) :— I should like to emphasise what Sir Edward Hutton has said about the Australian waler. I have the good fortune to be the colonel of the Carabiniers, and two years ago I visited my regiment at Bangalore, Madras. They were mounted principally on Australian walers, and as I commanded the regiment twenty years ago in the Punjab, I knew that the waler at that time was a very different animal from what it is now. I cannot help saying that in my opinion the waler has deteriorated to a very great extent, and my first impression was that it would be exterminated. The shape of the present waler is totally different from what it was. Twenty years ago he was a hunter of a fine weight-carrying class. There were a few buck-jumpers, but that did not matter. Generally speaking they were fine weight-carrying horses. But at the present moment the waler is a long, lean animal with very spindly shanks, and wanting one or two more ribs. I can only say I fully agree with what Sir Edward Hutton has said, that the horse bred in Australia has deteriorated to a very great extent.

Colonel W. H. BIRKEECK, C.B., C.M.G. (Commandant, Cavalry School, Netheravon) :— It might be of interest to you to consider for a moment the steps taken to ensure a plentiful supply of horses for the Army by a nation to which the menace of war is perhaps more of a reality than to ourselves. For the purpose of illustration only I propose to apply the French system to the United Kingdom. You would then have under the War Minister a Director of Remounts, under whom would be some five remount circles, each presided over by an assistant director; say two in Ireland, two in England, and one in Scotland. Under the Minister of Agriculture you would similarly have a Director of the Stud Department, and under him five similar circles, each presided over by an assistant director. The connection between the two departments would be made by a Council sitting under the Agricultural Minister, and composed of those twelve officials of the Remount and Stud Departments, supplemented by gentlemen nominated by the Agricultural Minister, who have an interest in the breeding of various classes of horses—thoroughbreds, hackneys, shires, and so forth. The Stud Department would be worked in this way. Take the northern circle of England; the assistant director would have some four or five stallion dépôts, each dépôt containing, say, one hundred stallions of various kinds; one would be established at Northallerton, to serve Northumberland, Durham, and York; one at Kendal, for Westmorland, Cumberland, and North Lancashire; one at Chester; and one about Grantham, for the Midlands. The officials in charge of these dépôts would become intimately acquainted with the horse-breeding capacity of their districts. They would make constant tours in the winter, calling together meetings of farmers interested in horse-breeding, scientifically advising them as to the mating of their mares, and arranging for the stallions which should be sent to travel that district during the covering season. Then in the spring the stallions would all be distributed in the various districts, each district being suited with the class of horse that it wanted. These stud officials would be in close unofficial communication with the remount officers of the corresponding districts. The Remount Circle would contain, say, two dépôts, and these would be the purchasing centres. The purchasing season would be in the late summer and autumn. Horses would be bought on certain days of the week at the dépôts, i.e., any young horses that the farmers choose to bring that were suitable; and the

remount officials would, further, make regular advertised tours throughout their own districts, visiting in turn the market towns and such like centres for the purpose of purchasing horses direct from the breeders. They would buy horses in the autumn of their fourth year. The horses would all be bought under legal guarantee of soundness and freedom from vice. They would be sent to the remount dépôts, kept there for observation for some three weeks, and then sent to remount farms in connection with the dépôts for two years, joining their regiments in the autumn of their sixth year. After a year's careful training they would join the ranks of their squadrons, mature, fresh, well-balanced horses, ready to serve the country for a good ten years. In the case of mares suitable for breeding, the remount officers would be authorised to purchase them at the end of their second year, i.e., just rising three, in the spring, and leave them with the farmers who bred them, on condition that they kept them well and worked them only very lightly, and put them two years running to an approved Government stallion. At the end of the first year, if the mare is in good condition and has bred a foal, the farmer would receive £14 for its keep; at the end of the second year he would receive another £20; and when the mare's second foal is weaned—that is in the autumn of her sixth year, she would join her regiment just like any other horse. The farmer gets a good bargain. He would get his money down; he would get the use of his mare for light work on the farm, and he would get two foals which would be unconditionally his own property. The State, on the other hand, would get two remounts kept for them for two years instead of sending them to a remount farm, and would possess an asset in two embryo war-horses. The case of mares likely to breed, cast before they are fourteen for any special reason, would also be specially legislated for. They would be sent back to the district from which they came and would first be offered to the original breeder, and if he did not want them, they would then be sold at a close auction of the breeders of the district of whom the remount authorities approved. The War Department would allot a certain sum from the Army vote annually to be given in prizes at local shows for horses of all classes which were offered to the Army for sale by the breeder. There again they would be as liberal as they were about the foals, because the prize-winner would be allowed to forego his money prize and accept a certificate if he found he could make a better bargain elsewhere, and he need not sell the horse to the Army at all. That is an outline of the French system. The gist of it is that you have a Government Department which guides the general horse-breeding policy of the country. They breed no actual horses themselves, but they provide horse-breeders with the means of breeding good stock, with a view always to Army requirements, and they give them sound advice as to the mating of their mares. You have a Remount Department which has very intimate connection with every horse-breeder in its districts, buys direct from the farmer without any middleman at all in the way of a dealer, and knows where to find horses when wanted for war. Of course, that cannot be done without money, and every French remount costs the Government from £70 to £80 before it joins the ranks. Statistics, giving the time the French remount lasts compared with our own, would possibly show that their system is no more costly than our own. But, anyhow, the French money goes direct into the pocket of the French farmer, and with the bitter experience of the German invasion of 1870 fresh in their minds, fortunately neither the French Government nor the French people grudge money spent on the efficiency of the Army.

MR. ALGERNON TURNOR, C.B.:—We have had two very interesting statements from people in high authority as to the deficiency in the supply of horses for military purposes. Both those statements are most valuable, and we need not now labour the point. It is admitted on all sides, and admitted by the Government, I think, that the question to which we have to address ourselves is: What is the remedy we can propose? Our noble Chairman has already said that the establishment of gigantic Government *haras* is not within the range of practical politics. I agree with him. I would like to address myself shortly and as clearly as I can to the memorandum which put before Government in 1906 certain proposals which grew out of the Conference summoned at the Board of Agriculture. That memorandum was submitted, previously to being placed before the Government, to two important Breed Societies: the Council of the Hunters' Improvement Society and the Committee of the Brood Mare Society. It was closely examined, and it was unanimously approved. I shall therefore explain to you its principal provisions, and I think if there should follow any criticism and comments thereon it might be an advantage to all who are concerned. The memorandum divides itself into four parts: the organisation required, the provision of suitable mares, the further provision of adequate stallions, and finance. The whole question, to my mind, is a matter of organisation. What we desire to do is to take some step which will make the breeding of general-utility horses remunerative instead of being non-paying as it is at present. In the case of thoroughbreds and shire horses, the industries are remunerative. The thoroughbred, of course, has considerable elements of risk, but the prizes are so great that those who breed them are tempted to go on, because perhaps in one or two cases they get a prize which pays for their deficiencies in previous years. In the case of the shire, the shire has been improved by skill and by judgment in breeding until the market for him is pretty well assured. Neither of those two classes of horses require assistance from the Government. The general-utility horse is an animal the result of haphazard and chance, as a rule. We have not bred him on any sound system or on systematic lines, and the result is that we breed a large proportion of misfits. If we can do anything to remedy that, to improve the standard of excellence, to improve the quality, and to cheapen the production, we shall be doing something towards the object we have in view. The scheme proposes that the Minister for Agriculture should make such arrangements as seem best to himself for the appointment of an organising committee sitting in London. That committee should be composed, as we think, of representatives of his own department, of the War Office, of the Irish Department of Agriculture, and two or three of the most prominent Breed Societies. Its functions should be to select the suitable districts of the United Kingdom—there is no use in breeding in a district that is not suitable—and organising those districts and providing them with a certain number of mares of the right quality. That process would be achieved by following very much on the lines that have been laid down by the Brood Mare Society. That society selects a district, forms a local committee, and through the agency of that committee it finds out who would be the custodians of the mares, and takes the necessary steps to put the mares within the reach of those custodians. The conditions are clearly explained to the custodians, who are generally farmers. The mare always belongs to the society; it is always liable to be withdrawn on demand. The mare must be served by an approved sire, and the produce will belong to the farmer or the custodian, with the exception of two fillies, which he is bound to offer to the society at a fixed price at three and a half years

old. The object of that provision is to ensure continuity of blood. We lay very great stress upon the establishment of a good family and the maintenance of that blood, and we want to devise some system by which we could arrive at a good family and ensure that the blood should not be lost. That system, we think, we have hit upon by proposing that the Government should purchase from the society the best fillies bred under this system at three and half years old, off the grass, unbroken, for a sum of £35. Those two fillies—we only take a right to two from the custodians—we should like to see passed into the Government service, and if they qualify to become officers' chargers that the Government should pay us the difference between the price of the trooper and the price of the officers' charger, and that we should pay that as a premium to the breeder. Further than that, after a number of years' service, which would have to be fixed, say five, six or seven, the best of those fillies, with their good record in Army service, should come back to the society, which would place them back again with the breeder. Thus you will go on always taking the best and preserving the continuity of blood. We think that by that means we should very greatly improve the standard. Among the other details is the provision of proper sires in the district. We think there ought to be two classes of sires: one for the heavy mares, and heavier horses for the slighter mares. We think that if each district is organised in that manner, and if the local committee provides for the inspection and mustering once a year of the animals brought into that district, we should gradually build up a register of useful horses which would be most valuable in time of stress, and we should also be instrumental in helping the sale of those horses because we should gather them together at a fixed spot every year and do our utmost to invite the buyers to come down. The scale of the horses will be a great inducement to the breeder. At present he has difficulty in getting rid of his horses; he does not quite know how to prepare them, and the difficulty of marketing them is his trouble. They generally pass to a middleman, and he takes all the profit. That deals with the section which relates to the mares, and I should now like to say a word as regards the stallions. We propose in our memorandum that the very modest sum of £25,000 a year—which I do not know is quite adequate, but it is a beginning—should be placed at the disposal of the Minister of Agriculture. We thought, roughly speaking, it might be divided into three heads: £10,000 a year to be spent on the acquisition of mares, and £10,000 a year to be applied to the acquisition of stallions. In Ireland they have a system by which the Government advances loans to individuals and associations to enable them to purchase good stallions under very stringent conditions. We think it would be desirable if something of that kind was adopted in England, in addition to the horses provided by the Royal Commission. There are many horses which we find out. They win our prizes and get the imprimatur of the society as good animals, and are then bought by the foreigner because we have found out their merits, and he is satisfied with what we have done. But that is no advantage to us. We discover and they purchase. We therefore think there ought to be a fund at the disposal of the Government, either to advance money for the purchase of these horses or to make some arrangements for their being let out in the United Kingdom. That is a matter of detail. Then I come to the disposal of the other part of the sum of money. I have dealt with £20,000 a year, and there remains £5,000 a year which would have to go partly in expenses and partly in endeavouring to get other Societies to conform to our rules. I believe an organising committee could do a great deal with the country Shows in

assimilating them to the objects we have in view, and preventing a great waste of money which invariably goes on. The Shows are conducted by committees and subscribed to by local gentlemen. Sometimes you may have in an area of, say, twenty miles, six or seven Shows spending £300 or £400 a year each in prizes. I believe a great deal more could be done with that money if it was properly organised and properly expended. There are several points on which we should very much like information from those in authority. One is with regard to the mares that pass into the Army service. I have noticed of late a very great improvement, and this arises from the fact that the Government now purchase officers' chargers and let them out at so much a year to the officers. They pay a higher price for those chargers than the troopers', and the result is they get a better class of animal. I think that might be developed, and if we were sure of getting a good many of those mares, assuming they bought mares for that purpose, we should be getting back a better class of mare than hitherto has gone under the name of the trooper. I have had three or four of those mares recently, and I have noticed the difference, and I think that is a point which is really worthy of attention. I confess that the doubt I have about all these suggestions is the mode of marketing the animals when you have produced them. If we do not manage to make it attractive to the breeder he certainly will not go on producing animals which he has to sell at a loss. That is the main point to which I think we ought to give our attention: first, to improve the standard; and, secondly, to assist the marketing for the animals. That is a subject which might be very well handed over to a committee, and it is hardly one which we could discuss with advantage to-day. The main lines of the provisions which I have explained are before the Government, and we earnestly hope that something will emanate from them, and that before long we shall have some scheme which will, at all events, be an attempt to put matters on a better footing.

MR. W. T. TRENCH:—I do not think I shall be able to give you much more information than what has already been placed before you; in the first place, because I came entirely unprepared to make any speech, and secondly, because the gentlemen who have spoken before me have a very much more intimate knowledge of the subject than I can possibly claim to possess. On that account I shall only occupy your time for a very few moments. I wish, however, to remark with regard to what Mr. Turner has mentioned, that I think the crux of the whole problem—the point upon which the scheme hinges—is whether or not we can make the breeding of the general-utility horse remunerative. If we cannot, then we must go to some other country where we can find horses that will suit what the Army requires. We have heard to-day—and to me it was more or less of a revelation—that a very large number of horses are required for the Army. As a member of the Hunters' Improvement Society, we have been constantly told, and have always understood, that the Government requirements in the matter of horse flesh were adequately supplied if they got from 1,500 to 2,000 horses annually. Further than that, we were told that they had no difficulty whatever in supplying themselves with 1,500 horses a year, and therefore that it was quite unreasonable to expect that they should give any assistance to the horse-breeding industry. I must say that always struck me as being a very fair answer to the request. Now the situation is entirely altered. We must have an enormous number of horses if the country is to be made safe in time of war. These horses must be forthcoming, and the question is, how can it be done? We have heard to-day of the decadence of horses in other

countries; we have heard of the decadence of horses in this country; but I think all speakers are thoroughly agreed that the best horses in the world can be produced in the United Kingdom. It is in the United Kingdom, and I believe especially on the other side of the St. George's Channel, where I come from, that the best horses are to be found, and it is in those countries that the industry ought to be developed. If we can get the matter put on a paying footing, the breeding of light horses, of general-utility horses, including troopers, will proceed with very little assistance once it is fairly started. But it requires a large capital to start with at first, and I think we may fairly, considering the requirements of the Government, expect that the Government will give adequate funds to enable the industry to be put on a sound basis. Mr. Turnor suggested the appointment of a committee which would represent the interests involved, and if that committee were appointed I do not think that anything more practical could be done. Some time ago the Hunters' Improvement Society attempted to find out, by issuing a series of questions¹ to a large number of different persons, what steps ought to be taken so that the horse-breeding industry could be made remunerative. The report dealing with their replies is still forthcoming, and if such a committee were to sit, I think some valuable information could be obtained from it. The whole object, as I said at first, is to try and make it a paying business, to try and provide a good market and to eliminate misfits. The horses will be forthcoming then, and we shall not fall short of the requirements, no matter what war might come upon the nation.

Lieut.-Colonel C. F. COLVILLE:—I think this meeting has scrySTALLised and emphasised most clearly and distinctly certain points of view in regard to this question; certain landmarks have been established; certain sign-posts have been erected. This meeting has shown—but we knew it before—the absolute necessity of a further supply of horses. It stands to reason that an Army without horses is as bad as an Army without officers, and that an Army without horses and without officers is as bad as a man-of-war without motive power or a rudder; it is an immovable machine, absolutely useless. It has been shown most clearly and distinctly that the supply has fallen off. I am a director of the London Road Car Company, and we have purchased during the last twenty years on an average something like one thousand horses a year, and I have been largely responsible for the purchase of those horses. I know something about markets, and I say that you cannot buy now, notwithstanding the introduction of mechanically-driven machines, the same number of horses with substance, power and size that you could do formerly. I corroborate every word that Mr. Tilling has said in that connection. I suppose of the stud horses owned by the Road Car Company, from 80 to 90 per cent. are imported horses. Why? Because the kind of horses we wanted could not be supplied then in sufficient numbers in the United Kingdom. If that foreign supply falls off, and it has fallen off, if it deteriorates—and it is deteriorating—we are then thrown back upon the United Kingdom, and where will we be? There may be any number of horses in the country, but not the sort of horse that we want. Then comes the question: What is the remedy? The remedy has been pointed out by Mr. Algernon Turnor. It is necessary—absolutely necessary—that this question should be taken up seriously, energetically, and im-

¹ The series consisted of ten questions, and replies were received from 466 individuals, societies or other bodies.—W.T.T.

mediately by the Government. Up to the present day we have simply been playing with the question by voluntary organisation. The Royal Commission on Horse-breeding has placed some twenty-eight premium stallions in the country. Many judges of horses do not consider them quite what they should be, because the money at the disposal of the Royal Commission is not sufficient to get people to bring forward the best class of stallion. Stallions with bone, stamina, and proved endurance must be sprinkled over this country in much larger quantities than they are at present, so as to be available for the mares. But it is no use having these stallions sprinkled over the country unless you have suitable mares to which to put them. Consequently suitable mares must be kept and produced in the country in much larger quantities than at present. The Brood Mare Society, of which Mr. Algernon Turnor is the Chairman, and of which I am a member, has done something in that direction; but it only claims to be a signpost. It is a tentative organisation, trying to see what can be done, but it is crippled and hampered by want of funds, and cannot do much. The experience, however, which it has gained is invaluable, and is at the service of the Government. The Government need not be afraid that they will tread on its toes or interfere with voluntary or individual effort. The Brood Mare Society has no desire to continue in existence; it was simply anxious to do something whilst the Government has been doing nothing; but if the Government will take it up, if they will benefit by the experience which it has obtained, it will feel that its existence has been fully justified, that it has done all that it could have done, and will no longer desire to continue in opposition to the Government. Therefore I hope that this meeting will crystallise its efforts by urging upon the Government the absolute necessity of immediate and energetic action.

Viscount VALENTIA, C.B., M.V.O., M.P.:—I think there are a certain number of counties in the Midlands which are not made use of at present by the authorities for the purpose of obtaining a supply of horses from them. No remount officer ever comes down there, and I think it would be most advisable if the horses available were registered in those counties; but so far nothing has been done in the way of registration of horses that exist in them. It is most necessary, as has been said by Mr. Turnor, that the horses must have great attention paid to them if we are to supply ourselves with special horses for Army purposes. But I believe there is a great deal to be done yet by the old system of registration, which was in vogue for some time, and that the supply which is required for the mounted services could be obtained to a much greater extent than it is at present. I believe if the Remount Department were to send down to the market towns of various counties in the Midlands they would succeed in obtaining what horses there are there. Whenever there was a sale they would be quite certain of getting a number of useful horses for cavalry purposes. So far as I know at present, no remount officer ever comes down to the Midland Counties and buys horses from out of those counties. I believe all the horses supplied for cavalry purposes come from Ireland, and it seems to me a pity if there are horses in the Midland Counties—and I believe there are—they should not be called upon to supply the needs that exist.

Sir RICHARD D. GREEN-PRICE, Bart.:—I have had a long experience of breeding horses in the Midland Counties, and have, therefore, been very much interested in the discussion to-day. I feel that many of the things which have been said in the Theatre this afternoon are of the

utmost importance to the question before us. It is not only a case of the Army being without horses, but I think it is a case of the nation being without horses very soon. The breeding of light horses has deteriorated in my experience of the last fifty years in a very remarkable manner. It is so far a fact that really our horsey farmers are almost going out as a breed. We have not men who are farmers taking an interest in breeding horses that we had twenty-five or thirty years ago, and it is all because we have not that encouragement from the Government which other nations that breed horses have. I was very much interested in what was said by the officer who suggested we should copy the French system, because unless we have a system by means of which we can arrange that horses shall be bred, and a market made for a reasonably useful horse of a military description, I think it is hopeless to look for any improvement. We are talking in the air unless we know that the Government are prepared to meet this question in a straightforward way. It really comes to this. We all know the existing needs, and they are really too serious to blink at at the present time. The Government, in a friendly way, may make promises, but their promises are like piecrust—they only exist to be broken; they never come to any decision. I hope that at a meeting such as this, where so many gentlemen feel that the question is really a national question, we shall be able to press upon the Government the fact that it is not a political question but a national question. I hope we shall impress upon the Government the reasons why they should face this question and bring the light horse-breeding industry in this country into a satisfactory state. I could tell you a great many facts connected with the decline of horse-breeding, but they have already been laid before you by military authorities, and they are too real to be blinked at. I do trust something will be done which will make the horse-breeding industry of this country a useful and practical industry.

The CHAIRMAN (The Earl of Donoughmore):—I am sorry to say that I have to ask a question in the House of Commons in a quarter of an hour's time, and I will, therefore, ask my friend, Mr. Chaplin, to take the Chair.

The Chair was then vacated by the Earl of Donoughmore, and taken for the remainder of the meeting by the Rt. Hon. Henry Chaplin, M.P.

Brigadier-General Sir HENRY RAWLINSON, Bart., C.V.O., C.B. (Commanding 2nd Infantry Brigade, Aldershot):—In connection with this question there is a point which I think it is well for us to consider, especially with reference to the very large figures quoted by Colonel Granet as necessary during the first year of war, I understand, for the mobilisation of six divisions. The figures quoted were 320,000 horses as being necessary in the first year, of which 180,000 would be riding horses. I imagine that in that number of riding horses he includes the artillery. We have heard a great deal this afternoon of the difficulty of supplying these general-utility horses. I am not surprised that the numbers required have been a revelation to some people, who have not previously studied the question of the enormous number of animals required for the mobilisation of an army. But there is a remedy which I think it would be worth our while to consider. It lies in the use of mechanical transport, which, to some extent at least, would reduce the number of horses required. In times of peace the Army have been satisfied with some 1,500 to 2,000 horses a year; in war we suddenly want 320,000 horses a year. There

are services, such as ammunition columns, the transport of heavy material for supplies, and so forth, which, under mobilisation arrangements, have, up to the present, been required to be done by horses. I think soldiers will agree that many of these duties might be done by mechanical transport, more especially as that mechanical transport has now come into the ordinary routine of commerce for the movement of heavy weights, and which might be registered for the purposes of the Army in time of war, just as the 'bus horses used to be registered. I merely wanted to put this before you as a possible means of reducing the enormous number of horses which, in present circumstances, I feel sure it would be almost impossible to supply.

Colonel Sir WILLIAM C. E. SERJEANT, Kt., C.B. (late Lieut.-Colonel 5th Battalion Rifle Brigade) :—I propose to approach this subject from a practical standpoint, and from the outlook of the small breeder, whom we really want to get at to supply us with the enormous number of horses required, not only for the needs of war, but in times of peace, in order that we may carefully prepare them for the special purposes to which we are going to devote them. We hear a great deal now to the effect that the Government should do this, and should do that; but when we look at all Governments we find they merely possess the capacity for spending money; not that for making money, and that is the difficulty. The tax-payers know this, and they are sometimes suspicious. We find that in expenditure for horses—I do not know why it should be so—there is a tendency, especially when the country is hard-pressed, for the Authorities to be liberal on a certain side. We have known that in the past, and, therefore, tax-payers imagine they are somewhat justified in being suspicious. But there is a remedy for this, provided we establish certain conditions, which has not yet been put forward, though I was hoping that Mr. Algernon Turnor would, at all events, have given us a practical outline of the scheme which, I believe, the Brood Mare Society has placed before the Authorities. I am going to approach this question also from the point of view of a president of a small horse show in the West of England. I spent the last Christmas season and New Year's Day in commune with a well-known master of foxhounds, in assisting to work out some useful problems connected with this question. We have approached a large number of small farmers—men who want money, men who can pay attention to breeding—take a delight in it. They are willing to assist the Authorities and benefit the country, because they want money. We cannot expect patriotism nowadays at the expense of a man's livelihood. We cannot expect horse-breeders—small farmers and dealers—to supply the Government unless they are enabled to do so on a profitable basis. What do they say? Farmer after farmer is prepared to accept the following conditions—now this is practical. "Supply me with a brood mare," says he, "I will pay you £2 a year rent; I will take no risk; I will keep and feed your mare; I will be responsible for putting her to the right type of stallion, and will pay the fee. But when that mare drops a foal, that foal must belong to me, to sell when I like, where I like, and to whom I like. I will work your brood mare up to the very last, and you know that is essential, not only to the health of the mare but to that of the foal." Now, that is the outline of the scheme; those are the terms upon which farmers are prepared to accept practically any number of brood mares that might be offered. We can place in my own district—not a very large one—as many as sixty brood mares at the present time, and I believe Mr. Turnor will bear me out when I say that the Brood Mare Society has—I speak subject to correction

—placed 60 mares, at a cost, for keep only, of how much do you think? Ten shillings! Here we have a scheme which is economical, which is comprehensive, which is satisfactory, and of proven popularity. You require no great Government fund, as in the case of France, Austria, or Germany to promote and work this scheme; but you do require the hearty co-operation of the very classes that you cannot do without, whenever you take action in this important matter, or in any general appeal to arms, those are the lower class and the lower-middle class. The only way in which we can ensure success, the only way in which the Government can economically institute and build up a sufficient stud, with every chance of success, is by enlisting the services of these people who are most interested, viz., the small farmers, who are willing to take brood mares on the very simple conditions I have specified, and who will then make it their business to see that the country in time of peace, as well as in time of war, is plentifully supplied with the right kind of animal. But, you may say, why should the proposed State-aided breeders sell these fillies as suckers, or at any time and to whom they like? The object is to keep the right kind of animal in the country, and to create a market for young stock, which would be popular with breeders. We, who advocate this scheme, suggest that the Government should also buy from the non-State-aided farmer, leaving the State-aided people, to some extent, to get as big a price as they can in the ordinary market. In time of war you will then have a big return in sound, suitable horses. You can work with a grant of £10,000 a year up to a stud of 12,000 mares with ease and certainty. But, before I sit down, there is one point I should like to impress on the Brood Mare Society. And here I come directly in conflict with the scheme which they have advanced. I do not believe in buying deteriorating or old mares; it is bad business. I believe in buying improving mares, because you get better stock and more certain results. I think I am correct in saying that if you buy improving mares, and let them to the farmers under the brood mare system, a mare, for which you would pay from £25 to £30 one year, you can sell next year for £37 or more, in the event of her being drafted out as barren. That is good finance. An aged or deteriorating mare is frequently worth merely the price of her skin—ten shillings. I consider that if you got a Government grant of £5,000 a year, you might make a sound start; but £10,000 a year would, of course, be better; you must go cautiously at first, and see what you are about, and work it, say, in three or four counties, which are prepared now to take the scheme on. But do not work the scheme by means of expensive "Official" Committees. You might have a Central Committee here in London, but the people to appeal to are the masters of foxhounds throughout the country, and the country gentlemen of Great Britain and Ireland, who would go into this scheme, not so much to make money out of it, as to encourage their tenants and the small, deserving breeder, so as to assist all who are interested to obtain exactly what they require in the way of horse flesh.

Colonel J. SEELY, D.S.O., M.P.:—I have only just come in, and therefore have not had the privilege of hearing the earlier part of the discussion owing to my enforced absence in another place; but I accepted the kind invitation of the Society to say a word or two in regard to the matter of mounted infantry, because I was asked by the County Association of Hampshire to undertake an inquiry into the supply of horses in that large county when the new territorial scheme was about to be put into force. The results of the inquiry were certainly very striking. They

showed that there was a far larger supply of horses available, especially the lighter kind of horse, than we had any idea of. They also showed another remarkable thing, that the supply was greater in populous centres, and was much smaller, as far as we have been able to ascertain, than it would have been say, 20 or 30 years ago in the purely farming districts. For instance, of all places in the world to find a very large supply of very excellent horses—many hundreds—Bournemouth was a place that could supply an immense number suitable for the Territorial Forces. Therefore, I think we need not despair of finding the total number of horses required for our Army if we adopt some of the measures which I have heard suggested to-day. I am not competent to speak as to which is the best method, but what strikes me—and this shall be the last word I will say—is that two things have to be borne in mind. The first thing is to get the necessary number of horses for our troops, and with regard to the Regular Army, all that we want is to have enough horses bred within these islands. But with regard to the Territorial Force, which is a much larger force numerically, we want not only the horses but we want the men to ride them, whether as artillery or as cavalry. Therefore I submit to this distinguished company that it is as equally important for the purposes of the larger half, though perhaps the less important half—the Territorial Army—to get the ownership of the horses widely distributed as it is to get a large number of horses bred. The importance of this is overwhelming, for if you have horses only bred by large concerns, whether State-aided or otherwise, the great mass of people of this country will never bestride a horse. The only thing they will bestride is a bicycle, or they will go for a ride in a motor car. Therefore, the number of men who can ride a horse will be a considerably reduced number—will be reduced ultimately almost to the vanishing point. I would suggest that the result of this Conference to-day should be that a Committee might be appointed by the Secretary of State to go into the matter, say, with the assistance of Mr. Chaplin and others who are here present, and that they should emphasise in their report the importance of some such scheme as obtains in Switzerland being adopted, where not only are efforts made to get the required number of horses, but where especial efforts are devoted to seeing that each man who is going to serve in the cavalry owns his own horse, and thus, as has been explained by many Swiss, French, and German officers, artificially create a class which rides not only during the brief period of training, which is all that can be possibly afforded in an industrial country like ours, but will have the opportunity of riding all the year round. They will thus become acquainted with the horse, and will learn that most difficult thing of all things—even more difficult than equestrian—horse management. I cordially support the suggestion that this meeting should press upon the Secretary of State the importance of the matter, and urge that some State action should be taken.

The Right Hon. Sir CHARLES DILKE, Bart., M.P.:—I was not present during the first part of the discussion, and I should therefore like to ask whether the point of the shortness in the number of cavalry horses has been sufficiently mentioned. It is a striking statement, but if you leave out the artillery, and if you look at the number of our cavalry horses only we cannot in the least horse the force which we are supposed to be ready to send abroad at an instant's notice. My friend Colonel Seely has just mentioned the Swiss system. The Swiss are now increasing the number of their cavalry, and they are making an experiment which France has also made in two army corps already, namely, of attaching cavalry to an

infantry battalion. There is a tendency at present in all countries, especially in Japan, to increase the cavalry forces. At the present moment we are woefully short of horses—leaving out the Territorial Army altogether—for the Regular cavalry. I have here Mr. Haldane's memorandum stating the force of cavalry which could be sent abroad immediately on an expedition. We have 11,368 trained cavalry soldiers "at home," but we have only 7,577 cavalry horses of all ages in the United Kingdom. It is, of course, a frightful waste to have cavalry soldiers, which are very costly to produce, without any horses for them to mount, and anything like rapid mobilisation of that force is impossible under present conditions. Then, formerly, we used to know the proportion of the 7,000 horses which were of military age. That fact is now concealed, on the ground that it is necessary to shorten Parliamentary Returns. One page alone has been left out, and that is that page from the Annual Report of the British Army, which is three pages longer than it was before the page was left out. That is done on the ground of shortening the Return in order to save expense. In Germany no horses under six years of age are counted as being fit to be sent on expeditionary work, but we used to count them under five. Now we no longer know how many of the 7,000 horses are of military age. It is obvious that we are very short of the number of horses required for the proper mobilisation of our cavalry, and I believe the same is true of the horse artillery and even the field artillery of the Regular Army.

Lieutenant C. E. B. DENNISS, R.F.A.:—One point which has only just been touched upon during this discussion is the export of mares. At every small fair in Ireland representatives of foreign nations may be seen buying. They only buy mares of the best type, and there is no competition except by private buyers, who cannot compete with the prices offered. Thus every year only inferior mares are left to breed from. Mr. Tilling, I think, said that eighty per cent. of the omnibus horses were foreigners; but there is very little doubt that they are of English stock bred abroad, and the profit realised by the foreigner. The small breeder must be offered inducements to keep or to sell to the Government good stamp mares. I do not see why *pro rata* export duty could not be levied and the income be devoted to the object in view.

Mr. G. STAPLETON:—We have heard a great deal about the short supply of horses. We all acknowledge it; we all know it. It seems to me, however, that the most practical thing is to endeavour to arrive at some suitable remedy as has been suggested in the course of the discussion. With this end in view, living as I did in Lincolnshire, I set to work three years ago to find out what was the most practical way of stopping this depreciation in the number of horses. I have been showing horses all my life, and I knew perfectly well the cause of it. The cause was this: that we were losing all our fillies. I set to work to see if I could create some sort of scheme and system that would be really practical if put into working order. I have succeeded so far that 47 Masters of Hounds in England and 1 in Wales, 9 Chambers of Agriculture, and 600 breeders in England have written to me in full endorsement of the scheme, that I am going to lay before you, so that I am not bringing forward this scheme until it has had a good test as to whether it is workable or not. I shall be glad to supply any of the gentlemen here with a pamphlet containing a short description of the scheme. The suggestion is this: That in September the foal shows are visited by a representative of the Army, and that all brood mares then exhibited with a foal at foot should

receive a premium of £5, and if the foal is approved it should receive £2; that is to say, £7 in all. Then, next spring, in February, if the foal is alive and well and in a sound condition it is to receive £3 more. If in November of the same year it is in the same healthy condition and growing all right it is to receive another £3; that is, £6 in all. It goes on for two years under the same conditions. Before the 14th May in its third year the Government have to declare whether they propose to keep that animal or not. If they say: "It is no use to us," it is then immediately left in the hands of the owner, and he does what he likes with it; but the owner has received £5 for the mare, £4 for the foal, and £6 for the yearling. He will have received by the time it is three years old £15 in all. If the Government take it, they can make their own arrangements with the owner by paying him £8 a year, so that the animal can remain in his charge for requisition at call, under the control and protection of the Master of Hounds. Every Association is attached to a pack of hounds, and it bears its name. The Master of the Hounds is the President, and he selects his own Committee. There may be 20, 30, or 40 mares in a particular Hunt that will be attached, they having accepted the terms I have mentioned already. The responsibility and control of the Society ceases when the animal is three years old, for the reason that it gives Agriculture Societies, the Hunters' Improvement Society, and the Hackney Society the opportunity of making use of them, developing them, and getting the benefit of them, as this Society is simply one for the purposes of production. When we treat the subject of British production we have to remember that we are not quite situated in the same way in England that they are in other countries. In other countries the breeding produce is practically the property of the State. In England the high standard of breeding as it stands to-day in every class and division you can think of has been brought about by the personal capital, energy, and enterprise of the individual himself, whether it is the shire horse or the hackney. Those two classes particularly stand out; the stride they have made during the last fifteen or twenty years is enormous. To what is that due? Not to any assistance from the Government, because the Government have granted nothing. I only mention those facts to remind you that the breeding material of England is in private ownership. Being in private ownership it has to be dealt with, and the only way to deal with it is by means of the national funds. As to the necessity for a further supply of horses, we are all acquainted with it. It is an imperative thing that the Government should come forward and give some sort of assistance so that this scheme may be carried out. To cut it short, there are to-day 50 Masters of Hounds in England and one in Wales who are prepared to attach a Society to their hounds and to be President of the Society. They have signed a memorandum to this effect: that they will give their services in every way to assist forward the movement, so that the particular branches will not cost a farthing for management in any shape or form, on the condition that the Government finds the money for the premiums. What will it cost the Government? By the time a horse is three years old it will have cost £5 for the mare for the first year and £2 for the foal; £4 for the yearling, £6 for the two-year-old, and £4 for the three-year-old, as "before the expiration of the first fourteen days of the month of May of the year in which any colt or filly is three years old the Society must have obtained from the Government their declaration of acceptance or rejection of any registered colt or filly, other than those reserved by the Society for breeding purposes." The Society having this advantage: that when they are two-year-olds (I most thoroughly believe in breeding from two-year-olds)

they have a lien upon them and retain them for breeding purposes only. "If and when accepted the Government to pay to the Society the sum of £8 per annum for each colt or filly as long as such remains in the hands of the owner (for requisition at call) to enable the Society to continue the annual premium payments to the owner." "If the Government, upon acceptance of any colt or filly, shall deem it necessary at any time to take immediate possession of the same and remove it from the custody of the owner, the Government shall immediately pay to the Society the sum of £25 for such said colt or filly, which sum of £25 the Society shall immediately pay over to the owner of the colt or filly in question." It wants a great deal of thinking out, but there are many things in these conditions that I consider are very much in favour of the Government. For instance, the responsibility for the premium payment can cease at any time—twice a year, spring and autumn. That is the scheme of this powerful Society, and we shall be very pleased to do anything we can to co-operate with any other Society to bring about the result we want, namely, the production of horses. If you study this scheme, no doubt you may be able to suggest many alterations that might be made; but I am sure you will agree with it in principle, and say that it might be made use of by the Government. If it had not been practical I do not think so many people would have been in sympathy with it.

Captain ARTHUR W. à BECKETT:—I only want to say a very few words. I wish to speak because I have just returned from Argentina, and I have had the advantage of seeing how the breeding of horses is carried out in that country, and I have been able to supply some figures to the War Office which at any rate have not been treated with contempt. What I have suggested is this: that if we do not make Argentina entirely a place for the production of our horses, we could at any rate make it a very valuable auxiliary. The figures which I have prepared, which have been carefully audited by those who are competent to undertake that duty are these: It is said by experts that His Majesty's Government would derive great benefit from such an establishment as I propose. Such an establishment would enable His Majesty's Government to count at any time on a good supply of well-selected horses at a minimum cost. The capital necessary for the purchase of a suitable property and for its management would be comparatively small. Assuming that the land required would amount to an area of some three square leagues—sufficient to carry three thousand brood mares—the cost would be at about 200 dollars—paper—£17 10s. per hectare—2.47 acres, or, say, at a total cost of 1,500,000 dollars, approximately £129,258 sterling. This, I hear, would be an outside price. This land, of which one league would have to be reserved for the offspring of the brood mares, could be obtained at this estimated price in the southern districts of the province of Buenos Aires, where the pasture is in every way adequate for the rearing and healthy development of the foals. The farm and depôts should be situated at a convenient distance from a railway station. The stock of brood mares mentioned above could be obtained at about 100 dollars per head, costing in all 300,000 dollars, or £26,000. The sires required for the services of these mares would number some 75, calculating 40 mares per horse. The acquirement of these sires I would recommend should be made in England, and should be selected from good big-boned thoroughbreds and from French *percheron* horses. From the former with the Argentine mares would be obtained horses suitable for light cavalry and mounted infantry, and from the latter

with the same breed of mares horses suitable for artillery work. For transport service mules could also be produced from old and inferior mares very economically. The sustention of such an establishment, calculating roughly, would entail an annual outlay for the first three years of some 36,000 dollars—£3,145. After this period these expenses would be considerably reduced, as during that time the fencing-in of paddocks, water supplies, and other requisites would be concluded. Further, during that period the establishment would be put in a condition to supply the necessary fodder for the maintenance of sires requiring to be stabled during the winter months. The Argentine horses are brought up in a very healthy climate on their birthplace, the pampas, being nourished on natural fodder. I understand that to-day, owing to some 50,000 horses having been exported, the market price of Argentine horses has risen to a sum not exceeding £15 per horse. It has been estimated that His Majesty's Government could produce horses in Argentina, after the expiration of three years, at a cost of £5 per horse. During the period the stock was being produced, if necessary purchases might be made from other establishments at a cost not exceeding £10 per horse. I found local horse-breeders anxious to assist in the carrying out of the scheme I have the honour to suggest. I also believe that there are British officers resident in Argentina who might lend their assistance to bringing my proposed plan to a successful issue.

The CHAIRMAN (The Right Hon. Henry Chaplin, M.P.):—I am informed that it is usual for the Chairman at these meetings, or whoever is in the Chair at the end of the proceedings, to say a few words upon the general course of the discussion. With your permission, therefore, I would like to begin by saying, in reply to the question that was put by Sir Charles Dilke, that although I was not in the room myself at the very commencement of these proceedings, I understand that on high military authority it is agreed that the deficiency in our horses of all kinds is placed beyond all dispute at the present moment, and indeed if any confirmation of that information was needed we should find it in the statement made by one of H.M.'s Ministers, viz., Lord Carrington at the Conference which he summoned of those interested in the breeding of horses about eighteen months ago. Perhaps I may briefly refer to the noble lord's speech at the close of the proceedings. It was to the effect "that it had been a very representative conference. . . . It was absolutely necessary to have some scheme, some basis to work upon. Much practical information had been laid before them, and he was encouraged to hope that after the valuable suggestions which had been made, with the help of the gentlemen present, something practical and useful may be done. As Mr. Chaplin and the Duke of Portland have said, pounds, shillings, and pence is at the bottom of everything." Alluding to the duties of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other claims upon him, "he was not without hope that if supported by the noblemen and gentlemen who were present, and if he could put before him a definite proposal, that Mr. Asquith would see the great necessity of doing something towards this great and important national object; and that he should be able to get some measure of assistance towards carrying out a scheme to remedy what is at present a thoroughly unsafe and unsatisfactory position." That was a grave and important statement to be made by one of His Majesty's Ministers and one in which, from my own investigation of the subject for many years, I entirely concurred. The statements of the President, and his general attitude at the Conference, were regarded as so encouraging that

a meeting of the Commission¹ was promptly summoned to consider them with the desire of rendering to Lord Carrington any assistance in their power in the promotion of the objects which he had before him, and I am justified, I think, in saying this: that very shortly after the Conference met, a communication was addressed by the Commission to Lord Carrington. It assured him of their readiness and anxiety to assist him in every way they could, and it expressed the confident belief of the Commission, that an agreement on a scheme such as he had indicated might be and ought to be arrived at without difficulty, if the co-operation of other public bodies such as the Brood Mare Society and others was obtained. That this could be effected they had little doubt; but in view of the labour, the time, and the expense involved, some understanding would be necessary, that some further assistance from the Treasury would be forthcoming in the event of an agreement being reached which was satisfactory to the Government. To that communication no reply of any kind, except a bare acknowledgement, was received until more than twelve months after, and when received it gave no answer to the suggestions of the Commissioners; neither was any answer made, so I am informed, to the memorandum addressed to the Department by the Brood Mare Society, which no one who is interested in the subject and sees it can read without great interest. The President's reply to the Commission was reserved for a speech made at Scarborough nearly a year afterwards, and I may be pardoned if I refer to it. He is reported to have said that "he had arranged a Conference last year of those best qualified to advise on the subject; but almost the whole of the time of the Conference was occupied by speeches from members of the Commission who enlarged on the need of more money, but proposed no plan whatever for dealing with the question." He added that "it was impossible to ignore the fact that many agriculturists were very dissatisfied with the Royal Commission." That statement may or may not be accurate; I am not in a position to judge. It is possible with those who are ignorant of the work done by the Royal Commission, and still more so of the difficulties that they have had to contend with from the first. But with regard to the statements as to the time which was occupied by the Commissioners, and that no plan whatever was proposed, the authorised record of the proceedings at the Conference shows that they are contrary to the fact. It would be too long for me to read the description of the scheme which is contained in the report which is published by the Board, but I affirm that it was a clear, workable, definite, and practically complete scheme which was submitted by a member of the Royal Commission who had been invited by Lord Carrington, both personally and officially, to attend at that meeting. And it is largely embodied in the memorandum in the report of the Brood Mare Society, which was published after the Conference. As the Royal Commission, of which I am a member, has been the subject of a great deal of hostile criticism since then, may I summarise as briefly as I can some of the work of that Commission during all these years? They have published eleven reports, but I will only refer to the most important. In their third report they state that, with the aid of a grant from the Treasury, they had taken further evidence, first of all as to what should be included in the diseases, which they afterwards embodied in a schedule, which ought to disqualify horses for premiums, and secondly, as to the general working and utility of the present plan for the distribution of premiums. With this result, that the witnesses generally agreed that with the limited means

¹ The Royal Commission on Horse Breeding.

at their disposal probably the plan adopted by the Royal Commission was, on the whole, the best that could have been adopted. The Commission at the same time suggested that the annual grant should be increased from £5,000 to £10,000 a year. In their fourth report they pointed to the success of the stock got by premium winners in winning prizes at shows in various parts of the country, which still continues. Again, they state in their fifth report that they had applications from all parts of the country for premium winners, but were obliged to reply that from want of funds they cannot meet them. In their seventh report the general soundness of the horses exhibited is made manifest by the judges, and the continued success of their stock is very satisfactory. In their eighth report they are obliged again to repeat that the sum annually voted is totally inadequate to enlarge the usefulness of the Commission. This is a complaint that they have repeated again and again. Then again, the question has been constantly before them in other reports of the want of assistance to promote and make provision for brood mares throughout the country, to which they are obliged to reply that nothing could be more beneficial, but that it is entirely beyond the means of the Commission. When you consider that all that is placed at the disposal of this Commission, which is charged with the important duty of improving the breed of horses in this country, is £5,000 a year, and compare that with the estimates of other countries for that purpose, it is obvious at once how totally inadequate it is. I will dwell no further on these reports, except to say a word upon the tenth. Hitherto the stallions had been judged entirely on their merits, no information beyond their age and height being given to the judges. In 1903, however, information as to their racing career was also supplied to the judges, and, according to their reports, with excellent results. Again the Commissioners point out that the question of remounts has been repeatedly before them, and they have made recommendations with regard to the purchase of remounts at an earlier age, but with absolutely no result up to the present time. I apologise to this meeting, but as the Royal Commission has been very severely criticised of late, I thought I should be right in referring to some of the difficulties with which we have had to contend. Now comes the question of what is to be our remedy and what ought to be done. Lord Carrington himself declared with perfect truth to the Conference that the question of pounds, shillings, and pence lies at the bottom of the whole thing. So it does. What I rather complain of is this, that having held out to us very considerable hopes that the question would be fully considered if we would submit a definite and comprehensive scheme—which has been done and which is approved of by the leading organisations and public bodies interested in the question—that no response whatever has been made to our suggestions. What I complain of is no action whatever, so far as we know, has been taken nor is there any prospect of further assistance to the industry, which we had some right to expect after the statements of Lord Carrington. How we are to get it now I do not know, with the Budget approaching. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is hardly likely to listen with much patience to any fresh demands upon him at the last moment. I do not suppose that with all the pressure we could bring to bear we could expect to get anything done on this occasion. But I am encouraged by the presence of Sir Charles Dilke, Colonel Seely, and others whom I see taking—and I rejoice to see it—so active and intelligent an interest in this question. When I think of the strength of our case and the gravity of the question upon which it rests, I am hopeful still. If we put our shoulders to the

wheel, and if we can get the assistance and support of a few of our friends on the other side of the House of Commons upon a question which is a purely, and ought to be a purely, non-party question, then we may get something of that assistance which we require, and which would enable us to fulfil a great public duty and to meet a great public need. My honourable friend, Mr. Algernon Turnor, went into the figures of the question. He has so far cut and dried a scheme that he is ready to tell you exactly what ought to be done with the £25,000 a year we ask for—£10,000 for the improvement of mares, £10,000 for the retention of the best stallions, which now leave the country, and which, if we had that sum at our disposal, we should be able to keep here instead, and the remaining £5,000 left for the organisation of the scheme which will have for its object to induce the farmers and the breeders of this country when they have the right material placed at their disposal to make use of it, and in that way permanently to improve the breed of horses in this country.

STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS.

CAVALRY IN BATTLE (15TH AND 16TH AUGUST, 1870).

By P. LEHAUTCOURT.

Translated by permission from *Le Journal des Sciences Militaires*,

By Major E. MAKINS, D.S.O., 1st Royal Dragoons.

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No. IV.

THE SURPRISE OF FORTON'S DIVISION.

16th August.

ON the morning of the 16th August the position of the Army of the Rhine was as follows: Forton's Division was still in the neighbourhood of Vionville on the Mars-la-Tour road, and that of General Du Barail on the same alignment on the Etain road. The 2nd and 6th Corps were a little in rear by Rezonville; a portion of the 3rd Corps was at St. Marcel; the rest of the 4th Corps was still *echelonné* in rear as far as the Moselle; the Imperial Guard and the Reserve of the Artillery was round Gravelotte.

As regards the enemy, the IIInd Army had commenced the passage of the river; the 5th Cavalry Division and the X. Corps threatened, as we have seen, to cut the Mars-la-Tour road; the III. Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division were in the valley ready to march by the same road. The remainder of the Army was *echelonné* to the left or the rear. The whole of the 1st Army was still on the right bank of the river.

According to the orders of Marshal Bazaine, our troops should have been ready to leave in the early morning, in order to advance on Verdun. The Emperor, who was in advance on the Etain road, had just started when the Commander-in-Chief suspended the movement, under pretext of giving to those portions, who were late, the time to close up on the heads of the columns. The movement was to have been resumed in the afternoon; but the enemy decided otherwise.

The night had been cold, but the morning was magnificent, and it was easy to foretell a broiling hot day. Forton's Division occupied almost the same position as on the evening before. Murat's Brigade was still bivouacked in two lines to the south of the Mars-la-Tour road, immediately to the west of Vionville, the two batteries in the third line. Gramont's Brigade was in rear to the right, also in two lines, on either side of the road from Flavigny to St. Marcel, with Valabregue's Division on his left.

The stillness of the night had been broken by some shots fired on the outposts of the 10th Cuirassiers. In the morning our patrols reported, in the direction of Mars-la-Tour and Tronville, the presence of a few horsemen, who were not slow in firing on our vedettes. General Forton thought that it was sufficient to support the patrols later by some dismounted dragoons of the 1st Regiment. The General himself also climbed several times on foot the little hill to the west of Vionville. He wrote later that he had only perceived some detached cavalry, who showed themselves at Puxieux, in the direction of Tronville, and were supported by a troop of weak strength (*sic*) at a great distance in rear.

One circumstance contributed to his peace of mind. Captain Arnous-Rivière, of the great Headquarters Staff Scouts, an Irregular Corps quite recently formed, had been put under the command of General Frossard. At midnight the latter ordered Arnous-Rivière to reconnoitre the roads from Mars-la-Tour and from Chambley, and then to put himself in communication with Forton's Division. At 6 a.m. Arnous-Rivière reported to Frossard that he believed Mars-la-Tour was occupied by a "few" of the enemy. The exits from Tronville had been barricaded during the night, but the village had been vacated "for the moment." A reconnaissance of more consequence was that of Lieutenant Devaureix, of the 66th Regiment, who gave precise information on the proximity of the enemy, which without doubt remained ignored by General Forton, in the same way as it was unnoticed by Frossard. "At Army Headquarters . . . our Colonel was told that he was not to send any more information, as that of the Cavalry had been received; and that he appeared to see Prussians everywhere. General Valazé protested against this idea, stating that our supports were already engaged."

As it was, at 8.30 a.m. the order was given to the 2nd Corps and to Forton's Division to off-saddle and water the horses.

General Frossard gave, it is said, the following order: "The Cavalry patrols have just come back; they have reported they cannot find the enemy anywhere; the troops can have their dinners." Soon several fatigue parties went for wood, water, and rations; on all sides fires were lit and kettles were filled. However, the outposts of the 1st, 7th, 9th, and 12th Dragoons reported the approach of the enemy, who were advancing "in great masses." General Forton was warned that

"large forces" appeared to want to debouch from the Tronville copses, and that Cavalry had appeared on the plain by Mars-la-Tour.

Captain Saint-Arroman, who had been sent to reconnoitre, reported also the arrival of Prussian columns on our left from beyond Tronville. At 6 a.m. the outposts of the 66th Regiment of Vergé's Division, which was more to the east, had already reported that there was some German Cavalry on the border of the Vionville wood. A deep spirit of unrest spread throughout our bivouacs.

"Each felt that the hour was approaching." Forton went on in front to the crest to the west of Vionville with Prince Murat and Colonel Durand de Villiers, his Chief Staff Officer. He stopped just in front of the camp without leaving the road. Colonel Reboul, of the 9th Dragoons, had joined the General, and several Dragoons were concentrated a little in rear. Thanks to his tall figure, the Chief of the Staff saw, without doubt, all the ground in front of the left, which had escaped the view of the Divisional General, who was very short. After having looked for a moment to the left, the Chief of the Staff turned to the General and said to him in a loud voice: "But, General, it is the fact of the 4th Corps rejoining us that is being signalled." Apparently satisfied by this unreasonable explanation, the two Generals and their *entourage* went back to Vionville without giving any orders.

Thus, from all sides Forton had been warned of the approach of the enemy. It is impossible to account for his aberration of mind, or why these warnings did not cause him to make any fresh dispositions.

The Commander of the X. Corps, General Voigts-Rhetz, had given the 5th Cavalry Division the order to advance against the bivouac, which it had reported to the west of Rezonville, and to take the first opportunity of attacking it. Although the main body of the Army Corps continued its march towards the Meuse, it seemed that its Commander considered the task of Rheinbaben the most important and the most delicate. His first idea was to accompany Rheinbaben in order to infuse into the division more of the dash which it so greatly needed. He decided afterwards to send his Chief Staff Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Von Caprivi, with this object. He gave this officer, who was in his entire confidence, a strong escort in case Rheinbaben should be opposed by larger forces than had been reported. He put also at Caprivi's disposal a good number of officers, in order that he might be able to modify as quickly as possible the direction of march of the different columns of the X. Corps. He gave him full authority to do this ere he started.

Caprivi joined Rheinbaben at 3 a.m. He was received "very coldly." Since 5 p.m. on the previous day the Division had not got any fresh information. It was known from the inhabitants that none of our troops had passed through St. Hilaire on the Mars-la-Tour road. It was not known if any columns had followed the Etain road; but the impression of

Rheinbaben himself was that our Army had not yet quitted Metz. "The French horsemen," said he to Caprivi, "are pivotted on Metz and its neighbourhood; it is in this direction that they retire when battle is offered them, and it is from Metz that the majority of them come." He concluded that no French had yet passed, and that they were still in Metz, but he had no certain knowledge, in spite of his 34 squadrons, and in spite of our extraordinary inertia.

In spite of the very precise instructions brought by Caprivi and of the latter's personal insistence, Rheinbaben did not move until the approach of the 3rd Corps coming from Metz had been reported. He was still not disposed to execute the offensive reconnaissance which Voigts-Rhetz had ordered him to make in the following precise terms: "General Von Rheinbaben, in front of whom to-day (15th August) a hostile Cavalry Division has retreated on Metz, and in front of whom is an enemy's camp of all arms, will advance to-morrow morning on this camp and will endeavour at the same time to reconnoitre the road from Metz to Conflans. He will seize the first favourable occasion to attack the enemy."

Redern's Brigade was in advance of the main body of the Division. Having left at 6 a.m. from Xonville, it stopped to the west of the Buxieux ravine with the four batteries of horse artillery, of which Rheinbaben had the disposal. It was not until 8.30 a.m. that Redern continued his march on Vionville by the south of Tronville. Behind him Bredow's Brigade marched from Suzemont to Mars-la-Tour by the Verdun road, and also Barby's Brigade, which formed the reserve, from Xonville to Tronville.

Redern sent forward, as advance guard, three squadrons of the 10th Hussars and a battery. A little behind in line of masses were the 11th and 17th Hussars with the three other batteries in between them.

It was known already from the outposts that there was immediately to the west of Vionville a French Cavalry bivouac, whose only occupation appeared to be to cook their dinners and to water their horses.

The 10th Hussars did not meet any patrols of the enemy as far as Tronville.

When Caprivi and Lieutenant Von Podbielski arrived at Tronville in front of the artillery of the advance guard, the village was full of French cavalry (of which one man alone was armed), who had come to water their horses. Naturally, the appearance of the enemy threw them into terrible confusion.

Schirmer's battery took up a position to the north-east on the point 286, and before he was seen opened fire from a short distance (about 1,500 metres) on the left of Murat's Brigade (9.15 a.m.). The three other batteries were not slow to join him. The three Hussar Regiments took up their position—the 10th to the right in a fold of ground, the 17th to the left, the 11th behind the centre near Tronville—a disposition in-

spired rather by an ingenious taste for symmetry than by the shape of the ground or the military requirements of the situation.

We shall see what was the effect on our troops of this unforeseen cannonade. It cannot be said that it fell in with the intentions of Voigts-Rhetz or the personal ideas of Caprivi. The former Chief of the Staff of the X. Corps said: "At this moment a chance such as seldom occurs was given to charge a bivouac, surprised and without protection." It was the shout of triumph of Athies which Caprivi wished to imitate, following the example of the allied cavalry in 1814. It would have been far more worth while to have profited by our incurable negligence and to have ridden straight at these two cavalry divisions and perhaps a portion of the Army Corps, which they covered so badly. A cannonade, which was not accompanied by a vigorous attack, had, in exchange for small advantages, the grave fault of putting us on our guard. General Von Alvenslaben, in his Souvenirs, has written: "I knew of the offensive reconnaissance of the 5th Division by the fire of its guns. It gave the alarm to the enemy, who learned from this action of our troops what it had failed to discover by reconnaissance. What a pity!" In the same strain General Von Pelet-Narbonne severely reproaches the Prussian cavalry for its inaction. He writes: "Redern demeaned himself by taking up the rôle of a support to artillery."

Le Flem, of the 9th Dragoons, had seen "some dense columns of infantry" (in reality Redern's Brigade) leaving the plateau to the south-east of Tronville. He hurried off to the Colonel. "My running across the bivouac and the warning which I thus gave, began to attract attention. . . . I arrived on the road where the canteen wagons had halted. Colonel Reboul and Lieut.-Colonel La Loyère were drinking some soup. . . . I accosted the Colonel with these words: 'Colonel, we are surprised. The enemy is on us. I am looking for a trumpeter to sound "mount."', 'Do you believe that—'" the Colonel commenced to say; but he had not time to finish. The sound of the first gun reverberated. It was the signal for terrible confusion. In the twinkling of an eye the main street of Vionville, the road which runs from it, and the ground round about was filled by a multitude of fugitives, which increased continuously as they passed each successive camp. Civilian conductors, dragoons belonging to Prince Murat, gunners from Forton's batteries, a large crowd frightened and shouting, fled towards Mefz, sweeping away with them teams of horses, artillery wagons, and even, it is said, whole batteries. At this moment some of the squadrons were watering; and the baggage of the Division for a long time kept at Ban-St.-Martin at Metz, because of the obstructions on the roads, had just arrived at Vionville under the escort of a squadron of 10th Cuirassiers. Owing to these wagons the disorder was accentuated and spread afar. Most of our guns began to fire with only two or three gunners. Little by little a large number, who had allowed themselves to be swept away

in the flight, returned. The Reserves and some guns were carried away as far as Gravelotte. In the 5th Regiment of Chasseurs of Valabrégue's Division only three squadrons could at first be rallied. In the 1st Dragoons the Colonel had only two-thirds of the regiment in the ranks, and the rest did not rejoin until well on in the day. On the Gravelotte plateau the baggage trains and convoys of five army corps had collected. It was a mass of about 5,000 wagons, not counting the ambulances. Most of the drivers had fled with their horses; others threw themselves more or less voluntarily with their teams into the ditches lining the road, and the animals scattered, beside themselves with terror.

The inaction of the Prussian cavalry allowed us, however, to get together again. While Prince Murat's Dragoons rallied with difficulty, and tried to show a front, a section of the 7th Battery of the 20th Regiment, with only two horses to each gun, advanced at a gallop to the hill to the west of Vionville and opened fire, in spite of the crushing superiority and the proximity of the enemy. Three other guns only of the 7th and 8th Batteries came to join them. Some officers served and laid the guns themselves. The remainder of Forton's artillery was swept away in the rout of the dragoons.

But our five guns had not been able to sustain this fire. Their position was untenable, and they retired. One of them which had lost its teams was in danger, when Colonel Forceville ordered the dragoons of the 1st Regiment to dismount and drag it below the crest. Part of Murat's Brigade, which had already rallied, wheeled about and retired at a walk in fair order, passing to the north of Vionville. Then it reassembled behind the first line of La Font de Villier's Division of the 6th Corps between the Mars-la-Tour and the Roman roads. Gramont's Brigade, which had not been affected by the panic, retired to the St. Marcel woods, and then went alongside of Villers-aux-Bois to the borders of Rezonville. From there it rejoined Murat's Brigade. "A little later" Marshal Bazaine ordered Forton's Division to the rear in a fold of the ground between Rezonville and the Pierrot wood. There it remained several hours.

The disorder of Murat's Brigade had only infected a part of Valabrégue's Division. At the same time it retired with regrettable precision, leaving the battery which accompanied it (the 7th of the 17th Regiment) in a critical position. The battery fired in haste two shots, while the drivers brought up the teams, and retired with difficulty, on successive positions, with some of the guns drawn by only two horses.

Meanwhile a fresh German battery belonging to the 6th Cavalry Division, which debouched from Gorze, opened fire from the south, and this double surprise attack appeared to have in some people's eyes an importance which it was far from possessing. "The Prussians knew how to conceal their movements from our cavalry and occupied some strong positions on the line, Gorze, Mars-la-Tour, Bruville. Their firing line

stretched round us in an immense arc of a circle, the extremities and centre of which were protected by powerful batteries in position, supported in the intervals by batteries in readiness. In fact, they appeared everywhere, surrounding us with a circle of fire."

Thus the surprise of Forton's Division, due solely to the neglect of the most indispensable precautions, was much more than a mere chance of war, which could be soon remedied. It affected the *moral* more or less of a great portion of our troops, making them believe that the enemy who had attacked them with such audacity was in much stronger force than he really was. If during the day we never knew of our numerical superiority, it was owing to the unpardonable negligence of Forton and his staff. It must be also acknowledged that if Rheinbaben's cavalry had charged our squadrons vigorously at the moment, when we rallied under the Prussian shells with such difficulty, the panic would have been more complete and the disorder irretrievable.

(*To be continued.*)

NAVAL NOTES.

The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—Captains—F. F. Haworth-Booth to “Brilliant”; R. P. Purefoy, M.V.O., to “Black Prince”; A. F. Everett to “Cumberland”; N. C. Palmer to “Suffolk”; Sir D. E. Brownrigg, Bart., to “Theseus”; C. F. Henderson to “Crescent”; B. H. Barttelot to “Leviathan”; C. H. Simpson to “Research.”

Vice-Admiral Sir Wilmot H. Fawkes, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., hoisted his flag on the 9th inst. as Commander-in-Chief at Devonport, in succession to Admiral Sir Lewis A. Beaumont, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., whose flag was struck at sunset the same day. On assuming the command, Vice-Admiral Sir W. Fawkes receives acting rank as Admiral.

The new first-class armoured cruiser *Shannon* was commissioned at Chatham on the 10th ult., for service as flag-ship of the Fifth Cruiser Squadron; the flag of Rear-Admiral G. A. Callaghan, C.V.O., C.B., Commanding the Squadron, being hoisted on board the same day.

Rear-Admiral C. H. Cross hoisted his flag on the 31st ult., at Devonport, on taking over the duties of Admiral-Superintendent of the Dockyard from Vice-Admiral C. J. Barlow, D.S.O.

The New Royal Yacht “Alexandra.”—The new turbine yacht *Alexandra*, which has been built on the Clyde to take the place of the old Royal paddle-yacht *Osborne*, has completed her trials satisfactorily, and been handed over to the Naval Authorities by her builders, Messrs. A. and J. Inglis, of Glasgow.

Her dimensions are as follows: Length, 275 feet between perpendiculars, and 328 feet over all; beam, 40 feet; depth, 33 feet, and displacement, 2,157 tons. She is built of steel, with the old-fashioned cut-water bows, and round stern. Her turbine engines are on the three-shaft plan, consisting of three turbines of equal power—one high-pressure and two low-pressure—with an astern turbine in the exhaust casing of each of the low-pressure turbines, and are to develop 4,500 I.H.P., giving a speed according to the contract of 18 knots. As a matter of fact, the yacht made, during a twelve hours' trial, and using two out of her three boilers, an average of 17.5 knots, and of 19.2 knots at full power. Steam at 200 lb. pressure is supplied from three large Yarrow water-tube boilers, and her bunkers have a coal capacity of 270 tons.

Q.F. Gun Practice in the Fleet.—The result* of the test of the gunlayers with light quick-firing guns, and the result of battle practice from torpedo-boat destroyers, have been issued by the Admiralty. In circulating these results for general information, their Lordships note in both cases their satisfaction at the improvement shown as compared with results obtained in 1906. With each return an abstract of the firing for 1905, 1906, and 1907 is given.

From the tabular statement which is prefixed to the result of the test of the gunlayers with light quick-firing guns, it is seen that, whereas in 1906 the number of ships which fired was 89, using 1,421 guns, and making 4,666 hits, in 1907 the number of ships which fired was 122, with 1,898 guns, and 7,462 hits were obtained. The percentage of hits to rounds fired was, in 1905, 21.63; in 1906, 34.53; and in 1907, 42.08; or, in other words, has just doubled in the three years' firing. The rate of accurate firing has also increased, for, while in 1905 with 12-pounders the number of hits per gun per minute was 2.12, and in 1906 rose to 3.41, in 1907 the rate was 4.47. Similarly with the 6-pounder and 3-pounder (except Vickers) the hits per gun per minute have risen from 1.97 in 1905 to 3.64 in 1907.

With the 12-pounder guns an abstract of the position of the various squadrons and Fleets shows that the China Squadron stands first in order of merit, with the *Kent* as best ship, making 11.32 hits per minute, the average for that squadron being 6.9 hits per minute. The Channel and First Cruiser Squadron are second in order of merit, with the *Britannia* as best ship, making 7.95 hits per minute, the average of the Squadron being 4.8 hits per minute.

With the 6-pounder and 3-pounder guns (except Vickers) the China Squadron was also first in order of merit, the *Kent* being again the best ship, with 12 hits per minute. The Atlantic and Second Cruiser Squadron are second in order of merit with these guns, the *Albemarle* being best ship, with 6.9 hits per minute. With the 3-pounder Vickers gun the *Duke of Edinburgh* was the best ship, her best gunlayer making 14 hits, although this score was beaten by four other gunlayers in the *King Edward VII.*, *Devonshire*, *New Zealand*, and *Britannia*, although their ships did not on the whole firing do so well as the *Duke of Edinburgh*. Classified in order of merit of ships competing, the *Kent* was first, the *Berwick* second, and the *Britannia* third with the 12-pounder gun; and the *Kent* first, the *King Alfred* second, and the *Bedford* third with the smaller calibres of guns.

The tabular statement supplied with the result of battle practice from the torpedo-boat destroyers of the Fleet shows that, whereas 57 ships fired 342 guns in 1905, and 52 ships fired 312 guns in 1906, the number of ships firing in 1907 was 121, and the guns used were 669 in number. The hits made in 1905 were 653, in 1906 the hits were 1,004, and in 1907 the hits were 2,069. The percentage of hits to rounds fired has thus risen from 20.02 in 1905 and 34.60 in 1906 to 35.81 in 1907. The guns used in this practice are 12-pounders and 6-pounders, and while with the former the rate of accurate rapid firing has increased, it has dropped a little with the 6-pounder, the hits per gun per minute in 1906 being 3.73 and in 1907 being 3.57. The vessels firing are divided between five stations, the six in China coming first in order of merit, then the 11 in the Mediterranean, these being followed by 46 in full commission in the Home Fleet, 56 with nucleus crews in the same Fleet, and finally the two boats in the Channel. The best score on the China Station was made by the *Otter*, with 105.10 points; while the *Foam* made the highest score in the Mediterranean, 62.77 points. Of the Home Fleet destroyers in full commission the *Exe* stands first with 50.57 points; and of the three divisions of boats with nucleus crews, the Devonport torpedo-boat No. 12 made 78.84 points, the Portsmouth torpedo-boat No. 1 made 52.56 points, and the Nore Division torpedo-boat

No. 6 made 45-99 points. The *Jed* was the best of the Channel Home. boats with 30-13 points. The boats at the top of the list in order of merit of all competing were the *Otter*, the *Virago*, and the *Fame*; there are four at the bottom which did very badly, three of them failing to hit the target with their 12-pounders and one with her 6-pounder.

The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—Rear-Admiral—J. J. De Percin to be Member of the Superior Commission de l'*Establishement des Invalides de la Marine*, and Member of the Mixed Commission of Public Works. Capitaines de Frégate—J. B. Baude to command of the fixed defence at Cherbourg; L. M. Reverdit to command of fixed defence at Toulon; L. A. M. Caubet to "Lavoisier"; M. J. Louël to "Couleuvrine" and the 3rd Flotilla of Ocean Torpedo-boats.—*Journal Officiel de la République Française*.

General.—Vice-Admiral Touchard, who last October vacated the command of the Mediterranean Fleet, has been appointed French Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Vice-Admiral Touchard is well known in Russian Court circles, and is a *persona grata* with the Tsar.

Vice-Admiral De Fauque de Jonquieres, who has been appointed member of the Conseil Supérieur de la Marine, and Permanent Inspector-General of Torpedo Flotillas, vice Vice-Admiral Melchior, deceased, is 57 years of age, and one of the youngest vice-admirals, and has led a most active career, his years of sea service almost equalling his total service. As A.D.C. to Admiral Courbet, he took part in the capture of Sontay, and was mentioned in despatches for conspicuous conduct. He was promoted capitaine de frégate in 1885 and capitaine de vaisseau in 1892, commanded the *Victorieuse*, *Hôche*, and *Bouvines*, and was Chief of the Staff to Admiral Humann. He was appointed rear-admiral in 1902, and commanded the 2nd Division in the Far East, and has since been acting as Naval Attaché in Berlin.

Rear-Admiral Philibert, commanding the 3rd Division of the Squadron of the North, at present employed off the Moroccan Coast, whose period of service in his command expires this month, will not be relieved for the present.

The new first-class battle-ships *Justice* and *Liberté*, are to definitely join the Mediterranean Fleet on the 21st inst., and will form the second division of the fleet, relieving the *St. Louis* and the *Charlemagne*; the third ship of the division is to be the *Verité*, a sister-ship of the other two, which will take the place of the *Gaulois*, and she will join as soon as she has completed her trials, which are now being carried out at Brest.

Rear-Admiral Le Pord, commanding the 2nd Division, is to transfer his flag from the *St. Louis* to the *Justice*. The *St. Louis*, *Charlemagne*, and *Gaulois* will form the 3rd Division, Rear-Admiral Chocheprat transferring his flag from the *Masséna* to the *St. Louis*; the 4th Division will consist of the *Bouvet*, *Jaureguiberry*, and *Suffren*, which last ship has been relieved in the 1st Division by the new battle-ship *Démocratie*. The *Charles Martel* and *Masséna*, on being relieved, are to become training-ships for gunnery and torpedo apprentices.

The three new submersibles Q64, Q65, and Q66, under construction at Rochefort, are to be named *Papin*, *Fresnet*, and *Berthelot*; while the three Q67, Q68, and Q69, building at Toulon, will be called *Monge*, *Ampère*,

France. and *Gay-Lussac*. All six vessels, which were laid down at the end of 1905, are of the *Laubéuf* type, with a displacement of 398 tons.

The destroyer *Estandard* was launched at Bordeaux on 20th March. She displaces 328 tons, carries one 65-mm. (2-5-inch) and six 47-mm. (1-8-inch) guns, and two torpedo-tubes. Her estimated speed is 28 knots, and complement 4 officers and 58 men.

Wireless communication has been effected between the battle-ship *République* in the Gulf of Juan and the Eiffel Tower by means of a balloon 100 metres above the ship.

The Treason Case.—The trial of Naval Sub-Lieutenant Ullmo for communicating secret documents to foreign Powers concluded at Toulon on 22nd February. The following were the questions put to the Court, and the answers were unanimous :—

1. Had he communicated with a foreign Power?—"Yes."
2. Had the information so communicated been made use of or acted upon?—"No."
3. Had he copied secret documents of importance to the security of the State which should not have been in his hands?—"Yes."

The sentence of the Court is: That he be transported and imprisoned for life in a fortress, with military degradation, and to pay the expenses of the trial, the judgment and sentence to be published.

A correspondent of the *Temps* writes that an admiral on being asked whether Ullmo was an opium smoker, replied: "Certainly, he smoked opium, but not more than others of his comrades."

I do not hesitate to declare, continues the correspondent, that all which up to the present has been done to suppress this vice is quite useless. Officers and functionaries are forbidden to smoke opium, but of what use is this, seeing that smoking goes on in secret? This habit is acquired in Indo-China, because opium is protected there by the French Government, who manufacture and sell it publicly at a profit. When the Government, which is the real culprit in this affair, gives up making money by poisoning its subjects, opium will no longer be smoked, either in Paris or Toulon. This is the only effective remedy.—*Le Temps, Le Vie Maritime, and Le Yacht*.

Some Notes from the Report of the Navy Budget Committee.—The Report of M. Charles Chaumet on the Navy Estimates for the current year, which extends over 92 pages, is now before the Chamber :—

The Budget Commission, M. Chaumet states, has not thought it necessary to make any serious modifications in the proposals put forward by the Minister of Marine. The Budget, as a matter of fact, differs only from the last one in an increase of the sums allotted to the emoluments and salaries of the junior officers and of the civilian staff of the small dockyard personnel and the different services of the fleet.

These increases, recommended by the Commissions presided over by Vice-Admiral de Maigret and M. Guiéysse respectively, seem to the Committee to be completely justified. The officers of the Navy cannot continue to draw less pay than their comrades in the Army, and it was no longer tolerable that certain employés should only be paid at the ridiculous rate of 936 francs (£37 9s.) per annum.

Possibly those who place the desire for economy before everything else will regret that the Committee have accepted an increase of credits for

France. a considerable rise in the pay of certain employés of the Central Administration, notably those of the Heads of Bureaux, by the establishment of a mean salary. But it appeared to the Committee, on the one hand, that the salaries of the officials of every class were in no case excessive; on the other hand, that in order to realise economies in the *personnel* it was not necessary to diminish the pay, but the number of the employés, by a radical reform and a fearless simplification of the Services.

Far from aiming at a reduction of the salaries or the rates of pay proposed, the Committee of the Budget has been fortunate in assisting the Minister of Marine to realise a reform that has been justly called for for some years, viz. : an increase in the pay of the petty officers and quarter-masters.

A sum of a million francs (£40,000) appears in the present Budget for this purpose, but it only comes into force during the second half-year of 1908. For the following years it will be necessary to provide an increase of about two millions (£80,000). The new rates of pay will be fixed later after a careful study of the question now being undertaken by the Department.

The Committee have had all the fewer scruples in giving the petty officers this tardy recompense for their admirable services since they cannot be suspected, under the circumstances, of having yielded to political considerations, as these petty officers have not the right of voting. It has also been found possible to make some further economies to the amount of 1,600,000 francs, in addition to those rendered necessary by the reforms in connection with the increased pay already mentioned.

In agreement with the Commission, the Minister of Marine has decided on the disarmament of several ships of no fighting value, and has also withdrawn some of the units from foreign stations. This marks the commencement of reforms, the utility of which the Committee has already attempted to demonstrate, and which it is hoped will be carried further in the future. They also call attention to the fact that it is proposed to spend a sum of 12,500,000 francs (£500,000) on the outer harbour of Cherbourg, 2,000,000 francs (£80,000) appearing in this year's estimates for the work; while not holding that this expenditure is quite uncalled for, the Committee yet consider that the work is not urgent, while the necessity of providing new docks at Brest and Toulon is of paramount importance, and the want of them will be badly felt when the new units of the 1906 programme are completed. The specialisation of the different dockyards is further recommended, the Committee being of opinion that Brest and Lorient should be used for the building of large units; Cherbourg and Rochefort for the construction and maintenance of the flotillas, while Toulon should be made the great repairing port of the Mediterranean Fleet, and Bizerte could also be used for this purpose. It is not advisable, in their opinion, that repairing work on a large scale should be carried on at the same dockyard as new construction, the two classes of work clash with each other, and, moreover, it has to be remembered that all the battle-ships are now concentrated in the Mediterranean.

The Committee draws attention to the delay in the construction of new ships, as compared with England and Germany, and although there is a marked improvement in regard to the new ships of the *Danton* class, the date for the completion of which has been definitely fixed, they doubt if they will be finished in the time allowed. In their opinion, when once a ship has been commenced, she should be completed as rapidly as possible, without any alteration in her plans being made, as such alterations

France. invariably cause considerable delay. Every day sees improvements made; the better will always be the enemy of the good.

And if the work in the French dockyards has been deplorably slow as compared with foreign yards, it is the Central Administration which is most to blame, as it is there that the continual modifications in the plans originally approved have originated.

In considering the question of the armament of the fleet, the Committee express the opinion that that is a question which must be settled by the Heads of the Navy alone; they express the hope, however, that whatever decision may be finally come to, it will not be due to the spontaneous inspiration of one officer, however eminent he may be, but that it will represent the well-weighed opinions and experiences of naval officers as a whole. It must not be forgotten that while the genius of an admiral can improvise tactics which will win a battle, when the time for fighting comes, there can be no modification of a ship or her guns; once the ship built, her guns made, it only remains to make the best use possible of them, and from this point of view, the Committee point out that it is essential that those who have to work the guns should have complete confidence in these weapons.

The Committee believe that with the guns and mountings now in use in the fleet, and with a well-trained personnel, the same rapidity of fire as has been arrived at in the English navy, can be reached in French ships.—*Budget Général de l'Exercice, 1908 (Ministère de la Marine)*.

The following are the principal appointments which have been made : Admiral—Dubassow to be Permanent Member of Russia. the Council of National Defence. Vice-Admirals—Lomen to be Permanent Member of the Council of National Defence; Starck to be President of the Administration of the Obuchow Gun Factory. Rear-Admirals—Matushevich to be Commandant at Vladivostock; Schtschensnowitsch to be Junior Flag Officer of the Baltic Fleet. Captains—Grammatchikov to be Commodore in Command of the Baltic Torpedo Flotilla; Studintsky to "Diana"; Hirs, senr., to "Oleg."

The Naval Estimates.—The Estimates of the Ministry of Marine for the present year, as originally proposed, were calculated on a modest scale, as the sum assigned for construction during a period of four years is no more than 125 million roubles—1,881 million marks (£17,722,220), or some 31 millions (£4,430,550) annually. It is proposed to build four battle-ships, each of 21,000 tons displacement, with more powerful armament and turbine propelling power, in place of the present engines. These alone will entail an expenditure of no less than 84 millions (£11,900,000). Out of the balance it is proposed to construct five destroyers of 700 tons, similar to those which have been built by voluntary contributions, but of considerably greater speed; and also to construct three submarines. A balance of seven millions (£991,666) remaining from last year's Estimates is allotted to the completion of the battle-ships *Andrei Pervosvanni*, *Imperator Pavel I.*, and the armoured cruisers *Rurik*, *Bayan*, and *Admiral Makaroff*. The turbines for the projected battle-ships will be supplied by the Baltic Works, and the whole equipment furnished by Russian works or yards.

The following details in regard to the projected new ships have been laid before the Committee of the Duma on the Russia. Estimates :—

The four new battle-ships are to have a displacement of 21,000 tons and a speed of 21.2 knots; the armament to consist of ten 12-inch guns and fourteen 4.7-inch Q.F. guns, with a proportion of lighter guns not yet fixed. The time for construction is to be four years for the first ship, and for the other three, three years. The five destroyers are to have a displacement of 700 tons, to carry an armament of one 4.7-inch and five 13-pounder Q.F. guns, and to have a speed of 26 knots. The three submarines are to have a displacement of 450 tons.

It has since been reported that at the request of the Committee the Government have agreed to the postponement of the construction of the four battle-ships until next year.

Launches.—On the 7th of September last the launch of the first-class battle-ship *Imperator Pavel I.* took place at the Baltic Works, in the presence of the Minister of Marine. Her principal dimensions are as follows : Length between perpendiculars, 438 feet; extreme length with ram, 460 feet 6 inches; extreme beam with sheathing, 80 feet; mean draught, 27 feet; displacement, 16,630 tons. The two four-cylindered triple-expansion engines are of a type specially designed by the Baltic Works, and are to develop 17,600-I.H.P., giving a speed of 18 knots. The boilers (25 in number) are of the Belleville type, also built at the Works, and are placed in three compartments, forming five stokeholds. The normal coal supply will be 1,500 tons, but 3,000 tons can be carried on emergency, and there will also be storage for oil fuel. The first plate was laid down in October, 1904. Her armament will consist of four 40-calibre 12-inch guns, twelve 45-calibre 8-inch guns, twenty 12-pounder Q.F. guns, with twenty 3-pounder and machine guns, and five submerged torpedo tubes. Protection will be afforded by a complete water-line belt 11 inches thick, tapering to 6 inches, with an upper belt reaching to the main deck 10 inches thick, tapering to 3 inches. The armour for barbette bases and turrets will be 12 inches for the 12-inch guns, and 7 inches to 6 inches for the 8-inch guns; that for the conning tower will be 8 inches, and the armoured deck 2 inches.

The first-class armoured cruiser *Bayan* was successfully launched from the Galernii Island Yard at St. Petersburg on the 15th of August last. Her principal dimensions are as follows : Extreme length with ram, 450 feet; beam, 57 feet 6 inches; draught, 23 feet 3.8 inches; with a displacement of 7,800 tons. The engines are to develop 16,500-I.H.P., to give a speed of 21 knots, steam being supplied by 26 Belleville boilers, engines and boilers being constructed by the Franco-Russian Works. The normal coal stowage will be 750 tons, but 1,100 tons can be carried if required.

The armament consists of two 8-inch, eight 6-inch, twenty 12-pounder and four 6-pounder guns, with two submerged torpedo-tubes. The 8-inch guns are mounted, each in one of two revolving barbettes; the 6-inch guns in separate casemates; and the smaller ones, eight in an armoured central battery on the gun deck and sixteen on the upper deck. Protection is afforded by a complete water-line belt of Krupp steel 7 inches thick, tapering to 4 inches at bow and stern, with an upper belt 3.5 inches thick, tapering to 2.7 inches. The barbettes are protected by 5.8-inch armour, and the casemates with 3-inch; the conning-tower with 5.4-inch, and ammunition tubes with 3-inch, while the armoured deck is 2 inches thick.

On the 29th of October there took place at Nicolaiev, **Russia.** in the presence of the Minister of Marine, the successful launch of the *Leutenant Zatsarenni*, and on the 5th of November that of the *Kapitan Leutenant Baranoff*, both of which were built at the Nicolaiev Shipbuilding Yard. They are two of the four vessels of the Destroyer Type laid down by that yard. Their engines are to develop 6,500-I.H.P., giving a speed of 26 knots; they have a displacement of 700 tons, and carry an armament of six 13-pounders, four 6-pounders, six machine guns, with three torpedo-tubes. These vessels are supposed to embody the lessons of the late war, and are the first wholly designed in Russia without borrowing types. Ten more of these vessels have been ordered for the Black Sea Fleet. Their cost, with armament, is about 3,000,000 roubles (£425,000).

The Commissioning of New Ships.—The following new ships are to be commissioned during the present year: For the Baltic Fleet, the armoured cruisers *Rurik* and *Admiral Makaroff*; mine-laying ships the *Jennessei* and *Volga*, with five submarines. For the Black Sea Fleet, the battle-ship *Ivan Zlatoust* and four sea-going torpedo-boats of the *Baranow* class. For the Pacific, the first-class gun-boats *Giljak* and *Korets*, with three torpedo-boats.

Of the ships which have been repaired, the cruisers *Oleg* and *Diana*, and the training-ship *Pjotru Velikie* join the Baltic Fleet, while the armoured cruiser *Rossia* remains in the Reserve.

During the past year the Baltic Fleet has been strengthened by the addition of eight destroyers of 350 tons displacement, built by the Neva Works on the model of the *Buiny*. These are the *Storojevoy*, *Silny*, *Stroiny*, *Raziaschchy*, *Rastoropmy*, *Dyelmy*, *Dostatoelmy*, and *Dyetelmy*, the first four of which were accepted for a speed at forced draught of 25 knots, and in several trips attained 27 knots. The Works have also in hand two gun-boats, the *Bobr* and the *Ssiwutsch*.

Steam Trials.—The new armoured cruiser *Admiral Makaroff* has carried out two very successful full-speed trials of twelve hours each, during the first of which she maintained a mean speed of 22 knots, or a knot over the contract, the coal consumption being 875 gr. (1.925 lb.) per I.H.P. per hour, while during the second, with the engines developing 19,000-I.H.P., or 2,500-H.P. over the contract, a speed of 22.5 knots was reached; during a coal-consumption trial of twenty-four hours, with the engines developing 3,300-I.H.P., a speed of 14 knots was maintained, with a coal consumption of 535 gr. (1.177 lb.) per I.H.P. per hour.

The new first-class armoured cruiser *Rurik*, during a ten hours' full-speed trial with all boilers alight, made an average of 21.4 knots; during a subsequent run of three hours, with three-quarters of her boilers alight, she maintained the same speed, so that she has come fully up to the contract requirements of 21 knots at full speed.

The new destroyers *Rastoropny* and *Dortoiny*, on their full-speed trials have made an average of 26.2—26.4 knots, with a maximum speed of 27.09 knots; they are vessels of 350 tons displacement, with engines developing 6,000-I.H.P. The new destroyers *Storojevoi* and *Djajatelnny*, slightly larger vessels of 380 tons, have also successfully completed their trials, making on their full-speed runs a mean of 27 knots, the contract being for 26 knots. —*Kronstädtski Viestnik* and *Marine Rundschau*.

United States. *Report on Navy Yards and Docks.*—Civil Engineer Richard C. Hollyday, U.S.N., Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy Department, whose estimates for the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1909, have been published, plainly states in his annual report that without increased funds for the maintenance of navy yards and stations for the next fiscal year the Bureau will be unable to conduct its part of the operations at all the yards. In taking over additional power plants during the coming fiscal year the expenditure under this head must be largely increased. The fund available for the present fiscal year is so small that the Bureau is unable to answer the most urgent appeals from the yards for funds that should be expended under this appropriation in the interests of economy.

One special item included in the estimates is for 100-ton floating derricks to cost 1,015,000 dollars, for which an appropriation of 500,000 dollars is recommended. At the present time the facilities for handling heavy weights at the navy yards are very meagre. Many of the yards have 40-ton travelling cranes about the dry docks, and in some cases these cranes have their track so arranged that weights can be handled along the water front in some places; but for the purpose of handling the largest guns, turrets, boilers, or any ship appliances weighing more than forty tons there is only one navy yard with the proper equipment. The New York Navy Yard has a 100-ton floating derrick of a special type which is very satisfactory. The Norfolk Navy Yard is equipped with a floating derrick of a nominal capacity similar to that of the New York Yard, but there is no other navy yard on the Atlantic or Pacific coast with equipment of any character satisfactory for the purpose. The same condition exists in the Philippine Islands; in fact, there is no crane in the Philippines even nearly approaching the 40-ton capacity travelling cranes of the home stations. It is proposed to purchase four floating derricks similar in type to that at the New York Navy Yard, capable of handling a weight of 100 gross tons and equipped with an auxiliary hoist of much smaller capacity but of quicker action. The estimated cost of one of these cranes complete at a home station is 250,000 dollars.

The consolidation of navy yard power plants, together with the material increase in the amount of electrical power consumed, necessitates the employment of a well-trained and experienced electrician to superintend this branch of the work under the civil engineer. A competent man must be experienced, not only in electrical machinery, but in steam boilers and engines, air compressors, and the various distributing systems.

In refutation of a general impression that navy yards are extravagantly operated, the Chief of the Bureau points out that as a matter of fact the expenditures for operation and upkeep are much less than for the best industrial and railroad corporations. The Bureau has secured certain information on these headings relative to railroads and industrial corporations. For the purpose of comparison, however, it has been necessary to combine the "maintenance" and "repairs and preservation" appropriations, as they cover expenditures carried under one head by the systems of accounting of the industrial and railroad corporations. The data obtained show that industrial concerns expend an average of six per cent. of the total valuation, disregarding depreciation, for the operation of their plants. Railroads in 1904 expended 3.95 per cent. of total capitalisation, or 4.59 per cent. of total valuation, on maintenance and repairs. In 1905 the expenditure was 4.09 per cent. of the total capitalisation and 4.4 per cent. in 1906. In 1906 the naval expenditures under "Maintenance" and "Repairs and preservation" were 1.1 per cent. of valuation.

United States. In ten years the work required of the Bureau has doubled, while the money appropriated has been increased only slightly. With double the number of stations, twice the value in property owned, with the good and sufficient reasons given, it must be apparent that a large increase in appropriations is absolutely essential to the prosecution of the work in accordance with enacted law. Indeed, it would not have been possible to have kept all the yards in operation but for the help of other bureaus in furnishing funds available for items in which they were particularly interested. "The Bureau," the report goes on to say, "feels constrained to represent that some relief must be found for existing conditions. If sufficient money is not to be appropriated, then some of the yards must be closed in order that others may be efficiently operated. Neither economy nor efficiency nor exact accounting can be expected under existing circumstances, and an improper use of funds is a danger which will always exist until the present state of affairs is remedied."

The Bureau has at last succeeded in filling all vacancies in its corps of officers. The recent extension of the allowance for quarters to the civil engineers is an extra inducement that must have contributed largely to this result. The Bureau is still, however, handicapped by a shortage of officers. It is limited by present law to forty commissioned civil engineers, but six of these are Naval Academy graduates, who are undergoing a course of instruction to ground them in their profession, and several years additional must elapse before they have sufficient experience to be of real value on navy yard work. The Bureau desires to place a civil engineer officer at every station where it has work to do, and there are constant calls for an additional civil engineer, not only at the larger stations, where such officers can economically be used, but also where the several other bureaus are prosecuting public works and call upon this Bureau for the necessary technical assistance. Of the thirty-five civil engineers and assistant civil engineers on the active list a considerable percentage is for this or other reasons unavoidable for the Bureau's own work, and this does not include those officers who devote part only of their time to other Government work than that of the Bureau proper. The requests of other bureaus for civil engineer officers cannot at the present time be met.

The detail of a civil engineer as assistant to the Chief of Bureau is recommended; also an increase in the pay of the chief clerk of the Bureau and in the pay of chief clerks of the Bureau at the principal navy yards.

Speaking of the proposed graded pay bill, the Chief of Bureau says: "This Bureau has for some years advocated the same basis of pay for its civil engineers as now enjoyed by naval constructors. It is evident, however, from present sentiment and action that any relief to be had will come through one pay table for all, based upon the present Army system. The Bureau has no objection to such a system, but invites attention, as it has done before, to the present inadequate and markedly disproportionate rank of its officers. Under the Army table low rank means low pay, and, if justice be done under the revised pay tables, the civil engineers must have rank as follows: Five captains, not less than five commanders, and the remainder such rank as is held by the officers of the line of similar date of precedence. Such a table of rank closely approximates the percentages in the present grades of the line, and under it a civil engineer will receive considerably less pay for his entire service than will a line officer, due to the fact that he will never have the rank and active service pay of a rear-admiral, while he will suffer, in addition, on the retired list as measured by the difference of retired pay of a rear-admiral and a captain, or by the present pay table, 1,500 dollars per annum—a severe

United States.

difference. The corps is also discriminated against by the present law in the matter of commutation of fuel and light. The line, Medical and Pay Corps of the Navy, now receive, within allowance, free heat and light, or are reimbursed therefor. It is obvious that all corps should be treated alike in this respect.—*Army and Navy Journal.*

MILITARY NOTES.

Home. The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—

Major-Generals—Sir J. Willocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., to be Commander of a Division in India. T. D. Pilcher, C.B., to be a Brigade Commander in India.

Colonels—H. N. C. Heath, from an A.A.G., to be a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, at Headquarters. N. D. Findlay, C.B., to be an A.A.G. at Headquarters. F. A. Fortescue, from h.p., to be a General Staff Officer, 1st Grade. L. B. Friend, from an Assistant Director of Fortifications and Works at Headquarters, to be a Brigadier-General, to Command Coast Defences. F. W. N. McCracken, D.S.O., to be an A.A.G. G. R. C. Paul, C.M.G., to be Colonel in Charge of Army Service Records. E. C. Bethune, C.B., Brigadier-General, General Staff, Southern Command, to be Major-General. J. S. Cowans, M.V.O., Officer in Charge of the Training and Staff Duties Section, Division of the Chief of the Staff in India, is granted the honorary rank of Brigadier-General whilst so employed.

Memorandum on the Proposed Organisation of a National Guard for the Land Defence of Australia.—

1. The outline of the defence proposals of the Government, contained in the speech of the Prime Minister on 13th December, 1907, in the House of Representatives, necessarily excluded many details and minor matters of interest. This Memorandum is therefore issued by direction of the Minister of State for Defence, in order to explain more fully how the change from the present to the new military system will be carried out when the scheme has been sanctioned by Parliament.

In addition to the proposals submitted as part of the programme for the current session, the statement of the scheme is slightly enlarged so as to permit of a clear understanding of some of the details given. This will not involve any further extension of the scheme for which approval is now sought.

2. **Legal Obligations.**—The general duties of all citizens of Australia to take part in the defence of their country were recognised definitely in the Defence Acts, 1903-4, but only in reference to service in time of war.

a. Every male Australian, from 18 to 60 years of age, is liable to serve in time of war.

No express obligation to make themselves fit to serve was then assigned to them. The new scheme repairs this omission by laying upon all Australians the following duties:—

b. Every male Australian will, in time of peace, be liable to undergo military training—from 12 to 18 years of age, in the Cadets or Senior Cadets; from 18 to 26 years of age, in the National Guard.

So far as the exigencies of defence will permit, it is proposed **Australia**, to allow individuals to select the arm of the service to which they will belong, and to allot to the naval Services such numbers as may be required. The personal obligation to military training is intended to operate in respect to all who attain the age of 18 years after the scheme comes into force.

3. *Cadet and Senior Cadet Training.*—This is intended to become universal and eventually compulsory on all lads from 12 to 18 years of age, and will be performed both while attending and after leaving school. In the latter case it will be so arranged as to interfere as little as possible with their employment. The compulsory character of this training will be held in abeyance until there are sufficient instructors available. Meanwhile, the existing Volunteer Cadet organisation will be fostered, and may even become nearly universal prior to its enforcement on account of the curtailment of the National Guard training periods in the cases of those who have attained a satisfactory efficiency as Cadets.

The training of Cadets will probably include physical drill, elementary musketry, and marching, and that of Senior Cadets military formations and musketry.

A great deal might be added under this head, but in view of the prior necessities for the creation of a large force, actually available within the next few years, further exposition of the very important possibilities of this branch of training are deferred for separate consideration.

4. *National Guard Training.*—Men of 18 to 26 years of age will be divided into two classes. Those from 18 to 21 will be required to attend a training of 18 days in the first year, 18 in the second, and 12 in the third. Such periods will be curtailed to 12 days in each year, if the member has a satisfactory record as a cadet, or, at the initiation of the system, can show a knowledge of recruit drill and musketry already attained. Members of the National Guard will be organised as regiments and brigades in accordance with the authorised war establishments.

On passing out of these units at the age of 21, if not promoted, they will be incorporated in the senior regiments of the National Guard each of which will consist of officers and men who have passed through the corresponding junior unit.

The places and times of training will be so chosen, wherever possible, as to suit local conditions of employment and prevent dislocation of business. Thus, in large centres of population the young men of the same age can be distributed in different units, and these be called out at different periods, so that employers will have but a small proportion of their employés absent at one time. Similarly, in country districts, periods when work is not pressing will always be preferred.

All units will be formed on a territorial basis, and trained in their own districts, thus decreasing very considerably the cost of the annual camps.

For the naval forces and the artillery and other scientific corps, the training will be from 18 to 23 years of age—a period of five years—with four weeks' work in each year, of which a proportion may be detached drills, as such units under present conditions will be almost wholly raised in large centres.

It is realised that, though it is essential to determine the minimum obligations for national training, binding upon all able-bodied males, the advantages to be derived from these must always depend very largely upon the spirit with which they are undertaken and fulfilled. There will always be varying degrees of interest and energy evoked in the ranks,

Australia. and the most patriotic will seek to perfect their efficiency. Ample provision will be made for the encouragement of the voluntary ambition of ardent citizens by a collateral organisation of Volunteer Reserves; but it has not been thought advisable at this stage to do more than indicate that this most valuable adjunct of the National Guard will be sympathetically fostered in every way wherever it exists in sufficient strength.

5. *Pay.*—The services required of all young men up to the age of 21 will not be paid for. An allowance may be provided or some exemption granted in very exceptional cases where young men have dependents. All over 21 years, and those serving longer than the ordinary periods, as in the naval forces and artillery, will receive pay for such additional services, probably at rates similar to those of the existing Militia.

6. *Officers and N.C.O.'s.*—It is proposed that all N.C.O.'s and officers shall pass through the ranks. The appointment of all candidates for promotion will be based upon practical examinations and the work of the candidate in the field. At the end of each year's training a certain number who are successful at a practical test will be eligible for promotion. These will be supplied with the necessary text-books; they will then attend, at times most suitable to themselves, a course of instruction for the new rank prior to the next succeeding training, and on qualifying at the end of the course will be confirmed in their new rank.

The candidates will incur no expense, and allowances may be paid for such attendances. The length of each course will be in proportion to the rank for which it is a preparation. In each State such Schools of Instruction will be practically continuous, and thus every facility to attend will be afforded.

The same methods will be applied throughout the whole force up to the rank of lieut.-colonel, and promotion based entirely on merit as exhibited at the competitive practical tests.

All the other conditions of service will be so framed that no man who has the qualities necessary for an officer shall be debarred by reason of his civil occupation or social position.

7. *The Training.*—The object of the formation of this new National Guard is to obtain a fighting force, as large as possible in numbers, at the lowest possible cost, and with this end in view the *training of the force will be limited to such matters as are absolutely necessary for war*. All else must be eliminated.

Drill-books will be amended to contain only the drill required on the march and in the field, instruction in the use of arms, and the general and special rules of tactics for the service concerned.

Instruction in musketry will, as now, include firing at targets graduating from the "bull's-eye" to those resembling the objectives found in war. For those troops whose arm is essentially the rifle—light horse and infantry—there will be provided for musketry and field practices 150 rounds in each of the first and second years, and 100 in the third year. It is to be remembered that the National Guard musketry is intended to be ultimately not so much a recruit course as an advance to practical shooting from the elementary musketry instruction previously taught them as cadets.

Further practice can be obtained in the rifle clubs, in which men will receive the free ammunition for practice now issued regimentally "for effectives."

Scientific corps and departmental troops, whose business in war is not primarily the use of the rifle, but only as a last resort, will also, as at

present, be put through a modified course in the first year of Australia. training only. They also can obtain further practice with the Rifle Clubs.

Provision will also be made for the practical training of the field artillery in shooting under service conditions.

The expense involved prevents the training of the National Guard at separate parades throughout the year; training at annual camps at a number of different centres decreases the average cost of transit, and, by concentrating the work of most units in a few weeks, avoids the necessity in most cases for drill-halls, orderly-rooms, regimental offices, and continuous clerical employment of military instructors, the cost of which is very great.

It is possible that the service of those living in the far-back districts with very sparse populations may have to be held in abeyance, at any rate during the first few years of the new system.

The training in annual camps for the major portion of the National Guard is not intended to be eventually the whole military experience of the Australian National Force. As cadets, all will have learned the elements of drill and musketry, and the instruction after the age of eighteen years will be restricted to the practice of military operations in the field. The rank and file will learn in this last stage to appreciate their responsibilities as outpost sentries and scouts; they will be taught the method of attacking and defending positions, and how to protect themselves from loss under fire by natural or artificial cover. Musketry will be continued and experience gained with targets such as an enemy presents in war, and all will be shown not merely how to shoot, but the effect of their shooting on an enemy.

A less obvious object to those unversed in military science, but one that is even more important, is the opportunity afforded to officers and N.C.O.'s for practice in the art of command and co-operation in the field. All commanders will thus learn by the mistakes experienced in peace what it is necessary to avoid in war. The senior officers of the Citizen Force will be given more frequent opportunities of commanding in the field forces of all arms, and of practising in manœuvres against similar forces the most difficult problems of war—the strategical and tactical operations of troops covering many miles of front, of which the commander can personally oversee but a small portion.

Eventually, such annual camps will take the form of moving columns, introducing the very difficult but little understood problems of how to move and supply armies in the field.

The estimate for camps and schools of instruction includes the expenditure required for rations and forage (hitherto found on an average to be extremely moderate in cost), and the expenses of transit of troops and camp equipment. Other items of expenditure will be small, and the estimate provides for schools where the new officers required will qualify for promotion. Should a larger number present themselves, the amount may be slightly exceeded, but may be met by small surpluses from other items. The eventual adoption of a system of moving columns will, of course, require an additional expenditure when carried out, but not nearly so great as under the present system, which has practically rendered such operations impossible.

8. *Uniform.*—Every £1 spent on the soldier's uniform will create an annual expenditure of about £30,000 a year, and it must therefore be limited to what is actually required as clothing in the field, and in such form as will comply with the rules of International Law. Nothing further

is required than military hat, with badge showing arm of the Australia. service, regiment, and rank of the wearer, woollen "jumper" or military shirt similar to that worn by the troops of U.S.A. on active service, breeches of strong cord, leggings or puttees, military boots. The whole of the above can be produced in Australia at a cost of under £3, and may fairly be required to last the whole of a man's service.

Uniforms will be supplied to officers as well as others, and no variation permitted except in the wearing out of uniforms now in possession. Uniforms will be worn only on military duty, and the absence of private expenditure thereon will enable all to enter for promotion who would otherwise be debarred. Swords and unnecessary articles will, of course, cease to be included in the dress regulations, unless prescribed as the arm of any special corps.

9. *Equipment.*—A complete set of bandolier equipment, with straps, water-bottle, mess tin, haversack, blanket, waterproof sheet, and great coat, will be provided for every man, with such variations as required by the arm of the service. It is probable that some of the above will be left in the possession of the soldier during his term of service, but it might be found advisable to retain the great-coats, blankets, and waterproof sheets in central stores to prevent deterioration, and transfer a certain number for continuous use from camp to camp.

Neglect to maintain arms, clothing, or equipment in good order will naturally be a punishable offence, but it is desirable, as far as practicable, to save the large cost which would be incurred by full departmental storage and maintenance.

An allowance towards the cost of the saddlery required for mounted men will be made after the initial and heavy expenditure on the new factories has been met. Till then, as heretofore, they will use their own saddles.

10. *Arms and Ammunition.*—Three-fourths of the number of any large organised force require to be armed with the rifle. Provision has therefore been made for the supply under the new scheme of 20,000 rifles per annum.

Steps are now being taken for the construction and equipment of a small-arms factory. Estimates show that we should be able to produce rifles here at a lower cost than that at which they can be imported, and the operation of such a factory will practically mean the employment of about 450 men and lads, and the retention in the country of about £150,000 per annum, to be spent on military and Cadet rifles.

There is already a factory in Australia, owned by a public company, for the manufacture of rifle ammunition. This is working satisfactorily, and producing reliable ammunition at a cost no greater than if it was imported. The greater portion of this expenditure is retained in Australia, and the factory employs about 250 hands. If it should be necessary, no difficulty would be experienced in trebling the output, enlarging it still further by duplicating machinery, and taking it over as a Government concern.

The cordite used in the above factory is supplied by the Commonwealth Government, and obtained from the Imperial Government. Arrangements are now in progress for the construction of a cordite factory, so that in the matter of ammunition Australia may be self-supporting. The estimated cost of working such a factory for our own demands alone is about £15,000 per annum, and it will employ about 75 hands.

It is anticipated that the cordite will be locally produced at present at a small advance on the price paid. As the demand increases, the cost will be no greater than that paid for the imported article.

11. *Schools of Instruction.*—It is proposed to establish a Central School of Instruction, for which the services of the most highly-qualified officers will be obtained. This school will conduct courses in all the States in turn, and afford opportunities for the higher training of the senior officers of the National Guard, and members of the Australian Administrative and Instructional Staff (Permanent).

Schools for the instruction of officers of the National Guard, below the rank of major, and also for N.C.O.'s, will also be established in each State. These will be conducted by the permanent officers of the Staff, and will be so arranged that candidates in the National Guard selected for promotion will have every facility for attending at dates convenient to themselves, or even in broken periods, so as to qualify for the higher grade.

All members of the National Guard chosen to attend such schools will be freed from expense in that regard.

In this manner a high state of training may be attained by the officers and N.C.O.'s of the Citizen Army of Australia, and the whole of the training at the annual camps be conducted by them alone. When required the members of the staff will, of course, be available to assist, and the necessary number will attend all camps for the purpose, but the object in view is that the officers and N.C.O.'s shall in peace instruct the men they would have to lead in war.

12. *Mounted Troops.*—The great bulk of the men in country districts may prefer to serve in the Light Horse units, and the condition for such service will be that they provide a horse for themselves, and also saddlery, pending the completion of the military equipment referred to in para. 9.

13. *Field Artillery and Machine Gun Units.*—The horsing of the field artillery may continue to be arranged as at present, but it is very probable that in several States it will be found more economical to maintain sufficient permanent horses to provide for the training of the several batteries in turn. In cases where members of the detachment can provide suitable horses an allowance will be paid for them.

The sum of £50,000 annually has been set down for the increase of this most important arm of the service, for which four additional batteries of four guns each will be provided each year, complete with all equipment and the ammunition reserve of 500 rounds per gun. The annual expenditure on ammunition for practice is included in the amounts shown as "Ammunition Annually Expended" (p. 26 of the Prime Minister's speech). A large portion of the above expenditure will be required for stores and harness that will be manufactured in Australia.

14. *Transport.*—Men electing to join the various sections of the transport services, who are by occupation carters, may be able to provide at the same time a horse and cart suitable for service. In such case some payment would require to be made, or the member's service curtailed as an equivalent. Otherwise a certain number of horses and vehicles would require to be hired.

To purchase complete wagon and cart equipment for the National Force will probably not be within our means for some years, and the adaptation of the vehicles ordinarily in use in the country is only what has been forced on other nations for the same reasons.

15. *Exemptions.*—Provision will be made for the exemption from service of those physically incapable, and also of those whom reasons of

State policy require to be freed from training, either permanently or temporarily. Any contributions required to be made in lieu of service will be formulated when fuller experience is obtained of the numbers and character of those exempted. In the meantime an elastic scale will be adopted temporarily.

In Time of War.

16. Out of over 1,000,000 men of military age in Australia, and subject to military service under the Defence Acts, 1903-4, probably about 800,000 are physically fit for service, though but a small proportion have received any military training.

About 40,000 male Australians reach the age of 18 in each year, of whom about 27,000 are estimated to be physically fit and otherwise available for service.

The operation of the system now proposed, after eight years, will, it is estimated, give us 214,000 men, fairly trained, physically fit for war, properly equipped, and organised in self-contained brigades for use as a field force, or in similarly complete units for garrison defence at important localities.

The ages of the members will be from 18 to 26 years, excepting those of the higher ranks.

In this connection it is noteworthy that of the whole British Regular Army at home and abroad, three-quarters are below the age of 25 years, and in view of the early development of Australian youths, as compared with Europeans, the ages of the National Guard compare favourably.

Men over 26, who have passed into the Reserve, will have been arranged in classes in the order in which they would be required to serve, as is now provided in the Defence Acts.

Out of these 214,000 there would be 83,000 undergoing regular annual trainings in the National Guard, the remainder being formed into senior regiments corresponding to the junior regiments in which they performed their three years' training.

The training for those between 21 and 26 years of age is a matter for subsequent consideration, and does not need to be determined at once. It may be that Parliament will decide on a modified form of training for one week every two or three years, or that it may be limited to an annual musketry course with a rifle club. This part of the scheme cannot take effect until at least four years from the commencement of the new system.

In time of war the latest joined, 18 years of age, would be left at the dépôts of units for further training, their places being taken by the men last passed over to the senior regiments. The regiments and corps composing the field force and the garrison troops would be distributed by ages as follows :—

Ages (officers excepted).	Numbers.	Allotment.
18 to 19 years...	27,000	At regimental dépôts for further training
19 to 22 " " "	83,000	National Guard—Junior Regiments
22 to 26 " " "	83,000	National Guards—Senior Regiments
25 to 26 " (part)...	21,000	Supernumeraries—to replace the casualties in both Senior and Junior Regiments.
	214,000	

If we add to these the men passed into the Reserve after Australia, reaching the age of 26, at the end of the twenty-second year of the system there will be over 750,000 Australians under 40 who will have received military training. In this calculation ordinary rates of mortality have been allowed for, and credit taken for an increase of population at 2 per cent. per annum.

The Expansion of the Militia and Volunteer Units into the National Guard.

17. The creation of this new National Guard involves no disbandment of the existing Militia units. It will simply be an expansion of each of the present units into several new ones, and the absorption therein of all the Militia and Volunteers who are willing to continue their service.

The National Guard in training (83,000) will number nearly three times the war establishment of the present Defence Force, and over five times its peace establishment.

Each existing unit at peace establishment will therefore be formed into either two or three (as found necessary) units of the National Guard. All units of the National Guard will have but one establishment—"War"—and will be trained in bodies similar to those maintained on service. This will be better understood by taking as an example a regiment of infantry—

		Officers.	W.O.'s and Sergts.	Others.	Total.
A Militia Regiment of Infantry, Staff and 8 Companies,	consists on a Peace Establishment of and expands on a War Establishment to	31	37	453	521
		32	51	969	1,052

The above regiment (peace establishment) would form the nucleus of three regiments, whose eventual establishments would require 3,156 of all ranks. The regimental distinctions of units would naturally follow to the new units. Each of the new regiments would contain about one-third of the old unit, viz., 174 of all ranks, and its numbers would, during the first three years, vary approximately as follows, if all the old members of the Defence Force continued to serve:—

Steps in the formation of a National Guard Regiment (infantry):—

	From old Force.			New Force.		Total.
	Officers.	Sergts.	Others.	Number.	Age.	
1st year, Staff and 4 Coys.	14	18	142	300	18-19	474
2nd " " " 6 "	23	33	118	600	18-20	774
3rd " " " 8 "	32	51	91	900	18-21	1,074

The three National Guard Regiments would thus require 96 officers and 153 sergeants—total 249—out of the original 521 forming the old regiment. The balance, 272, for whom there would be no promotion, represents no more than the average waste by resignation during the three years.

During the first three years' operation of the system **Australia.** all members of the Militia continuing to serve will receive their ordinary rates of pay; but there will be no fresh enlistments on the same basis. During this time there will, of course, be considerable wastage from the ordinary causes now in force, and by the end of the third year it is anticipated that all those fit for promotion to the higher grades of N.C.O., and to commissions, will have been promoted. Others who are not fit for promotion will not be then re-engaged, but passed into the senior regiments, the policy of the proposal being to pass through a uniform course of training all the lower ranks, and retain for further instruction only those destined for higher grades. Pay will continue for the Militia so retained, and for the members of the new force subsequently promoted after attaining 21 years of age, to fill vacancies as they occur.

No doubt the different conditions of service, even with the issue of pay and the reduction of the training to twelve days, will make it impossible for some members of the Force to continue their present engagements; but it is confidently anticipated that a large proportion will continue to serve for many years, and that even those who experience some difficulty in giving the time required will make an effort to remain for a year or two, while the new organisation is reaching an assured position. Members of existing regiments will have an unexampled opportunity of obtaining promotion if they qualify for higher grades. After the third year it will be possible to obtain senior N.C.O.'s and officers by promotion from the young men of the National Guard.

The reason for at once forming all three regiments in part is in order to have eventually in each regiment one-third leaving each year, and being replaced by new men, rather than having the service of the whole of a regiment terminating at one time. Each regiment will thus have in it men in all three stages of instruction, and the new men will always be learning something from those who are more experienced, as well as from their instructors.

The artillery and other scientific corps will, of course, require a modification of the above arrangement.

Conclusion.

18. The expansion of the existing regiments into the National Guard, rather than their maintenance as a separate organisation, is inevitable.

- a. The latter course would involve an additional expenditure of about £600,000 beyond that shown on the present year's estimates, irrespective of the cost of arms and ammunition factories and the fixed defences.
- b. Apart from the question of cost, the new force of 214,000 will require about 8,000 officers and a proportionate number of N.C.O.'s—about 18,000 in all. The initial instruction of the National Guard recruits may be commenced by the 200 instructors of the Permanent Staff,¹ but it is obvious that to rely on them alone would be to create a force without leaders and of no use for war. From the existing Militia and Volunteer Forces it is, therefore, absolutely necessary to obtain leaders, numbering not less than 7,000 by the third year.

¹ The services of officers of the Unattached List and Reserve of Officers will also be utilised, where they are prepared to give the necessary time.

Australia. c. Moreover, the opportunity for rapid promotion in the new regiments would induce most of the best officers and men in the old units to apply for a transfer, and so result in an automatic disbandment of the present organisation.

All military exercises will be made more interesting by the issue of prizes, as is now done with respect to the musketry. The regimental winners will take part at central competitions in each State, and an annual meeting of the State champion teams be held in the various States in turn, as is now done in the Federal Rifle Matches. By this means it is believed that enthusiasm for true military efficiency will be assured, and to no less extent than is now devoted to other manly sports, and that the annual trainings will be looked forward to rather than deemed a burden.

No wide-reaching proposals such as this can succeed, unless carried out with thoroughness, and much more than a mere perfunctory compliance with the law. It will be provided that attendance alone for the period laid down by law shall not operate as a fulfilment of requirements unless each member of the National Guard attains the prescribed standard, and is classified as "efficient." Failure will involve in every case training for an additional year.

On the other hand, good service will be recognised by promotion, and every man whose duty is well performed will have it recorded on his register of service, or other official document, which in civil life may often be an advantage to him.

It is not expected that the 48 days' training of the National Guard will of itself produce a soldier of the European type, or that the training would be sufficient alone. It is to be remembered that the object in view is to train all Australians from the age of 12 upwards, that at each age they will be learning so much as their physical and mental development will permit, and that finally, on attaining manhood, they will be taught the principles that must guide and the responsibilities laid upon the soldier in the field of battle.

The training will not guarantee a "well-drilled" soldier, in common acceptation, but should give us men who know how to shoot, and who have overcome by field practice the great difficulties of organisation and combination, without which the bravest men do not make an army.

No pains will be spared, however, in the instruction of the leaders, and by the means already explained in paragraphs 6, 7, and 11, a high state of military knowledge will be attained. In the past, experience has shown what Australian citizens are capable of in the leading of troops, both in peace and war, and when the system of selection by merit alone has been in operation a few years we shall have commenced to utilise the services of the best in the community.

With such men as officers there will be no need to mention discipline, for with troops composed of Australians, leaders who know their work can command unflinching support.

Increased efficiency will result from year to year as the system is better understood in the light of the experience gained by the practical organisation of a National Force, and as public opinion ripens in the community, all of whose male electors will have themselves been educated by serving through the prescribed courses.

S. A. PETHERBRIDGE,

Acting Secretary, Department of Defence.

Department of Defence,

Melbourne, 31st January, 1908.

Queens- *The Military Forces of Queensland.*—The following has been communicated: The Military Forces of the Commonwealth in Queensland were originally organised under the State Defence Acts, 1844 to 1896, and reorganised under the Commonwealth Defence Act, 1903-4. Regulations (provisional) under the same Act, promulgated and taken into force 1st October, 1905. The force consists of:—

1. The District Headquarters Staff; 2. Instructional Staff; 3. Royal Australian Artillery, including Mounted Instructional Cadre; 4. Corps Australian Engineers; 5. Militia—Australian Light Horse, Australian Field Artillery, Australian Garrison Artillery, Corps Australian Engineers, Infantry, Australian Corps of Signallers, Australian Army Service Corps, Australian Army Medical Corps, and Veterinary Departments; 6. Volunteer Infantry, and Army Nursing Service; 7. Unattached and Reserve of Officers; 8. Chaplains; 9. Cadets; 10. Rifle Clubs.

All the male inhabitants of Queensland (excepting those who are exempt from service in the Defence Force), who have resided therein for six months, and are British subjects, and are between the ages of 18 and 60 years, shall, in time of war, be liable to serve in the Militia Forces. In time of war it shall be lawful for the Governor-General (the occasion being first communicated to the Parliament, if the Parliament be then sitting, or notified by proclamation, if the Parliament be not then sitting), by proclamation, to call upon persons liable to serve in the Militia Forces, to enlist in the Militia Forces, and thereupon such persons (other than those who are members of the Defence Force) shall, in the manner prescribed, enlist in the Militia Forces for the prescribed period (three years). A proclamation under this section may call upon all the persons specified in any one or more classes hereunder set out so to enlist, but so that the persons specified in any class shall not, in any case, be called upon so to enlist until the persons specified in every preceding class, are, or have been, so called upon.

The classes referred to in this section are as follows:—1. All men of the age of 18 years and upwards, but under 30 years, who are unmarried, or widowers without children; 2. All men of the age of 30 years and upwards, but under 45 years, who are unmarried, or widowers without children; 3. All men of the age of 18 years and upwards, but under 45 years of age, who are married, or widowers with children; 4. All men of the age of 45 years and upwards, but under 60 years.

In the time of peace corps are recruited by voluntary enlistment only. All members of the force are subject to the provisions of the Defence Act, 1903-4, and Regulations (provisional), 1905. Rifle Club members are governed by the Rifle Clubs Regulations, 1904.

Pay and Allowances.—A driver or gunner of the Permanent Artillery is paid at the rate of 2s. 6d. per diem; a sapper of the Permanent Engineers, 4s. 3d. per diem (seven days in the week). In addition to these rates of pay, quarters, rations, fuel, light, medical attendance, hospital, uniform, bedding, and cooking utensils, are provided by the Government free. Extra rates are given to troops stationed at Thursday Island and Townsville. Extra duty pay, from 3d. to 5d. per day, may be granted to non-commissioned officers and men of the artillery. District gunners and limber gunners are allowed extra pay, at 6d. per diem. *Good Conduct Pay.*—After two years' service with good conduct, 2d. per day; after four years' service, and if in possession of one good conduct badge for one year, 4d. per day; after six years' service, and if in possession of two good conduct badges for one year, 6d. per day. Non-commissioned officers

Queens- and men of good character may be permitted to re-engage for land. a second period of service. *Married Establishment*.—When quarters are not available, an allowance in lieu thereof is given on the following proportion and scale:—Warrant officers and staff-sergeants, 100 per cent. of establishment, 2s. per diem; sergeants, 50 per cent. of establishment, 1s. 9d. per diem; rank and file, 10 per cent. of establishment, 1s. 3d. per diem.

NAVAL AND MILITARY CALENDAR.

MARCH, 1908.

2nd (M.) The British Forces returned to Peshawar from the Zakka Khel Expedition.

5th (Th.) Launch from Imperial Dockyard, Wilhelmshaven, of first-class Battle-ship *Nassau* for German Navy.

6th (F.) 2nd Bn. Connaught Rangers left India for England in the *Plasy*.

10th (T.) H.M.S. *Shannon* commissioned at Chatham for service as Flagship of Fifth Cruiser Squadron.

11th (W.) 1st Bn. Connaught Rangers arrived in India from Malta in the *Rewa*.

27th (F.) 2nd Bn. Connaught Rangers arrived in England from India in the *Plasy*.

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Internationale Revue über die gesamten Armeen und Flotten. Dresden: March, 1908.—"Military and Naval Intelligence from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan, Austria-

Hungary, Russia, and Spain." *Supplement 95.*—"The World's Navies at the Beginning of the Year 1908." *French Supplement 108.*—"The German and French Field Artillery in Action, according to the Regulations of 1907." "Protection and Surprise of Railways." "The German Officers' Reserve Corps, Compared with Similar Foreign Organisations, and Judged by the Foreign Press." "Eighteen Months with the Russian Armies in Manchuria." "Submarine or Submersible?" "Mounted Infantry in the American Colonial Wars."

Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine. Berlin: March, 1908.—"On the Training of Cadets." "Remarks on the New Field Artillery Regulations and Gunnery Instructions" (concluded). "Did General von Yorck ratify the Convention of Taurrogen according to Secret Instructions or not?" "Disciplinary Powers for Punishment of Men on Leave of Absence." "Tactics of Field Artillery." "Proposals for the Better Working of our State Railways for Military Purposes." "Battle Firing with Subsidiary Targets."

Artilleristische Monatshefte. Berlin: March, 1908.—"Barrel-Recoiling Guns." "Artillery in the Russo-Japanese War" (concluded). "Results of the New French Artillery Organisation for Germany." "Intelligence of the French Field Artillery." "The Employment of the Turkish Field Howitzers in the Battle at Domakos." "Artillery from the Naval Pocketbook." "The Japanese Infantry Drill Regulations." "Field Artillery Considerations."

ITALY.—*Rivista di Artiglieria e di Genio.* Rome: January, 1908.—"Floors Constructed with Joists of Armoured Concrete." "Vicissitudes of an Alpine Barrier Fort: Rocca d'Anfo in 1813-14." "Musketry Fire from Opposing Entrenchments." "On the Calculation of the Angle of Sight in Field Batteries." "The Rôle of the Engineers in the Russo-Japanese War."

February, 1908.—"Musketry Fire from Opposing Entrenchments" (concluded). "The Electric Light Installation at the Victor Emmanuel II. Barracks in Florence." "The Method of Carrying out Series of Effect in Field Artillery Fire." "Artillery Scouts."

Rivista Militare Italiana. Rome: March, 1908.—"China and Japan in the Far Eastern Problem" (concluded). "The History of the Origin of the Present Administration of Army Corps." "The Sources and Selection of Officers for Rapid Promotion." "The Grand Manœuvres of 1907." "Revolutionary Propaganda and the Education of the Troops." "Colonel Gabriele Pepe and the Pepe-Lamartine Duel." "The Future Campaign of the Italian Army." "Our Reconnaissance Service and the Russo-Japanese War." "Field Batteries on a Four-Gun Basis."

PORUGAL.—*Revista de Engenharia Militar.* Lisbon: January, 1908.—"The Military Pontoon Train." "Dirigible Balloons at the Present Time and Field Aerostatical Parks." "The Hague Conference" (continued). "New Regulations for the Military Telegraphic Service."

Revista de Infantaria. Lisbon: March, 1908.—"King Manuel II." "Machine Guns" (continued). "Our Infantry Regimental Schools." "The Infante Don Alfonso Institute." "The Employment of Machine Guns with Infantry in Attack and Defence." "Candidates for the Military Administration."

Revista Militar. Lisbon: January, 1908.—"Rearmament of Mountain Artillery." "Chronicle of the English Army." "Preparation for War." "The Care to be Given to Horses."

RUSSIA.—*Voënnnyi Sbórnik*. St. Petersburg : March, 1908.—Has not been received.

SPAIN.—*Memorial de Ingenieros del Ejército*. Madrid : February, 1908.—“The Automobile Service in our Army” (continued). “Ideas on the Present State of Fortification on the Field of Battle” (concluded). “Night Siege Operations carried out by the 8th Battalion of the Sappers of the Rhine.” “Brakes for Electric Carriages.” “Practical Method of Division.”

Revista Técnica de Infantería y Caballería. Madrid : 1st March, 1908.—“Tribunals of Honour” (continued). “On Unity of Doctrine.” “The Russian Cavalry at Mukden.” “Infantry and its Branches.” “Mobilisation and Manœuvres carried out in Galicia in the Autumn of 1907.” “Bibliography of the War of Independence.”

15th March.—“Tribunals of Honour” (continued). “Our Cavalry at the Beginning of the 19th Century.” “Provisional Instruction of the Group of Machine Guns of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division.” “Initiative in Command in the French Army.” “Infantry and its Branches” (concluded). “Bibliography of the War of Independence” (continued).

Revista Científico-Militar y Biblioteca Militar. Barcelona : 10th March, 1908.—“The Occupation of Mar Chica : Some Political-Military Considerations.” “That is the Question.” “The Organisation and Duties of the General Staff.” “General Oku’s Maxims of War.” “The Personnel in the Naval and Military Organisation.”

25th March.—“The Occupation of Mar Chica : Some Political-Military Considerations” (continued). “Reminiscences of Germany.” “A Book on the Art of War and the Principles of the 19th Century; by Colonel Banus.” “Reports by Heads of Divisions.” “Mobility in Armies.” “Coast Batteries.”

SWITZERLAND.—*Revue Militaire Suisse*. Lausanne : March, 1908.—“The Manœuvres in the Vosges in 1907.” “Observation of the Enemy by Means of Advanced Posts.” “Attack of Fortified Positions.” “The New Programme for Infantry Musketry” (concluded). “The Goerz Panoramic Telescope.”

UNITED STATES.—*Journal of the Military Service Institution*.—Governor’s Island, N.Y.H. : March-April, 1908.—“The Scope of Teaching of Hygiene and Sanitation in our Military and Naval Schools” (*Seaman Prize Essay*). “The Vicksburg Campaign.” “A Study of the Conditions of Warfare in North-Eastern Morocco.” “Cavalry Operations in the Russo-Japanese War.” “Transmission of Military Intelligence.” “The Military Shoe and the Military Foot.” “Colonial Protection: A Mobile Army for the First Line of Action.” “Tropical Infection.” “The Army and the Organised Militia.”

Journal of the United States Infantry Association. Washington : March, 1908.—“Our Machine-Gun Platoons.” “Our Military Policy.” “A Visit to the Lava Beds.” “Technical Training for Line Officers in the Use and Construction of Military Lines of Information.” “A New Device for Carrying the Foot-Soldier’s Pack.” “Translations and Reprints.”

Army and Navy Life. New York : March, 1908.—“The Loss of the Patrie.” “British Empire Notes.” “Berlin Letter.” “German Military Automobile.” “Indian Campaigns in Texas.” “The States Forces.”

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Historical Memoirs of the XVIIIth Hussars (Princess of Wales's Own).
By Colonel HAROLD MALET. London: Simpkin and Co. 1907.
Price 23s.

Thirty-nine years ago Colonel Malet, then a captain in the regiment, compiled the Records of the Eighteenth Hussars, and now the happy discovery of a number of old letters and Peninsular diaries has enabled him to bring these memoirs up to date and to revise and amplify much that had been published in the earlier volume. He was fortunate indeed, not only to find diarists of Peninsular days, but to be able to make use of journals so full and so interesting, for if in these times it is the fashion to bewail the want of education among our officers, it is very certain that the majority of their predecessors of the beginning of the last century had but little taste or inclination to write anything at all. Among the journals of which Colonel Malet has made use there is that of Lieut. Woodberry, published, curiously enough, only in French, and wherein the writer describes in great detail all the episodes of the campaign in Spain in which the Eighteenth took so notable a part. There are also included in the present volume a large number of amusing verses and sketches illustrative of life in France during the occupation—a curious period of which there is but little record to be found elsewhere. The old Eighteenth were disbanded in 1821, and the present regiment was not raised until 1858, but they were fortunate in finding that some at least of the old officers were alive and to receive from them tangible proof of the keen interest which they took in the tardy resuscitation of the old corps. The young Eighteenth were fortunate too in the man who was selected to raise the regiment, and who came, by a curious coincidence, from a regiment with which the 18th Dragoons had been brigaded during the whole of the latter part of the campaign in the Peninsula. The account of the part which the 18th Hussars took in the war in South Africa is singularly full of interest, and Colonel Malet was able to obtain for this portion of the memoirs the manuscript of a very minute record kept by Major Burnett throughout the campaign. As a mark of His Majesty's approval of all that the Eighteenth did in South Africa, the title of Princess of Wales's Own was given to the regiment, and the portrait of Her Royal Highness adorns the first page of Colonel Malet's handsome volume. This book should command interest even outside the circle of those for whom it has been primarily intended, for the inner history of the part which the old regiment took in the great wars of the last century as of that which was so well played by the corps which has inherited the same number and the same traditions, is of value to all Englishmen whether they follow the trade of war or pursue the arts of peace.

Panorama Drawing. By Captain P. E. LEWIS, R.F.A. Pamphlet.
London: Hugh Rees, Ltd. 1908.

The object of this pamphlet is not, as the author states, to detail the various methods of panorama drawing, but merely to describe a simple

and practical method by which those not proficient in landscape drawing may be able to produce a useful and accurate panorama, either from Nature or from maps. The little work is divided into three parts, viz.: drawing a panorama from Nature; drawing a panorama from a map; and drawing a contoured sketch from a panorama. The method is, in each case, clearly and concisely described, and the pamphlet should commend itself to candidates for promotion and Staff College examinations. Three excellent plans accompany the pamphlet.

Weapons: A Brief Discourse on Hand-weapons, other than Fire-arms.

By B. E. SARGEANT, Assistant-Curator of the Royal United Service Museum, Whitehall. London: Hugh Rees, Ltd. 2s. 6d.

This very useful book, which is exceedingly well illustrated, will be of great interest and assistance to those desirous of acquiring information concerning the weapons which have been employed in general warfare from time to time. The book is divided into three chapters, dealing respectively with weapons for stunning, cutting, and thrusting, or stabbing, and a fourth chapter is added for the inclusion of certain miscellaneous arms which are not capable of classification under any of the headings of the first three chapters.

The author points out in his preface that specimens of nearly all of the weapons alluded to in the book are to be found in the Museum at Whitehall, and he concludes by expressing a hope that his efforts may be the means of inculcating increased interest in a collection which is truly deserving of the attention of every member of the community.

The illustrations are collected in eleven plates, with historical descriptions on the facing page. These plates are excellent examples of art printing. They contain copious illustrations of war-clubs, swords, lances, halberds, pikes, daggers, and numerous other weapons.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY DURING MARCH, 1908.

Diary of Cornet F. C. Trower, 16th Queen's Light Dragoons, during the First Afghan War. From the 29th April to the 19th December, 1842.
Manuscript.

Manchu and Muscovite. By B. L. PUTNAM WEALE. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd.) London, 1907.

The Admiralty of the Atlantic. By P. A. HISLAM. 8vo. 6s. 6d. (Presented.) (Longmans, Green & Co.) London, 1908.

Three Voyages of a Naturalist. By M. J. NICOLL. 8vo. 7s. 6d.. (Presented.) (Witherby & Co.) London, 1908.

Memories of Eight Parliaments. By H. W. LUCY ("TOBY, M.P."). 8vo. 8s. 6d. (William Heinemann.) London, 1908.

Morgan's Cavalry. By B. W. DUKE. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Neale Publishing Co.) New York, 1906.

Kavallerie—Pionier vorschrift vom 24 Oktobr, 1907. (Official.) 12mo.
(E. S. Mittler & Sohn.) Berlin, 1907.

Life of His Royal Highness Edward, Duke of Kent. By The Rev. E NEALE. 8vo. (Richard Bentley.) London, 1850.

Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Duke de Saldanha, with Selections from His Correspondence. By CONDE DA CARNOTA. 2 Vols. 8vo. (John Murray.) London, 1880.

Weapons: A Brief Discourse on Weapons other than Fire-arms. By B. E. SARGEANT. 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Hugh Rees, Ltd.) London, 1908.

Training and Tactics. By Captain H. M. JOHNSTON. 12mo. 1s. 6d.
(Presented.) (Oliver & Boyd.) London, 1908.

Massachusetts, Military Historical Society:—

Vol. I., *Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-62.* Edited by T. F. DWIGHT.
8vo. Boston & New York, 1895.

Vol. II., *The Virginia Campaign of 1862, under General Pope.* Edited by T. F. DWIGHT. 8vo. Boston & New York, 1895.

Vol. III., *Campaigns in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, 1862-63.* 8vo. Boston, 1903.

Vol. IV., *The Wilderness Campaign, May-June, 1864.* 8vo. Boston, 1905.

Vol. VI., *The Shenandoah Campaigns of 1862 and 1864, and the Appomattox Campaign, 1865.* 8vo. Boston. 1907.

Vol. X., *Critical Sketches of Some of the Federal and Confederate Commanders.* Edited by T. F. DWIGHT. 8vo. Boston, 1895.

Vol. XI., *Naval Actions and Operations against Cuba and Porto Rico, 1598-1815.* 8vo. Boston, 1901.

Vol. XII., *Naval Actions and History, 1799-1898.* 8vo. Boston, 1902.

The World's Peoples. By A. H. KEANE. 8vo. 6s. (Hutchinson & Co.) London, 1908.

The Empire and the Century: A Series of Essays on Imperial Problems and Possibilities by Various Writers. 8vo. 2ls. (John Murray.) London, 1908.

Turkey in Europe. By Sir CHARLES ELIOT ("ODYSSEUS"). New Edition.
8vo. 7s. 6d. (Edward Arnold.) London, 1908.

A Forgotten John Russell, Being Letters to a Man of Business, 1724-1751
Arranged by MARY E. MATCHAM. 8vo. (Edward Arnold.) London, 1905.

Dictionary of the World's Commercial Products. By J. A. SLATER. 2nd Edition. 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Sir Isaac Pitman & Co., Ltd.) London, n.d.

Handbook of Commercial Geography. By G. G. CHISHOLM. 6th Edition.
8vo. 15s. (Longmans, Green & Co.) London, 1906.

The Story of the Guides. By Colonel G. J. YOUNGHUSBAND. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd.) London, 1908.

Ordnance Ledgers from 30th June, 1680, to 30th June, 1715. 26 Vols. 22 inches by 15 inches. (Presented.) Manuscript.

The Pirates of Malabar and an Englishwoman in India Two Hundred Years Ago. By Colonel J. BIDDULPH. 8vo. 6s. (Smith, Elder & Co.) London, 1907.

The Search for the Western Sea. By L. J. BURPEE. 8vo. 16s. (Alston Paris, Ltd.) London, 1908.

The Early History of Charles James Fox. By the Right Hon. Sir G. O. TREVELYAN. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. (Longmans, Green & Co.) London, 1901.

Memoirs of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wylie Norman, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.I.E. By Sir W. LEE-WARNER. 8vo. 14s. (Smith, Elder & Co.) London, 1908.

The History of the 3rd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1798-1907. By the Rev. R. W. WEIR. 8vo. (Presented.) ("Courier" & "Herald" Offices.) Dumfries, 1908.

Notes on Magnetism and Electricity. By Lieutenant J. S. IREDELL, A.S.C. 8vo. 3s. 6d. (Presented.) (Gale & Polden.) Aldershot, 1908.

Panorama Drawing. By Captain P. E. LEWIS. 8vo. 1s. 6d. (Presented.) (Hugh Rees, Ltd.) London, 1908.

Guide to Army Signalling. By Lieutenant R. L. G. HENRIQUES. 12mo 1s. (Presented.) (Gale & Polden.) Aldershot, 1908

Memoir of the Life and Military Services of Viscount Lake, Baron Lake of Delhi and Laswaree, 1744-1808. By Colonel H. W. PEARSE. 8vo. 15s. (William Blackwood & Sons.) London, 1908.

Journal of Captain William Smith, 11th Light Dragoons, during the Peninsular War, May, 1811, to October 26th, 1812. Crown 8vo. Manuscript.

Our Coast Defence. By Captain A. E. C. MYERS. Crown 8vo. 1s. (William Clowes & Sons, Ltd.) London, 1908.

A History of the Peninsular War. Vol. III. By C. OMAN. 8vo. 14s. (Presented.) (The Clarendon Press.) Oxford, 1908.

First or Grenadier Guards in South Africa, 1899-1902. By Brigadier-General F. LLOYD, C.B., D.S.O., and Major Hon. A. RUSSELL. Crown 8vo. (Presented.) (Kellher & Co., Ltd.) London, 1907.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF MILITARY INTEREST.

COMPILED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE.

APRIL, 1908. PUBLISHED QUARTERLY.

*Communicated by the General Staff and reprinted by permission of the
Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.*

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PREFATORY NOTE.

This Pamphlet will be issued quarterly, in April, July, October and January. Its purpose is to draw the attention of Officers to British and Foreign publications of Military interest which are likely to assist them in their professional work. Copies of the pamphlet will be distributed to the Headquarters of Commands, Educational Establishments, Units and Reference Libraries.

PART I.

BOOKS.

Notes.—1. When the price is not given in Part I., it is not known.
 2. In Part I., books whose titles are given in foreign languages, as well as in English, are published in those languages, and are not translated.

HISTORICAL.

The Russo-Japanese War: Lectures given at the Russian Staff College. Translated from the Russian into French. Part VI. (Conférences sur la guerre Russo-Japonaise faites à l'Académie d'état-major Nicolas.) 206 pp., 5 sketches. Paris, 1908. Lavaudelle. 4/2.

Parts III., IV., and V. of these lectures were noticed in "Recent Publications of Military Interest" for January, 1908.

The lectures in Part VI. of this series contain an account and criticism of General Mishchenko's raid on Ying-kou during the month of January, 1905. The lecturer was Colonel Vadolski, chief of General Mishchenko's staff during the raid. He considers that up to the morning of the 15th January the operations were well conducted, and that the accusations of slowness which have been levelled against the Commander are not well founded, but that after that date many mistakes were made. The lecturer believes that the principal causes of failure were, that the detachment employed was too cumbersome for the duty entrusted to it, and that the objectives of the expedition were not clearly defined.

A diary kept by Captain Agathonov, from the 7th to the 19th January, is included in this part. It contains some interesting remarks on the condition of the horses at the conclusion of the raid.

Kuropatkin (Куropatkin). By V. A. 213 pp. 8vo. 2nd edition. St. Petersburg, 1908. V. Berezovski. 2/-

This work professes to be a character sketch of Kuropatkin as a leader, but a strong bias against him is observable throughout, and the subject forms a peg upon which a good deal of idle gossip is hung. However, some interesting sidelights are thrown by the author upon the Russian army in the field, such as:—The haphazard way in which the personnel of the higher staffs was selected, the jealous antagonism between the staffs of the Viceroys and of the Army Commander, the struggle for decorations, and the want of method in choosing officers for commands. Perhaps the most interesting of all is the description given of the feeling in the army after Liao-yang and the panic of the 54th Division.

Journal of a Trans-Baikal Cossack (Journal d'un Cosaque du Transbaïkal). By Col. A. Kvitska. 408 pp. 160 illustrations from photographs and sketches by the author. A general map and rough plans of some engagements. 4to. Paris, 1908. Plon-Nourrit. 12/6.

The author of this book distinguished himself at the assault of the Grivitsa Redoubt in 1877, and served with Skobelev at Geok-Tepe.

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out he was no longer on the active list, but he lost no time in applying for leave to return. He was at once appointed to the 2nd Nerchinsk Regiment of Trans-Baikal Cossacks, and started immediately for the Far East. He reached Liao-yang at the end of April, 1904, accompanied Count Keller to Lien-shan-kuan, and eventually joined his own regiment near Sai-ma-chi. He saw most of the fighting which took place on the left of the Xth (Russian) Corps, but his account does not add much to that already given by Von Tettau, except in personal details. As an instance of the organization of the reserve regiments, the author mentions that the regimental doctor attached to the 2nd Nerchinsk Cossacks was an eminent accoucheur with but little knowledge of surgery.

The general strategy of the campaign has no place in this book, but the orders received, conversations related, and other indications, provide ample evidence of the anxiety which was felt in the senior ranks of the Russian army lest General Kuroki should advance directly against Mukden.

Modern Egypt. By the Earl of Cromer. 2 vols. 594 and 600 pp. With map. 8vo. London, 1908. Macmillan. 24/- the two volumes.

Lord Cromer, after a brief introduction, outlines the political history of Egypt, from 1863 to 1876, and discusses the financial crisis which led to intervention by the Powers of Europe, and notably of France and Great Britain. The author shows that the institution of a Commission of Inquiry into the finances of Egypt was a necessary corollary to this intervention, and how Ismail Pasha endeavoured unsuccessfully to wreck the Commission by means of a *coup d'état* designed to rid the country of European advisers.

After the deposition of Ismail in 1879, Great Britain and France re-established a joint control over Egypt, and Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) was appointed British Controller, a position he held until June 1880.

RECENT MILITARY PUBLICATIONS.

From the beginning of 1881 the want of discipline in the Egyptian Army gave serious cause for alarm, and after two successful mutinies the army got completely out of hand, the authority of the Khedive was destroyed, and Egypt was reduced to a state of anarchy. An outbreak against Europeans at Alexandria in June, 1882, brought matters to a crisis. Arabi Pasha, the leader of the military party, had become "a power to be reckoned with."

The action of the British Government in ordering the bombardment of Alexandria is described by Lord Cromer as being "perfectly justifiable, because it was clear that, in the absence of effectual Turkish or International action, the duty of crushing Arabi devolved upon England." Arabi withdrew his army from the vicinity of Alexandria after the bombardment, and issued a proclamation stating that irreconcileable war existed between the Egyptians and the English.

Lord Cromer writes: "The history of the next two months may be summarised in a single sentence. England stepped in, and with one rapid and well-delivered blow, crushed the rebellion." The author, however, shows that England acted alone only after every diplomatic resource had been exhausted in the endeavour to persuade the French, Italian, and Turkish Governments to co-operate in the work.

After Tel el-Kebir, in September, 1882, and the final rout of Arabi's army, Lord Dufferin was sent to Egypt to report on the situation, and the result was that a policy of reform was adopted which connected with an indefinite prolongation of the British occupation, and the abolition of the dual control, which was only effected after some sharp diplomatic skirmishing with France. It then became clear that for some long while to come the representative of the British Government in Egypt would of necessity be more than an ordinary diplomatic agent. Sir Edward Malet having been promoted, the British Government offered the appointment to Sir E. Baring, who accepted the offer, and arrived in Egypt in September, 1883.

Part III. of Lord Cromer's work deals with the story of the Sudan from 1881 to 1907. After describing the vast area over which the Khedive still exercised a nominal control, and after calling attention to the misgovernment that existed throughout the country, Lord Cromer shows that everything was ripe for a successful rising when a man named Mohammed Ahmed proclaimed himself Mahdi of the Sudan in 1881.

Egypt at this time maintained garrisons at Khartoum, El Obeid, and other distant places in the Sudan, but when in the spring of 1883 the Mahdist movement had become formidable, the military and financial resources upon which Egypt could rely to quell the rebellion are thus described by Lord Cromer: "The Treasury was exhausted; the army was unpaid, undisciplined, untrained, partially disloyal, and, therefore, worthless as a fighting machine." These facts were well known to the British Government of the day, and Lord Cromer censures it for not interfering in the despatch of the ill-fated expedition under General Hicks from Dueim in September, 1883.

The policy of evacuating the Sudan was now urged by Sir Evelyn Baring, accepted by the British Government, and finally acquiesced in by the Egyptian Government, and in answer to popular clamour in England, General Gordon was sent to Khartoum early in 1884 to concert measures for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons still in the Sudan. But after the defeat of General Hicks, events followed each other with startling rapidity: Egyptian troops were defeated at Tamanieb; Slatin Bey surrendered Dara, and the Province of Darfour fell into the hands of the Mahdi; General Valentine Baker's force was defeated at El Teb; Berber fell, and Khartoum was cut off and besieged by overwhelming numbers of Dervishes. The only success among this series of disasters was the victory of Sir Gerald Graham's force at Tamai.

Lord Cromer deals with these events in a forcible and impartial manner. He criticizes the dilatoriness of the British Government in despatching a force to the relief of Gordon, but eulogizes the gallantry of the British troops, and the strenuous efforts made by all, when once the expedition started, to arrive in time. While he calls attention to a want of consistency in some of General Gordon's actions, he nevertheless pays an eloquent tribute to the bravery and devotion of this national hero:—

"History has recorded few incidents more calculated to strike the imagination than that presented by this brave man, who, strong in the faith which sustained him, stood undismayed amidst dangers which might well have appalled the stoutest heart. . . . Hordes of savage fanaticism surged around him. Shot and shell poured into the town which he was defending against fearful odds. Starvation stared him in the face."

Lord Cromer, in reviewing this period, makes the following comments:—

"Looking more closely to the details in the execution of the British policy, the following are the conclusions at which I arrive:—

"In the first place, it was a mistake to send any British official to Khartoum. The task he had to perform was well-nigh impossible of execution, and his nomination involved the assumption of responsibilities on the part of the British Government which it was desirable to avoid.

"Secondly, if anyone was to be sent, it was a mistake to choose General Gordon. In spite of many noble traits in his character, he was wanting in some of the qualities which were essential to the successful accomplishment of his mission.

"Thirdly, when once General Gordon had been sent, he should have been left a free hand, so long as he kept within the main lines of the policy which he was authorized to execute. It is, in my opinion, to be regretted that General Gordon was not allowed to employ Zobeir Pasha, but any view held as to the probable results of employing him must be conjectural.

"Fourthly, the question of whether an expedition should or should not have been sent from Suakin to Berber in the spring of 1884 depends on the military practicability of the undertaking, a point on which the best military authorities differed in opinion.

"Fifthly, a great and inexcusable mistake was made in delaying for so long the despatch of the Gordon Relief Expedition.

"Sixthly, the Government acted wisely, after the fall of Khartoum, in eventually adopting a defensive policy, and in ordering a retreat to Wadi Halfa."

Lord Cromer raises another point which was much discussed at the time, namely, the delay of three days in despatching steamers from Gubat after the arrival of the desert column at that place on the 21st January, 1885.

"If the steamers had left Gubat on the afternoon of the 21st they would probably have arrived at Khartoum in time to save the town." This conclusion is probably sound.

Lord Cromer states that it is beyond the scope of this work to write a detailed history of the military operations which took place in the Sudan, but he gives a brief summary of the chief events connected with the Nile campaign of 1884-85.

On receipt of the news that Gordon had been killed and Khartoum taken, British public opinion was so intensely aroused that it appeared probable for a time that active operations would be undertaken for the recapture of the town, but, eventually, it was decided to pursue a more logical course and to withdraw the British troops to a good strategical position in the valley of the Nile and to there await the attack of the Mahdist forces.

The years from 1886 to 1892 were devoted to the defence of Egypt proper north of Wadi Halfa, and to maintaining an Egyptian post at Suakin.

Although British military aid to a limited extent was subsequently on one or two occasions afforded to the Egyptian Government, it may be said that from the date of the battle of Ginniss (December 30th, 1885) the defence of Egypt against the Dervishes practically devolved on the Egyptian army.

The Egyptian army as it existed prior to Tel-el-Kebir, was disbanded immediately after that battle, and the work of reorganising it was intrusted in the first instance to Sir Evelyn Wood and a devoted body of British officers. Lord Cromer shows how its organization and fighting efficiency gradually improved under the methods inaugurated by Sir Evelyn Wood and continued under his successors, Sir Francis Grenfell and Sir Herbert Kitchener, with the result that when the re-conquest of the Sudan was begun in 1895 the Egyptian Army had been converted into a formidable fighting machine.

Speaking of the final stages of the Khartoum campaign in which the Egyptian army was reinforced by British troops, Lord Cromer writes:—

"Early in August (1898), the Sirdar (Lord Kitchener), whose calculations of time were never once at fault, warned me that I ought to be back in Cairo by September 1st. . . . The long expected battle took place under the walls of Omdurman on September 2nd. . . . The Dervish loss was, in truth, terrible. Out of an army whose strength was estimated at from 40,000 to 50,000 men, some 11,000 were killed, and about 16,000 wounded. . . . The financial success was no less remarkable than the military. The total cost of the campaigns of 1896-1898, was £E.2,354,000, of which £E.1,200,000 was spent on railways and telegraphs and £E.155,000 on gun boats. The military expenditure, so called, only amounted to £E.996,000. Of the total sum rather less than £E.800,000 was paid by the British. The conditions under which the campaign was conducted were very peculiar. . . . The Sirdar was from the commencement of the operations, placed under my orders in all matters. The War Office assumed no responsibility and issued no orders. The result was that I found myself in the somewhat singular position of a civilian who had had some little military training in my youth, but who had had no experience of war, whose proper functions were diplomacy and administration, but who, under the stress of circumstances in the Land of Paradox, had to be ultimately responsible for the maintenance of even to some extent for the movements of an army of some 25,000 men in the field."

The Sudan having been reconquered, the question of the future political status of the country naturally presented itself for solution, and Lord Cromer explains the political reasons which rendered it "necessary to invent some method by which the Sudan should be, at one and the same time, Egyptian to such an extent as to satisfy equitable and political exigencies and yet sufficiently British to prevent the administration of the country from being hampered by the international burr which necessarily hung on the skirts of Egyptian political existence." Lord Cromer devised such a method, and the flags of Great Britain and Egypt which now float side by side throughout the Sudan betoken that the Sudan is governed by a partnership of two, of which England is the predominant partner.

Under the new régime, the Anglo-Egyptian official is described as requiring qualifications of the highest order, and comparing the position of military and civilian officials, Lord Cromer says: "The British officers of the Egyptian Army have had to contend against considerable difficulties, but as compared with their civilian colleagues, they have from one important point of view been at an advantage. There is a reality about the position of the soldier which does not exist in the case of the civilian. . . . The Sirdar is, therefore, master of the situation. . . . He is not obliged to trim his sails to every passing political breeze."

Lord Cromer devotes the remainder of his work, which he hopes will be of some special interest to those of his fellow countrymen who are or who at some future time may be engaged in Oriental administration, to discussing the Egyptian Puzzle; British policy in Egypt up to 1887, with one chapter devoted to the subsequent Anglo-French Agreement of 1904; the reforms effected, and a concluding chapter on the future of Egypt.

The Second Afghan War, 1878-80. Abridged Official Account. Produced in the Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters, India. 631 pp., with appendices, maps and plans. 8vo. London, 1907. Murray. 21/-.

This book was originally the work of Major-General Sir C. MacGregor, and was produced in the "eighties," but was treated as a secret work. It has now been revised and produced by Major Cardew, Indian Army, and the Intelligence Branch of Army Headquarters, India.

The book gives a detailed and voluminous account of the operations from October, 1878, to the close of the war in the end of 1880, and contains numerous maps, plans and illustrations.

The nature of the campaign was such that a full account must be a somewhat disjointed narrative, so the different phases in each theatre are dealt with in turn.

It includes a number of despatches which are, in many cases, very interesting, especially those of Lord (then Sir F.) Roberts, in Chapter XII., and those of Sir D. Stewart.

The accounts of the principal engagements are clear, and accompanied by good plans and sometimes by eye-sketches, which give the reader a very good idea of the country.

Although plans are given of nearly every skirmish and engagement, some of which were of very small importance, there is no general map of the country over which the operations extended, and there is no map of the line of communication from Peshawar to Kabul, nor of the line of communication from Quetta to Kandahar. This fact very much detracts from the value of the book, for, with the exception of the operations in the immediate vicinity of Kabul and Kandahar, it is impossible to follow the course of events, and numbers of places are mentioned, the exact location of which can only be a matter of guesswork for the uninitiated or the general reader who does not happen to be provided with an atlas.

We should say that the book had a greater value as a record than as a military history, for, owing to the defects mentioned above, it is difficult for the student to extract those lessons which are the valuable result of studying campaigns. There is little or no account of such points as the organisation of the lines of communication, and generally, of the working of the administrative services, though the difficulties of supply and transport are clearly brought out in some of the despatches, notably in Chapter XI. These difficulties, which occurred on both the northern and southern lines, prove the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of employing large forces in Afghanistan without railway communication. There are references to the scales of rations in Appendix XIX. and other places, but it would have been better and more easy for reference had such subjects been grouped under their separate headings and not interspersed among the accounts of the operations.

As readers will have to consult maps, a list is given below of those most likely to be useful:—

1. General map of Afghanistan.—Map of Afghanistan published by General Staff in 1906. 1 inch to 32 miles.
2. Frontier as settled by the Treaty of Gandamak, and for communications in the early stages of the war.—Stanford's large-scale map of Afghanistan, published 1879. 1 inch to 23 miles.
3. Communications in later stages.—Map of Afghanistan, published by Survey of India, 1883. 1 inch to 24 miles.
4. For operations of line of communications (more detailed study).—N.W. Trans-Frontier Survey. 1 inch to 8 miles. Sheets 27, 28, for northern lines, sheets 21, 21 S.E., for southern.

Spicheren (6th August, 1870) (Spicheren, 6 août 1870). By Lieut.-Colonel Maistre, 79th Infantry Regiment, and former Professor at the Staff College. With a Preface by General H. Langlois. 420 pp., with 9 maps and 10 panoramic views. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Berger-Levrault. 10/-.

General Langlois contributes a preface to this volume, in which he urges the importance of the study of the war of 1870-71, because it was fought in Europe, and because its events and lessons are thoroughly known and have been impartially discussed in the sober light of history. He points out on the other hand, that the Manchurian war is of too recent date for its teachings to be fully accepted, and to be of real value in every respect; it was, moreover, like the South African war, though in a lesser degree, fought under conditions very different to those which would obtain in a European war. The South African war produced a whole crop of false conclusions; though the Russo-Japanese war has done a great service in correcting a number of these, care must be taken to prevent it from creating a fresh series of ideas and theories, of a different nature, but almost equally unsound and misleading.

General Langlois therefore agrees with the author in his view that, for a European nation, the thoroughly digested lessons of 1870-71 are still of very great importance. The story of this war has been told so many times, and in such detail, that it would seem difficult to write anything fresh on the subject. Lieut.-Colonel Maistre, however, has set himself the task of dealing with the personal equation in the Franco-German war, the tactical training of the troops, the qualities of the higher leaders, and above all, the spirit which animated the opposing forces, from general to private soldier. He is of opinion that the disasters suffered by his countrymen were mainly attributable to the loss of the offensive spirit, which was as striking a characteristic of the French armies of the First Republic and of the First Empire, as it was of the Prussians in 1866 and of the Germans in 1870. With the object of dealing at length with the question of *moral*, Lieut.-Colonel Maistre determined to make a thorough and searching analysis of one of the great battles of 1870; he chose Spicheren as the most suitable for his purpose, a battle which he describes as the "apotheosis of the initiative."

The object of this volume is not to attack individuals, but the system by which brave men and talented generals were robbed of their energy and power of action, a system of inaction and want of initiative which would have paralysed any army and any leaders, and was more especially foreign and repugnant to the particular genius of the French nation. The author emphasizes the fact that no army can win victory by contenting itself with merely repulsing an enemy and warding off his blows; the surest road to success is by means of attack, a constant and energetic offensive, and a determination to conquer, which will repair any temporary checks that may be caused by an excess of ardour on the part of individual commanders; if, however, a defensive attitude should be temporarily imposed upon an army, then its

commander must be prepared and determined to assume the offensive on the first favourable opportunity, to wrest the initiative from the enemy, and to crush him by a decisive counter attack delivered by a powerful general reserve.

General Langlois also lays stress on the fact that it seems highly likely that France's next great war will again be fought against her ancient enemy, Germany, whose troops will be animated with the same spirit of the offensive as in 1870; he dwells on the necessity of cultivating the initiative, a plant which grows slowly, and requires constant attention. He concludes with a few words of praise for Lieut.-Colonel Maistre's work, which he is sure will attain its object of "seeking in the wars of the past the lessons which will prepare us for the wars of the future."

Lieut.-Colonel Maistre's history of Spicheren is accurate, impartial and interesting; it is, of course, written with a particular object, that of proving that the defeat of his countrymen was due to false doctrines and over-confidence, to a lack of enterprise and initiative; that the Germans owed their victory to their offensive spirit, and to the energy and initiative of their leaders, not to any superiority in courage or endurance. He has pleaded his cause with eloquence, and, we think, with success; it was not the French soldiers who were defeated at Wörth, Spicheren and Vionville, but their leaders, whose natural abilities had been blunted by false theories and vicious doctrines.

The arguments employed by the author are clear and convincing; he writes with knowledge and conviction, and with an evidently strong sense of a patriotic duty—that of educating his countrymen and of inculcating in them the moral qualities which are necessary for success in war. He is a member, and an able member, of the great school of thought, presided over by such men as Generals Bonnal and Langlois, whose lives are devoted to the attempt to teach the French nation the spirit of modern war. They believe in the necessity of the offensive; that success can only be obtained by attack, preferably by constant attacks, like the Germans in 1870-71, and the Japanese in 1904-05, but, if necessary, by defensive action; always provided that it be followed by a resolute and vigorous counterstroke.

Lieut.-Colonel Maistre points out very clearly the disastrous results that are certain to accrue from a merely passive defensive action. At Spicheren, as in other battles, the French made use of their reserves for local counter attacks and *retours offensifs*; there was, however, no determination to conquer by means of a great stroke by a powerful general reserve, and therefore, the French were invariably beaten, just as and for the same reason that the Russians were constantly defeated in Manchuria.

The author compares the vigour and energy of the Prussian generals, especially von Alvensleben, whose determination to conquer secured the victory, with the want of offensive spirit shown by the French leaders, who only sought to maintain their positions and not to defeat the enemy. He also emphasizes the necessity for mutual co-operation, both on the field of battle and in marching to the sound of the guns.

The book abounds in able criticisms and valuable lessons; the views expressed and the principles enunciated are fully in accordance with the teachings of our own regulations, with the result that the volume cannot fail to be of considerable interest and utility to the British officer and student of military history.

The War of 1870-71. The Investment of Metz (La Guerre de 1870-71. L'investissement de Metz). Historical Section, French General Staff. 160 pp. text, 240 pp. documents, 5 maps. 8vo. Paris, 1907. R. Chapelot. 6/6.

The authorship of this work is a guarantee of its value. The period from 19th August to 23rd August is dealt with in detail.

The Campaign in Bohemia, 1866. By T. Miller Maguire, M.A., LL.D. Reprinted from the United Service Magazine. 33 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. 2/6.

This little book, which is designed to convey a clear idea of the principal features of the war of 1866, is the result, as the author says in the preface, of the translation of a series of articles which were written by an anonymous writer, and which appeared in *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, in 1868.

The author himself summarizes the events which led to the war, and adds some remarks on the strategy and results of the campaign.

The Austro-Prussian War in Bohemia, 1866. By J. H. Anderson, F.R.Hist.Soc. 88 pp., with maps and plans. London, 1908. Rees. 3/6.

This is a condensed account of the 1866 campaign, with comments. There is a good general map, and there are plans of the various actions. The plans are not of very much assistance to the reader, for they in no way show the features of the ground. This book may be useful as a companion to larger works.

The Campaigns in Austria, the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and the Valley of the Isonzo, between 1796 and 1866 (Die kriegerischen Ereignisse in Innerösterreich, Tirol, Vorarlberg und im Isonzo-Gebiet, 1796-1866). By Major Ludwig Brunswik von Korompa. 305 pp., with 14 sketch maps. 8vo. Vienna, 1907. Seidel. 6/-.

This volume contains a detailed account of the operations in the above-mentioned districts in the years 1796, 1797, 1799, 1800, 1805, 1806, 1813, 1848, 1859 and 1866. The author is already known for his previous works, entitled *Military Leaders in the Valley of the Danube*.

Major-General Ignaz von Fratricsevics' Cavalry Brigade during the period 14th May to 4th July, 1866 (Die Kavalleriebrigade Fratricsevics in der Zeit vom 14. Mai bis 4. Juli 1866). Anonymous. 132 pp., with map. 8vo. Vienna, 1907. Seidel. 4/-.

These interesting records are derived from the staff diary of Captain Heinrich Ritter von Ambrosy, the General Staff Officer of Fratricsevics' Brigade, and furnish a complete account of the part taken by that brigade in the 1866 campaign. The original form of the diary has been retained as far as possible, the editor's remarks and explanations being printed in smaller type.

The American Civil War. By General E. P. Alexander. 620 pp., map and plans. 8vo. London, 1908. Siegle, Hill. 21/-.

This except for the title, is page for page the same book as was published in 1907, by Messrs. Scribner under the name of *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*. A review of it will be found on p. 148 of the January JOURNAL.

The Tale of the Great Mutiny. By W. H. Fitchett. 6th impression. 2nd edition (enlarged). 470 pp., with maps and illustrations. London, 1907. Smith, Elder. 6/-.

A new edition of this well-known work.

Waterloo — Operations of the Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine (Waterloo.—Opérations de l'armée prussienne du bas-Rhin). By Winand-Aerts. 316 pp., with sketches and photographs. 8vo. Brussels, 1908. Spineux. 4/3.

This is an account of the Waterloo Campaign from the point of view of the Prussian army. The book commences with a review of the Prussian army from 1806 to 1815, as regards organisation, moral, leadership, and tactical training. Discussing the events of the 16th June, reference is made to the well-worn controversy as to whether Wellington induced Blücher to fight at Ligny in order to cover his own still uncompleted concentration; the authorities on either side are cited, but no conclusion is arrived at. Neither can the author throw any fresh light on the movements of d'Erlon's corps during the battle of the 16th. The delay in giving Grouchy his orders on the morning of the 17th is, perhaps, reasonably accounted for by the Emperor's desire to have fuller reports from his cavalry (Pajol) as to the alleged retreat of the Prussians on Namur, and by the vague reports sent in by Ney as to the fighting at Quatre Bras.

Gneisenau's despatch on the battle of Ligny is cited to show that Wellington accepted battle at Waterloo, on condition of Blücher's co-operation with two corps, while Gneisenau's hesitation and evident mistrust of the English is in striking contrast with Blücher's determination to come "not with two corps, but with my whole army."

In considering to whom the chief merit is due, the author divides the honours. The two Staffs were in frequent communication. Wellington would not have fought at Waterloo had Blücher not promised to co-operate, nor would Blücher have moved to Mount St. Jean on the 18th had Wellington retired on Ostend after Quatre Bras.

The book is a readable and impartial account, but throws little fresh light on the old controversies.

Précis of Great Campaigns, 1796-1815. By J. H. Anderson, F.R.Hist.S. 138 pp., with maps and plans. 4to. London, 1907. Rees 10/6.

This book is divided as follows:—

1. First Coalition, 1796-7.
2. French Expedition to Egypt and Syria.
3. Second Coalition, 1799-1801.
4. Third Coalition, 1805.
5. Fourth Coalition, 1806-7.
6. Fifth Coalition, 1809.
7. Campaign in Russia.
8. Sixth Coalition, 1813-14.
9. The Peninsular War, 1807-14.
10. The Seventh Coalition, 1815.
11. The War with the United States, 1812-15.

Appendices give details regarding the great Generals of both sides, French military institutions, the frontiers of France, fortresses and the military forces of England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

The book is, as its title indicates, only a précis of the campaigns above indicated, but the accounts given are easily followed, and the maps are good and clear. Maps are given of the campaign areas and of most of the principal battles, though, curiously enough, Salamanca and Vittoria are omitted. The book may be recommended as a companion to the more detailed accounts of the campaigns with which it deals, but though it gives short general remarks and strategical and tactical comments, the lessons to be learnt by a campaign cannot be studied by a perusal of a précis. It will, however, be useful as a book of reference. In the appendix the author draws attention to the fact that all the great generals of that time studied assiduously.

Napoleon. Vols. III. and IV. (First two volumes published in 1904.) Great Captains series. By Theodore Aynault Dodge, U.S. Army. Vol. III., 747 pp. Vol. IV., 241 pp. Appendix and Index. Illustrated and numerous maps. 8vo. London, 1907. Gay and Bird. 18/- each volume.

A narrative of the campaigns from 1808 to 1815, furnishing a study of the causes which led to Napoleon's downfall. His rise to power is dealt with in Vols. I. and II. This work is a study of the military life of Napoleon; political events and personal matters are only touched upon to throw light on Napoleon's character as a soldier. A valuable work for the purely military student.

The Emperor Napoleon's Campaign in Spain (1808-1809) (Campagne de l'Empereur Napoléon en Espagne 1808-1809). By Commandant Balagny. 4th volume, 546 pp., 8 maps and sketches. 5th volume, 563 pp., 5 maps and sketches. 8vo. Paris. Vol. IV., '06. Vol. V., '07. Berger-Levrault. 10/- each volume.

The 4th volume of this important work deals with the operations connected with the battle of Benavente, December 24th, 1808, to January 2nd, 1809; the pursuit of the English army, January 2nd to 16th, 1809; the operations in Galicia in January, 1809; the retreat of Sahagun and the operations of the English armies up to January 16th.

The 5th volume gives an account of the operations round Madrid, December 22nd, 1808, to January, 1809, and the history of the war up to the departure of Napoleon. The correspondence of Napoleon and the French general staff is fully given.

Seydlitz. (Seydlitz.) By Col. Emil Buxbaum. 4th edition. 216 pp., 5 illustrations and 3 maps. 8vo. Leipzig, 1907. Wigand. 7/6.

The book deals with the early life of this great cavalry leader, and chapters are devoted to following his career through the grades of squadron leader, regimental commander, and finally Inspector-General of the Silesian cavalry. His vicissitudes during the Seven Years' War are closely followed, an account of which campaign is concisely given in Chapter IV. The battles of Rossbach and Zerndorf are dealt with in some detail, more especially as regards the action of the cavalry, which is graphically described. Not the least interesting portion of the book is that contained in the few pages of Chapter V., which deal with the excellent tactical qualities of this cavalry soldier and his aptitude for interpreting, and applying correctly, the tactics as laid down in the regulations of the period for the Prussian cavalry.

Military History and Art (2nd Part). Vol. II.—The War, 1870-71. Vol. III.—The Wars from 1871 to 1905: Oversea Expeditions, Mountain Warfare. *Histoire et Art Militaires.* By Gen. Frédéric Canonge, former Professor of l'Ecole Supérieure du Guerre. Vol. II.—696 pp., 81 maps and sketches. Vol. III.—540 pp., 67 maps and sketches. 4to. Paris. Vol. II., 1902. Vol. III., 1905. G. Fanchon. Vol. II. (2nd Part), 20/-. Vol. III., 16/-.

Previously published:—Vol. I. (1st Part), *Dès l'Origine à 1786.* Vol. II. (1st Part), from 1853 to 1870.

Both "Couronné" in 1904 by the Académie Française.

Vol. II. is divided into three parts, which deal respectively with the events which led up to the war and the history of the war up to the end of the Empire, the history of the national defence up to the fall of Paris, and from that time to the conclusion of peace.

The author describes the war as the victory of science and reflection over ignorance and presumption.

This is a well arranged and detailed critical history of the war.

In the first part of Vol. III., 93 pages are devoted to a study of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 in both theatres, and 94 pages to the Russo-Japanese War.

The Greco-Turkish and Spanish-American Wars are dealt with shortly.

The second part contains accounts of the following French oversea campaigns:—China, 1860; Mexico, 1861-1867; Tonkin, 1881-1885; Dahomey, 1892-1894; Madagascar, 1895; and the British Campaigns in Abyssinia, 1868; and Transvaal, 1899-1900. The China War, 1900, 1901, is briefly referred to, and some notes of medical and veterinary interest are given.

The third part of this volume comprises short accounts of campaigns in the Alps and Tyrol from 1835 to 1866.

Historical Essays and Studies. By Lord Acton. Edited by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence. 507 pp. 8vo. London, 1907. Macmillan. 10/-.

This, with one exception, the "Causes of the Franco-Prussian War," is a reprint of articles contributed by the late Lord Acton to various reviews and magazines, and of lectures delivered by him. Although the whole book is very interesting to the student of history in general, in a strictly military sense only a few of the articles are worth special attention. Among these are:—

IV., "The Civil War in America, its place in history," in which Lord Acton deals with the causes of the war;

V., "The Rise and Fall of the Mexican Empire," which describes shortly Maximilian's brief career. In this lecture, delivered in 1868, Lord Acton foretold

the annexation of Spanish-America by the United States. He evidently did not reckon with the possibility of the advent of a Porfirio Diaz;

VII., "The Causes of the Franco-Prussian War," which gives an interesting and instructive account of the political events before the declaration of war;

VIII., a lecture dealing with the war of 1870. It begins with an account of the political events previous to the war, but the account is not so full as that given in VII., owing doubtless to the fact that this lecture was given in April, 1871, while VII. was apparently given at a much later date. The lecture proceeds with a sketch of the military operations which led up to the siege of Paris, and describes rather more in detail the political events of that period which ended with the signature of the terms of peace. Lord Acton pointed out how the forces which dissolved society in France had consolidated Germany. He considered a federation between Sovereign States perhaps the form of government which promised to provide the "strongest and safest securities for the liberty and progress of the world."

Another article, interesting from the influence which the person with whom it deals had on military events, is XIII., "Talleyrand's Memoirs."

XVI., is a review of Seeley's "Short History of Napoleon the First" and of Ropes' "The First Napoleon," written in 1887, and is worthy of the military student's attention. Other articles, such as reviews of Bright's "History of England" and of Stephens' "French Revolution," are interesting in a minor degree. Generally the high reputation of the author for learning and impartiality is sufficient recommendation to this book.

Heligoland, its History and Legend (Helgoland in Geschichte und Sage).
By Major von Brohm. 69 pp., 35 illustrations and 15 maps and plans.
8vo. Cuxhaven-Helgoland, 1907. Rauschenplat. 12/-.

A well got-up book, giving a history of the island and a geological and physical description. The chapters dealing with the gradual diminution in size due to sea encroachment are interesting. The maps at the end of the book date from 1638 to 1904, and give a good idea of the changes which the form of the island has undergone during the period embraced.

POLITICAL.

The Hungarian Question from a Historical, Economical, and Ethnographical point of view. Translated from the Hungarian by Ilona and C. Arthur Ginever. 95 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Kegan Paul. 2/6.

The translators state that this book was written by a distinguished Hungarian publicist with the object of making Hungary's attitude on military and economic questions, and on her relations with Austria, comprehensible to English readers, and they explain that information concerning Hungary usually comes through Viennese channels, and takes a distinctly Austrian colour in its course, the number of English journalists who are acquainted with the Hungarian language being exceedingly small.

The book contains a sketch of the history of Hungary and of the relations between that State and Austria. This is followed by a discussion of the ethnical situation in Hungary, and of the language question. The author then deals with the chief problems of the crisis and their solution, and attempts to discover what he terms "a practical policy which can lead, without very great disturbance, to such a transformation in the relations between Hungary and Austria as shall accord with the distribution of strength among the nations ruled by the Habsburgs, and shall thus create a real organic link between the countries in place of the existing ties which are purely mechanical."

In conclusion, the writer states that the Hungarian Kingdom is predestined to become very soon a united and solid State, while Austria, on the other hand, is driven towards a federal organization of her separate nationalities. The direct and final aim of the Hungarian people cannot be the establishment of an entirely separate Hungary. An endeavour must be made to place the Monarchy, while still ruled by the Habsburgs, upon natural foundations, and Hungary must then stand at the head of the new confederacy of States. The Hungarian question will thus be solved so as to promote the interests both of the Hungarian nation and of the Habsburg dynasty.

Europe and the Turks. By Noel Buxton. 143 pp., 2 maps. 8vo. London, 1907. Murray. 2/6.

Mr. Noel Buxton is a member of the Macedonian Reform Committee, and has, as he states in the preface, written this book with the object of inducing the British public to take a more active and intelligent interest in the Macedonian question. After sketching the past history of Turkey in Europe, he discusses the various factors in the problem of the Near Eastern Question, and the cause of the present trouble in Turkey. He then examines the work of the Powers in their efforts to introduce reform in Macedonia, and submits a definite proposal in order that peace in that country may be secured.

The Sultan, Islam and the Powers (Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances).
By Victor Bérard. 443 pp., 2 maps. 8vo. Paris, 1907. Colin. 3/4.

This book deals with the two great railway projects at present on foot in the Ottoman Empire, viz., the Hejaz and Baghdad Railways, and discusses the relations between the Turks and the Arabs on the one hand, and between Turkey and the Powers on the other hand, in respect of those projects.

The Netherlands and Belgium (Nederland en Belgie). By R. Klerck. 110 pp. 8vo. The Hague, 1907. Van Stockum. 3/2.

The author reviews the historical and legal aspects of Belgian neutrality, but can find nothing in the Treaties examined to prevent Belgium from contracting defensive alliances. Stress is laid on the reality of the "German danger" for the Low Countries. The construction of the large military railway station at Daelhem, the objections raised to the fortifications of Liège and Namur, and the obvious advantages to Germany of the Dutch and Belgian harbours, are instanced in respect of this. As regards Holland, the book traces the persistent, though unsuccessful efforts of German writers to represent France as her enemy, and Germany as her natural protector. Holland has, however, no real reason to seek an alliance with Germany, and the "English danger" to the Dutch commerce and colonies, which such an alliance might involve, is an important factor.

As regards the violation of Belgian neutrality, this is thought to be more probable on the part of Germany than of France, since the policy of the Republic has been eminently pacific (witness Fashoda and Algeciras). But the combined armies of Holland and Belgium would be too strong to be neglected by either belligerent, especially if Maastricht, Liège and Namur were adequately fortified, so as to afford the field army the fullest liberty of manoeuvre. Such an alliance, the author concludes, is most urgently to be desired both for economic and for military reasons.

The coming Struggle in Eastern Asia. By B. L. Putman Weale. 640 pp., with 1 map and numerous illustrations. London, 1908. Macmillan. 12/6.

The author has accumulated a mass of details, many of which are conveniently given in tabular form. The data concerning the defensive resources of the various countries in question are, generally speaking, accurate; his deductions are coloured, however, by strong sympathies which he does not attempt to conceal.

The book is divided into three parts:—

Part I. deals with Russia's Far Eastern possessions and Siberia. Part II. treats of the Japanese sphere of influence in Manchuria. Japan's constitution, her system of finance, industries, commerce, and fighting resources, are next described. The last chapter, "Greater Japan," deals largely with Korea.

In Part III., "The struggle round China," the author discusses the recently instituted reforms in the Peking Government, and the army, the internal condition of China, and its attitude towards Europe and Japan. The concluding chapters of the book contain reflections on the position of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East.

An excellent description is given of Vladivostok, with its fine natural harbour. Despite the strong fortifications erected since the last war, the writer considers the position of the fortress as somewhat precarious. He comments on Russia's geographical weakness in the Ussuri province, owing to the interposition of Manchuria between it and Siberia, and on the facilities which the dense belt of forest, extending southward from the Vladivostok—Harbin line, along a portion of its course, would afford to an enemy advancing from the Tumen river of placing himself astride of this the shortest link between Russia and her maritime province.

The writer draws attention to the influx of Chinese and Koreans into Vladivostok, the Ussuri province, and along the River Amur, and points to the impossibility of extensive Russian colonisation alongside of this Asiatic immigration.

The abundance of cereals in Manchuria, and the erection of numerous flour mills, facilitated the rationing of the Russian field armies in 1904-5 "to a degree that contemporary military critics were quite unaware of."

Some interesting figures are given, illustrative of Russian railway work during the last war. At the beginning, six trains a day were run each way. In June, 1905, there were 16, "the maximum that could conveniently be handled." The speed had increased meanwhile from 5 to 8 miles an hour.

The various schemes of Russian railway expansion in Siberia are clearly depicted.

The following are said to be projected:—
(i) The extension of the Ekaterinburg—Tiumen (Western Siberia) line to Omsk, which is tantamount to doubling the western portion of the trunk line.

(ii) The doubling of the Omsk—Tomsk section.

(iii) The construction of a line from Tashkent, via Semipalatinsk, to join the Trans-Siberian railway west of Lake Baikal, thus linking up the Caucasian and Siberian systems, and enclosing China from the west as well as from the north and north-east.

Regarding the position of the Russians in Asia, he observes: "In latent strength and reserves of men and materials their superiority is so vast that no one in the world can afford to ignore them or their future."

The author enlarges upon Japan's commanding position in Manchuria, resulting from her acquisition of the railway line up to Kuan-cheng-tsu, and speaks somewhat disparagingly of her colonising methods in the new sphere. British officers who know Japan will agree that "in military as in all other affairs, the Japanese mind has always inclined to finally adopt rigid Prussian methods."

His estimate of the total strength of the Japanese forces at the battle of Mukden is too high.

Of China he says that, notwithstanding many defects in her military forces, she is now quite capable of policing her empire, and indulges in some interesting reflections as to the effect on international politics which a continued increase in her armed strength may entail.

The information about railway and mining concessions, about internal disorders, and the Chinese opinion on some recent conventions between Powers, will greatly assist students of Chinese affairs. Of interest, too, are the comments on the American position in the Pacific and the existing Anglo-Japanese alliance.

In spite of a certain exuberance of style the book is a most readable and instructive one.

Bonapartism. Six Lectures delivered in the University of London. By H. A. L. Fisher. 123 pp. 8vo. Oxford, 1908. Clarendon Press. 3/6.

These Lectures have the following titles:—

- (i) The Bequest of the Revolution.
- (ii) The Napoleonic State.
- (iii) Napoleon and the Empire.
- (iv) The Growth of a Legend.
- (v) The Rise of the Second Empire.
- (vi) The Downfall.

These lectures were delivered to show that "these two Bonapartist Governments were to a large extent inspired by the same principles, rested upon the support of the same intellectual and social forces, appealed to the same appetites, flattered the same vanities, and shared in the same kind of ruin." The purport of the lectures is political rather than military, but they are brilliantly written and will be interesting to all classes of readers.

CAVALRY.

The Regiments of General Margueritte's Division, and the Charges at Sedan (Les régiments de la Division Margueritte et les charges à Sedan). By Général Rozat de Mandres. 284 pp. 4 maps, numerous photographs and sketches. 8vo. Paris, 1908. 6/-.

In 1884 General Lebrun published a book entitled *Bazeilles—Sedan*, in which he made certain somewhat harsh criticisms regarding the conduct of the cavalry at Sedan. General Rozat de Mandres was then in a position enabling him to collect ample material to answer these strictures, and was anxious to do so, though he had not served in any of the regiments concerned. Reliable information was speedily forthcoming, but for various reasons was never published in the form of a reply to General Lebrun.

General Rozat de Mandres had, however, become so deeply interested in the question that he persevered in his self-imposed task, to which he devoted all his leisure time for 8 years, until all sources of information had been exhausted. The work had become the more important in his eyes, as he conceived it to be his duty to vindicate the honour of his comrades who had fallen in one of the most heroic charges of all time, and to point the moral of devotion and self-sacrifice for the benefit of future generations. It is, therefore, not surprising that the work should be one of great historical value, of peculiar interest to cavalry soldiers, and to the numerous students of military history, who are fascinated by the story of the gallant charges of Margueritte's division, the death of its commander, and the heroism of officers and men.

The book is written in the clear and lucid style so common amongst French military historians, with the result that the reader's interest is maintained throughout, and he is saved from being wearied by the mass of detail. The importance of certain military lessons is very clearly brought out, though the tendency of the gallant author is evidently to minimise the faults committed by General Margueritte and his brave troops.

Thus we see how the want of reconnoitring led to the failure of the first charge; the division had been under arms for 4 hours in the immediate vicinity, and yet no steps had been taken to reconnoitre the surrounding country, in spite of the lack of reliable guides.

After the failure of the charge in the morning, the division remained for over 2 hours in full view of the enemy, and under the hot fire of his artillery. It is inconceivable that the moral effect of this can have been a sufficient compensation for the losses thereby caused to the cavalry.

The subsequent passage of the division through the Bois de la Garenne shows the danger of a wood which is under artillery fire, as well as the attraction that such wood seems to possess for shaken troops and stragglers.

The description of the final charges in the afternoon is most graphic, and does full justice to the bravery of the cavalry. The most striking feature of these charges is, however, their absolute ineffectiveness; though delivered over suitable ground, by a large force of excellent cavalry, no impression whatever seems to have been made on the sturdy Prussian infantry, whose losses were small as compared with those of the attacking horsemen.

During the long day of September 1st, from 4 a.m. until the close of the battle that evening, the French cavalry made practically no use of its mobility; it was nursed for two unsuccessful charges, in the first of which only a small proportion took part; until 2 p.m. 16 squadrons out of 22 had virtually remained idle, to be sacrificed ultimately as a forlorn hope. There was little or no reconnoitring, no manoeuvring, no dismounted fire action, when so much might have been gained by delaying the German enveloping movement. This was, however, less the fault of General Margueritte than of the French Headquarter Staff.

ARTILLERY.

The Field Artillery Equipment No. 96 n/A. (Das Feldartilleriegerät 96 n/A.). 60 pp., with plates and diagrams. 12mo. Berlin, 1907. Vossische Buchhandlung.

This is a short handbook of the new German quick-firing gun and equipment.

Pocket-book for Field Artillery, 1908 (Taschenbuch für die Feldartillerie). By Major Wernigk. 283 pp., with diagrams in text. 12mo. Berlin, 1908. Mittler. 2/6.

A useful field service handbook for field artillery, containing, amongst other matter, numerous examples on ranging in various situations.

Modern Guns of the Foot Artillery (Die modernen Geschütze der Fußartillerie). By Von Mummendorf. 175 pp., with 15 illustrations. 12mo. Leipzig, 1907. Göschen'sche Verlagshandlung. 10d.

The book traces the evolution of ammunition, carriages and guns for siege artillery in different countries. It concludes with a review of the development of the arm in Germany.

The Breech-screw System with Plastic Obturation, and the Wedge System with Obturation by means of the Cartridge Case (Der Schraubenschluss mit plastischer Liderung und der Keilverschluss mit Hülsenladerung für Geschütze). By J. Castner. 32 pp., with diagrams in the text. Svo. Berlin, 1907. Schiffbau Company. 1/-.

The book compares the rival systems of breech obturation as applied in France and Germany, and the conclusion drawn is very much in favour of the wedge system. The continued use of the breech screw in France and England is attributed entirely to national prejudices. A fabular statement is given of all the accidents which have occurred in gunnery practice throughout the world from 1882 to 1894. These are all alleged to have taken place in countries using breech-screw systems, while none are recorded from Germany, where the (Krupp) wedge system has been adopted.

Field Artillery (The Question of Augmentation.) L'Artillerie de Campagne. Encore la question de l'augmentation. By Commandant Aubrat. Paris, 1907. Lavaudelle.

Until recently the numerical inferiority of the French field artillery to that of Germany was compensated for by the superiority of the French 75 mm. gun. But now that Germany has a good Q.F. gun it has been urged that France must re-establish the balance, either by increasing the number of her batteries, or by raising the balance, either by increasing the number of her batteries, or by raising the number of guns in a battery. The author of this article suggests a third method to get on terms with the Germans, viz., to adopt the principle of three-gun batteries, which he urges best utilizes the properties of Q.F. guns.

Der Einjährige-Freiwillige der Feldartillerie (The one-year Volunteer of the Field Artillery). By Major von Wernigk. 11th edition. 602 pp., with 163 diagrams, plates, and sketches. 12mo. Berlin, 1908. Mittler. 8/6.

This is one of the many popular and useful handbooks which are compiled from time to time in Germany for the use of the soldier. It contains everything the one-year volunteer of the artillery should know as regards his entry into the service and release therefrom, the provision of his clothing, his maintenance, and his duties as a soldier. Chapters are devoted to the ways and means of becoming a reserve officer, to the relationship of the reserve to the army, to military law and tribunals, and to the organisation of the army generally and of branches of the service other than that of the field artillery in particular. Details are given as regards the field artillery in connection with drill, manoeuvre, equipment, horse-mastership, and interior economy.

The most interesting portion of the book is that dealing with fire discipline and fire tactics, the sixteen examples given of ranging a battery under varied conditions being particularly instructive.

Space is also devoted to descriptions of the equipment of the field gun and howitzer, and to combined tactics, including eight simple tactical problems, and the concluding chapters deal with the procedure of mobilization and the subjects for examination of the one-year volunteer.

Lessons in Gunnery and Ballistics for Guns and Rifles (Die Lehre vom Schuss für Gewehr und Geschütz). By Lieut.-Col. von Heydenreich, in 2 vols. Vol. I., 112 pp. Vol. II., 160 pp., with 88 pp. of ballistic tables appended. Svo. Berlin, 1908. Mittler. 7/3.

The book is a text book of gunnery and ballistics. Volume I. deals with elementary principles of ballistics. Volume II. deals with natures and rates of burning of various powders, pressures in the bore, and flight of projectiles in the air and *in vacuo*.

Our New Field Gun (Unser neues Feldgeschütz). By Col. Maximilian Csicsery von Bacsány, Austro-Hungarian General Staff. 124 pp., with 8 maps and a diagram. Svo. Vienna, 1907. Seidel. 4/-.

This publication, which is a special supplement to "O.M.Z." appears on the eve of the rearmament of the Austro-Hungarian field artillery with a quick-firing gun. The book is divided into three parts. The first (pages 5 to 32) deals with the

characteristics of quick-firing guns, more especially in the light of experiences of the Russo-Japanese war, and contains some useful statistics as to the expenditure of ammunition. The second part (pages 33 to 41) is devoted to a description of the Russian system of indirect laying. The third part (pages 42 to 124) contains the first of a series of tactical exercises, framed with a view to bringing out the principles of the employment of quick-firing field artillery. The exercises are adapted to the organisation of the Austro-Hungarian army, and the solutions are explained by references to parallel incidents in the Russo-Japanese war.

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL.

Notes on the Development of Tactics from 1740 to the present day.
By Major C. Ross, D.S.O. 42 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Rees. 1/-.

This is an outline of the development of tactics within the period above mentioned. Major Ross considers the period under the following headings:—

Period of Frederick the Great, 1744-1763

Napoleonic Era, 1792-1815.

Wellington's Tactics, 1808-1815.

Crimean Period, 1854-1855.

Austro-Prussian War, 1866.

Franco-German War, 1870-1871.

Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878.

Boer War, 1899-1900.

Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.

Each period is divided into (a) Grand Tactics; (b) Infantry Tactics; (c) Artillery Tactics; (d) Cavalry Tactics. Major Ross concludes with some general remarks, in the course of which he outlines the possible future development of tactics, the general purport of which is that "the principle of success is immutable, but the application of this principle must be modified according to ever-changing circumstances."

"Secrecy and thoroughness in preparation, rapidity and resolution in execution; in these is comprised the whole secret of success in war. And these demand, inexorably, the display of the very highest qualities, both mental and physical, not only by the warriors of a nation, but by the nation as a whole."

Some of the conclusions drawn from the Boer War seems to be open to argument, but generally the book will be a useful one to students.

Frontiers (The Romanes Lecture). By Lord Curzon of Kedleston. 58 pp. 8vo. London, 1907. Frowde. 2/-.

In Lord Curzon's words, "The majority of the most important wars of the century have been Frontier Wars. Wars of religion, of alliances, of rebellion, of aggrandisement, of dynastic intrigue or ambition . . . tend to be replaced by frontier wars, i.e., wars arising out of the expansion of states and kingdoms, carried to a point, as the habitable globe shrinks, at which the interests or ambitions of one state come into sharp and irreconcilable collision with those of another." As instances of wars caused by frontier questions, Lord Curzon quotes the wars of '66, '70, '71, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, which, he says, originated in a revolt on the frontier states. Other instances he gives are the Afghan war of 1839 and 1878, the Tibetan Expedition of 1904, and he includes the Russo-Japanese war.

Besides the above, Lord Curzon gives various cases of recent frontier disputes, and shows how the British Empire has the greatest extent of territorial frontier of any dominion in the globe. From this subject he proceeds to discuss the origin of frontiers and natural frontiers, which he classifies under the following types:—

(1) Sea; (2) Desert; (3) Mountain; (4) River; and (5) Forest, Marshes and Swamps.

The subject of natural frontiers leads on to artificial frontiers, "by which are meant those boundary lines which, not being dependent upon natural features of the earth's surface for their selection, have been artificially or arbitrarily created by man." Under this heading are considered neutral zones, buffer states, neutralized states, and, finally, frontiers created by following a parallel of longitude and latitude by drawing a line from point to point, or by referring to some existing feature or condition.

Under the heading of modern expedients are considered Protectorates, giving Lord Curzon an opportunity of showing the results of the Durand Agreement of 1893, Spheres of influence, Leases, and Spheres of interest.

Lord Curzon concludes with a statement of the evidences of modern progress in respect of the delimitation of frontiers and with a brief reference to the influence of frontiers on the American and British nations. In his peroration Lord Curzon calls on the Universities not to forget their mission "still from the cloistered alleys and the hallowed groves of Oxford, true to her old traditions, but widened in her activities and scope, let there come forth the invincible spirit and the unexhausted moral fibre of our race."

From the above summary it may be seen that the lecture, though, as Lord Curzon says, it ignores large portions of the subject, is of great interest to all concerned for the safety, honour and welfare of the British Empire.

On War. By Gen. Carl von Clausewitz. Translated by Col. J. J. Graham. New and revised edition, with introduction and notes by Col. F. N. Maude, C.B. (late Capt. R.E.). 3 vols., 315, 415, and 324 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Kegan Paul. 21/-.

An "Editor's Note" on page 9 of Volume III., dealing with a re-arrangement of the author's MS., would lead one to infer that the present text had been carefully compared with the original by Colonel Maude; a reference to the original, however,

shows that the note was written by the "Editress," for von Clausewitz's papers were prepared for the press by his widow. The translation under review appears to be a hurried reprint of Colonel Graham's one-volume work (issued in 1873) and reproduces even his errors of spelling; it has been expanded into three volumes by the use of smaller paper, larger type, and the employment of large capitals for the numerous headings. Colonel Graham's index, owing, no doubt, to the change of pagination thus introduced, has been omitted. The introduction is short, and the notes are few in number.

A considerable portion of Clausewitz's classic work has now only an historic value; this part might well have been given in the smallest type, so that the reader should not be fatigued by the perusal of it, but should be directed at once to the great and important truths of the philosophy of war contained in the remainder of the book. The editor has given no such help, nor has he attempted to attract readers by redrafting Colonel Graham's somewhat heavy and closely-following-the-German periods.

It is much to be regretted that no cheaper translation of a work of such great importance to the Army should be available.

The Campaign of Landshut (La manœuvre de Landshut : étude sur la stratégie de Napoléon et sa psychologie militaire depuis le milieu de l'année 1808 jusqu'au 30 Avril 1809). By Gen. H. Bonnal. 360 pp., good and numerous maps. 8vo. Paris, 1905. Chapelot. 8/-.

This book, written in easy French, gives a graphic and most interesting description of a campaign which is perhaps hardly as well known in England as it deserves to be. Napoleon himself considered this campaign to be one of his greatest masterpieces. In 1808 Napoleon was apparently at the zenith of his power, and believed himself to be infallible, and his troops invincible. General Bonnal points out with his usual clearness and lucidity that the Emperor's genius was still as bright as ever, but that it was warped by overweening pride and conceit.

Napoleon remedied Berthier's initial errors of deployment with masterly skill, intuitively divining his opponent's intentions, and evolved a clever plan for the defeat of the Austrian army. Up to this point his dispositions were brilliant in the extreme, but he now made several fatal mistakes; he attached too much importance to the moral influence of his own presence, and prepared to cut off the Archduke Charles' retreat, without waiting for the latter's army to be defeated. Instead of considering the capture of Vienna as the prize of a decisive victory, he made the fatal error of regarding the hostile capital as at once his primary and main objective, imagining that the magic of his name would be sufficient to transform a mere repulse into a rout. General Bonnal shows very admirably the extraordinary energy and rapidity of thought displayed by Napoleon, when, during the early hours of April 22nd, he realized his mistake; it was, however, too late, and the Emperor had allowed a great victory to slip from his grasp, a victory which would have spared him the bloody repulse of Aspern, and the doubtful success of Wagram.

General Bonnal has made a very deep study of Napoleon, whose genius and marvellous military talents he fully appreciates, whilst he does not hesitate to expose his faults and errors; the description of Napoleon's character, his methods, his military views and precepts, is most valuable. He deals with the various marshals, their failures and shortcomings, and shows how some of them, notably Masséna, had deteriorated, and had become indolent and tired of war; he also emphasizes their inability for independent action, which was to prove so fatal in 1813 and in 1815. On the other hand, he draws attention to the great qualities of Marshal Davout, still as resolute and skilful as at Austerlitz and Auerstädt, and makes the English reader congratulate himself that the marshal was left at Paris in June, 1815, instead of being in Ney's place on June 16th-18th.

Amongst the numerous important lessons and points of interest brought out in this able work are the following:—

(1) The difficulty of remedying a faulty initial deployment, though General Bonnal considers that this difficulty is no longer so great at the present time, owing to the increased delaying power given to *troupes de couverture* by modern arms.

(2) The necessity of ensuring the enemy's defeat, before diverting troops to cut off his retreat. Napoleon despatched Masséna and Oudinot to intercept the Austrians before the latter had been beaten, and without considering the possibility of their adopting another line of retreat.

(3) The necessity of rapid and energetic offensive action. The Archduke Charles lost a great chance of inflicting a severe defeat on the French between April 19th and 21st, when he might have crushed Davout's corps.

(4) The importance of issuing definite orders as to the destruction of bridges was exemplified by the action of the French 65th Regiment at Ratisbon; the failure to destroy the stone bridge at this place greatly facilitated the junction of the Austrian forces on and after April 22nd.

(5) The fatal mistake of underestimating the enemy; Napoleon constantly underrated the Austrians throughout this campaign.

(6) The extraordinary marching powers of the French infantry.

(7) The wonderful influence of Napoleon over the troops under his command, both French and Germans.

The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and Coast Defence. Translated by Capt. A. F. Custance, late (XXIX.) The Worcestershire Regt. By Moraes Sarmento. xvi. + 206 pp., 6 plans. 8vo. London, 1908. Rees. 5/-.

This is a translation of a book published in 1904. The translator points out that some of the theories put forward by the author require considerable modification owing to the changes which have taken place not only in *Weltpolitik* but also in our own home affairs. The reader will, however, easily recognize when this is the case. The author refers to a contract which he assumes to be of an offensive and defensive

character, and the terms of which he states to have been recently (1904) ratified between Great Britain and Portugal. He examines the advantages of such an alliance to each of the contracting powers respectively, and then proceeds to discuss to what ends Portugal can most profitably devote her limited resources, while at the same time fulfilling her obligations to Great Britain. After quoting many historical and contemporary examples the author comes to the conclusion that the rules laid down by Bonamico for Italy apply equally to Portugal, namely:—

- (i) To give up the illusion of attempting to defend indefensible localities by the erection of local defences.
- (ii) To give up the system of dividing coast defence into sections, which invites disaster.
- (iii) To establish a system of defence which shall consist of two large zones having Lisbon as their common base.
- (iv) To defend the latter harbour suitably on the seaward and land fronts.
- (v) To select a type of vessel which must be used exclusively for purposes of home defence under cover of the British fleet, which will be engaged in holding the main lines of communication.
- (vi) To select types of torpedo-boats and scouts to suit the two separate zones in which they operate.

Finally, having outlined the part to be played by the naval forces, the author suggests that any money left over after providing suitable defences for Lisbon, should be devoted to the better organization of the army:—

- (a) To defend the land frontiers in the event of Spain being hostile.
- (b) To co-operate with Great Britain, oversea if required, in the event of Spain being friendly or neutral.

The Tactics of Home Defence. By Col. C. E. Callwell, C.B. 206 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Blackwood. 3/6.

In his introductory chapter, Colonel Callwell expresses the opinion that the influence which the peculiar topographical conditions prevailing in the United Kingdom have upon tactics has not been studied as it ought to be, and he states that the object of his book is to draw attention to that influence. He alludes to the fact that the Territorial Forces are rarely exercised in enclosed country, but generally in one of the great military camps where the ground is totally different from the country in which they might expect to fight in case of an invasion.

In the first two chapters he deals with the influence which sea transport and the enclosed character of the country are likely to exert on the composition of an enemy's force, and concludes that mounted units must be largely eliminated, that artillery must be reduced, and that cyclists would be a prominent feature.

Colonel Callwell then proceeds to consider the study of ground and of topographical features, and, treating this subject in detail, he indicates the difference which the seasons make in the appearance of a country, the effect of the atmosphere, and he goes deeply into the subject of hedgerows and fences. After some general remarks on troop-leading in enclosed countries he passes on to infantry tactics, when he again insists on the tactical importance of hedgerows and on the necessity of an eye for ground; he also insists on the necessity for subordinate leaders being prepared to accept responsibility, because the difficulty of maintaining communication is enhanced in close country, and he touches on the questions of ammunition, supply and scouts. The question of cyclists forms the subject of the next chapter, and the author is enthusiastic about the probable utility of corps of cyclists for use in the United Kingdom, and their ability to take the place, in a large measure, of mounted troops, but, as he observes, since trained corps of cyclists do not exist, it is all the more important that our yeomanry should be trained to carry out the cavalry duties of an army. In the chapter on artillery tactics, Colonel Callwell deals with the difficulty of central control in enclosed country, and, consequently, the possibility of dissemination of batteries and even sections, and he also alludes to the question of the support afforded to infantry by artillery and to the selection of positions and other artillery questions. He considers that howitzers and mountain guns would be most useful, but that heavy guns would not be so.

The book closes with a chapter on positions, their occupation, and preparation for defence, and the pith of it may be summed up in the author's words:—"It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the paramount requisite of a position is that the locality chosen should comply with the plan of operations, and that it should satisfy the general situation in the theatre of war."

The book will be read with interest by all students of the subject, and there are many points which the author brings out the consideration of which will prove instructive to all soldiers. The book is written in the easy readable style with which all readers of Colonel Callwell's books are familiar.

The Fight about Fortified Field Positions (Der Kampf um befestigte Feldstellungen). By Major von Fritsch (instructor at the Staff College in Berlin). 68 pp., 3 maps. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Liebelsche Buchhandlung. 4/-.

This is a book, written by an expert, offering much valuable instruction on the important subject of fortified field positions.

The author divides his work into two parts, the first dealing with theoretical principles, the second with the application of these principles. As Major Fritsch explains in his preface, the first part is not intended to be in the nature of a manual on the fight about fortified positions, but rather explains and discusses a series of conceptions and questions on this subject.

The second part gives a set of three problems, under the headings: (a) Choice of a position; (b) Defence; (c) Attack; and furnishes, in each case, an interesting solution of the problem, worked out in considerable detail.

A special map is provided for each problem.

The Employment of Heavy Artillery in the Field. By Col. F. G. Stone. A lecture before the Aldershot Military Society. 24 pp., with 2 plates. 8vo. London, 1907. Rees. 6d.

The subject of this lecture was dealt with under the following headings:—
Lessons from Actual War, Comparative Roles of German and British Heavy Artillery, Field Artillery Howitzer Batteries, Heavy Howitzers for use with the Field Army, Tactical Employment of Heavy Artillery, Positions on the Line of March, and Communications. The map illustrates how Heavy Artillery might have been employed at the battle of Liao-yang. A discussion took place after the lecture in which General Sir J. French, Major-General Grierson, Brig.-General Burton, and others took part.

Fire Fighting. By Lieut.-Col. N. R. McMahon, D.S.O. A lecture before the Aldershot Military Society. 18 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Rees. 6d.

An interesting lecture, which was followed by a discussion in which Generals Grierson, Mackenzie, and Lloyd took part.

INTELLIGENCE AND SCOUTING.

Reconnaissance in the Russo-Japanese War. By Asiaticus. Translated from the German by Lieut. J. Montgomery, 3rd Hussars. 147 pp., with plans. London, 1907. Rees. 4/-.

The book opens with an introduction which briefly outlines the way in which cavalry should carry out its reconnaissance duties. The writer then deals with the characteristics of the two cavalries, but he throws no very new light on this subject. He then gives a rather remarkable account of the way in which the Japanese organized a system of espionage, which they were able to carry out owing to their knowledge of the natives and how to treat them.

The first study in this book is that of Mishchenko's Cossack brigade in Northern Korea. The action of the cavalry on both sides is criticised, and, in the author's opinion, the Japanese worked their cavalry considerably the better of the two.

The next four chapters deal with Rennenkampf's reconnoitring activity round Ssai-ma-chi, and here again the Russian comes in for a considerable amount of criticism, though the author praises the marching power of the Cossacks. It seems that the Russians never attempted to surprise the Japanese, while frequently surprised themselves, and the lack of the most ordinary precautions, both in camp and on the march, is hardly credible. It is, as the author says, an example of how a commander, "full of zeal, self sacrifice and energy, as Rennenkampf undoubtedly was, was unable to bring to a successful issue his given task. . . . What was the net result of all this activity? Really nothing at all."

The next chapter describes the operations of the 1st Japanese Cavalry Brigade, under Major-General Akiyama, from 30th May to 16th June, 1904. Here, again, the author severely criticises the Russians, and praises the Japanese; and the energy and enterprise of Akiyama certainly seem in striking contrast to the apathy and lack of vigour of the Russians.

The next operation dealt with is Mishchenko's raid on Ying-kon in January, 1905. In this raid we find the Russian leader altering his plan and diverting his force to a secondary objective, with the result that the enterprise failed with considerable loss. The Russian want of precaution is shown by the fact that this force, entirely composed of cavalry, was surprised by infantry.

The book concludes with a review of the work done, and considers what new methods and measures have established a claim to future consideration, and may be applicable to European theatres of war. The author considers that the value of cavalry has not in any way suffered by the experiences of the war, but that its training and employment seem to be a matter of increasing difficulty.

The book generally is well worthy of the attention of cavalry and general staff officers. The maps are clear, but are often inserted in inconvenient places.

INSTRUCTIONAL.

Handbuch der Waffenlehre (Treatise on Arms and Ammunition). By Major Berlin. 2nd edition. 515 pp., with 298 diagrams, plates and sketches. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Mittler. 11/6.

This treatise has been prepared for use of officers studying for the Staff College (*Kriegssakademie*). It deals with explosives, small arms, and artillery material in use in Germany, and with the rifles and artillery material of the more important European Powers.

A useful book of reference.

The Writing of English. By P. J. Hartog. 160 pp. 8vo. Oxford, 1907. Clarendon Press. 2/6.

This is an attempt to bring home to head masters, governing bodies of schools, and public authorities generally, that the English boy cannot write English, and is not taught to write English, and so to help in the fight for the introduction of

English into the curriculum of our secondary schools for boys; it is, therefore, of considerable interest to the Army.

Mr. Hartog shows further that the French boy can write French, and can write French because he is taught how to write it; and he describes in detail how the French boy is taught to write.

It will be of interest to soldiers to know that the reform of education in France was brought about not by the schoolmasters but by Napoleon, who, in the law for the reorganization of secondary teaching of the 11 *floréal*, an X (1st May, 1802), decreed that French should be placed in the *lycées* on an equality with Latin.

Guide for the solution, on Maps and in the Field, of Tactical Problems, involving small forces (Несколько приложений тактических задач на планах и на полях для малых отрядов). Compiled by Lieut.-Cola. K. Eigel and V. Nikolski, Instructors in the Alexis Military School. 5th edition, corrected, as required by the introduction of Q.F. Artillery and Machine Guns, and embodying the experience of the Russo-Japanese War. 106 pp., with 12 plans. 8vo. Moscow, 1907. Shushukin. 2/1.

This book is, as the preface explains, an elementary guide for junior regimental officers. The subjects treated are:—Bivouacs, Bivouac, Outposts, Marches, Defence, Attack, Reconnaissance, Foraging, Convoys.

Each section contains—(1) a list, in order of importance, of the chief points to be considered on the subject; (2) explanatory notes on these points with reference to the paragraphs in official regulations; (3) outline orders; (4) an example of orders on a typical problem.

The orders, as a rule, are short and simple. They are signed by both the Staff Officer and the Commander of the Force. The rank and names of two officers next in seniority to the Commander, and who would replace him in case of accident, are invariably published for the information of all concerned. This seems sound in principle, and, if it had been practised in South Africa, would have avoided delay and misunderstanding on more than one occasion.

One or two points, showing the present tendency of Russian tactics, may be of interest.

Outposts are only formed exclusively of cavalry when no infantry is obtainable. Experience in the late war is said to have proved the advantage of placing the support in line with the pickets in each outpost company instead of in rear of them. Night outposts were made three times as strong as day outposts. A line of standing patrols with an interval of 100 to 150 paces was put out 150 to 200 paces in advance of the ordinary sentry line.

According to Russian regulations, all reconnoitring patrols are sent out from the outpost reserve.

The average march for a force of all arms is from 13½ to 16 miles. The ordinary halts are for ten minutes in each hour, with a long halt of two to four hours rather more than half way. When the whole march is less than ten miles, there is no long halt.

The P.S. Regulation of 1904 laid down 400 paces as the average front of a battalion on the defensive. In the late war companies (one-fourth of a battalion) often covered this space. Guns are only placed in the General Reserve when the whole force on the defensive exceeds a division in strength.

In open country artificial cover of bushes or grass is recommended 200 to 300 paces in front of a battery in action.

The War Game (Das Kriegsspiel). By Major von Altrock. 190 pp., 1 map. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Mittler. 4/6.

This is another of the "Officer's Handbook" series. After a short dissertation on the game, the author gives 24 problems, with a commentary on each. The forces dealt with vary in strength from an army corps to a mixed brigade. The volume concludes with a very brief chapter on "The War Game in other Armies," and a bibliography of war game literature. Tables are provided giving the order of battle of French and Russian units, so that one side in a game can be practised in representing a foreign force, and can thus be exercised in combating methods of possible enemies. German authors do not seem to consider that there are any objections to referring to friendly Powers in this relation, and frequently recommend that manoeuvres, exercises, and war games should be conducted in this manner.

Battle Orders (Gefechtsbefehle). By Lieut. von Kiesling. 89 pp., 2 maps. 8vo. Berlin, 1907. Eisenschmidt. 3/-.

This is a study of the orders written and given during an action in a division and in its brigades and regiments. The author remarks very justly in his preface that the writing of orders for and during a battle is not so much practised as the preparation of march, halt and deployment orders; in consequence, while there are numerous junior officers who can draft orders of the latter categories, there are very few who understand what orders are possible during a battle, and how they should be given.

The specimens of orders presented by the author, while absolutely clear, are models as regards brevity; the author writes the names of units in the body of the orders in thick fat letters, so that they strike the eye and cannot well be overlooked by the receiver, who is thus enabled to see at once whether his unit is concerned, and, if so, what is expected of it.

The following order is extracted to show the style; it is longer in English than in German, as such useful words as *marschbereit* (prepared to march at any moment) and *nächtigen* (to pass the night) are not available in our language.

P....23.11. 0.30 P.M. Divisional Order No. 4 for the 23.11.

1. *Enemy beaten, withdrawing everywhere.*
2. *Army pursues to-day 23, as far as A....2nd Division with left wing via Y...M....*
3. *1st Division pursues via K... towards F...*
4. *11th Infantry Brigade, plus 2nd Hussars and 7th F.A.R., advances on B... and seizes the bridge there.*
5. *1st Infantry Brigade advances into area Y... and B... 2nd Infantry Brigade into area G... and K..., where they will probably pass the night. They will cook and make ready for the night, but be prepared to march at any moment. S.A.A. wagons and 2nd line transport not yet up will be sent on by the Division.*
6. *Divisional Staff until 7 at P... afterwards B..., where order-receivers to be 7.30 P.M.*

Drill Regulations for Coast Artillery. U.S. Army. Provisional. 182 pp. 12mo. Washington, U.S.A., 1906. Government Printing Office.

As its name implies, a training manual for garrison artillery, which, in the United States, also carries out submarine mining and searchlight duties.

An Army Corps Staff Ride (Un voyage d'état-major de corps d'armée). By Général de Lacroix, Vice-Président du conseil supérieur de la guerre. 270 pp., with numerous maps and sketches. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Chapelet. 4/-.

This is a full and detailed account of an Army Corps Staff Ride, which was held in the neighbourhood of Lyons. It is a most valuable book, especially as it gives a deep insight into the mentality and school of thought of French officers. The fact that it comes from the pen of General de Lacroix adds considerably to the interest of the volume, in view of the distinguished position occupied by him as Vice-Président du Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, and as Commander-in-Chief designate of the French Army.

The book goes into great detail, showing the exact number of officers and men taking part in the exercise, their respective appointments and duties, and the method of carrying out the work of the staff ride; it explains the preparatory measures with reference to marches, quarters, accommodation, etc., and gives comprehensive information about the journey, the direction of the operations, and the nature of work to be done. Most of the orders by the various commanders are reproduced with instructive criticisms, showing clearly many of the tactical and strategical views and principles dominating military opinion in France. A feature of the tour is the very complete way in which the work of the administrative services has been carried out; owing to the large number of officers employed, it has been possible to pay great attention to these important duties, and to study them in considerable detail. The question of the removal and treatment of the wounded has been worked out with much care, and thorough reconnaissances have been made with regard to the amount of transport and supplies available in the neighbourhood.

Until the last day, the staff ride was single, the enemy's dispositions and movements being entrusted to two officers of the directing staff. This system was probably adopted in view of the wide extent of the area of operations, and on account of the wish of the director to employ his officers in the positions which they would actually occupy on service. On the sixth day the party was divided into two parts, and the enemy's (blue) operations were conducted by one of these parties; the result seems to have been good, and it would certainly appear to be more advantageous to have a scheme drawn up for opposing sides, instead of the enemy being a mere "bogey," run by the director and his staff. The double staff ride involves a larger number of officers, an adequate supply of motor cars, and entails a certain amount of delay, but undoubtedly leads to a greatly increased keenness in the work, whilst it may even produce a good imitation of a real battle. Diary officers do not seem to have been employed to any great extent, nor does the daily narrative appear to have been considered of importance, unlike at recent staff rides in England, and more especially at the Staff College, where the daily narrative is now looked on as a most valuable instrument for instruction.

The tactical instruction derived from the staff ride must have been great, as practically every description of fighting was practised, e.g., cavalry reconnaissance, outpost combats, advanced guard actions, night attacks, the assault of entrenched positions, the pursuit, counterstrokes, *retours offensifs*, delaying actions, etc. The interest in the operations appears to have been maintained up to the end, with the assistance of a "bogey" in the shape of a reinforcement of a mixed brigade to the enemy, who had been roughly handled and forced to retire at the end of the fourth day.

The book may at first sight appear to be somewhat long and unduly discursive; a few minutes' study will, however, suffice to show that the form in which the matter is arranged makes it easy to pick out the parts required. A large number of maps and sketches are attached, which mark the troops clearly, and are very useful in enabling the reader to follow the course of the operations.

The Execution of Infantry Intrenchments. By Major H. Jennings-Bramly. 63 pp., with plates. 8vo. London, 1908. Rees. 2/-.

This is a useful little book for infantry officers. Officers should, however, bear in mind that, where this book differs from the Manual of Military Engineering, the latter is the authority on these matters and is the text-book for examinations.

AERIAL NAVIGATION.

Airships Past and Present. By A. Hildebrandt, Capt. Prussian Balloon Corps. Translated by W. H. Story. 361 pp. Illustrated. 8vo. London, 1908. Constable. 10/6.

An historical record of dirigible balloons, useful to the student as recording the progress made. It includes very practical information in the theory and practice of ballooning, and a good chapter on balloon photography.

Some mention is made of kites and flying machines.

It includes some interesting details of construction, description of aeronautical instruments, and discusses methods of disabling balloons in war.

TRAVEL AND TOPOGRAPHICAL.

Kiaochau: The German Protectorate in East Asia (Kiautschou. Das deutsche Schutzgebiet in Ostasien). By Hans Weicker, Naval Chaplain. 236 pp. 145 illustrations in text. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Schall. 10/-.

Contains a good deal of useful information about the Protectorate in a readable form.

Some of the illustrations are valuable.

Diaries from China. (Tagebücher aus China). By F. von Richthofen. 2 vols. 1st vol., 588 pp., with one map and several pencil sketches by author. 2nd vol., 352 pp., with several pencil sketches and facsimiles of writings. 8vo. Berlin, 1907. Reimer. 20/- (for the two vols.).

These volumes deal with a series of journeys through China made during the years 1868-71; they have been compiled from diaries and letters, and are posthumously published by Richthofen's widow with the collaboration of Herr E. Tiessen.

The primary object of Richthofen's journeys was geological research, but the work contains much information about geographical and topographical features, government, national characteristics, influence of missions, the Chinese attitude towards foreigners, coal mining, &c.

Volume I. treats of journeys from Shanghai to Pekin via Tientsin; to Chusan; to Ning-po; up the Yang-tsu to Hankow; through Shan-tung province; through Manchuria and into Korea; into Chiang-su, An-hui, Ché-chiang and Shan-hsi.

The Manchurian trip was via Niu-chuang, Kai-ping, Pi-tan-wo up the coast to the Yalu, and back via Feng-huang-ch'eng, Tai-tse-ho, Mukden, Liao-ho, Hein-min Fu, Mongolia and Chih-li.

A description of an interview with Li Hung-chang, and a mention of Sir Robert Hart's wonderful influence over the Chinese, are included in this volume.

Volume II. treats of journeys to Kuang-hsi, Ssu-oh'uan, and down the Yang-tsu from Ch'eng-tu Fu.

The book is written in a chatty style, and bears throughout the impress of a thinker and master of his subject. Roman characters are used.

The Tramways of Java (De tramwegen op Java). 170 pp., with maps, plates, and photographs. 4to. The Hague, 1907. Kon. Ned. Boekhandel. 5/5.

This book is compiled by the Samarang Steam Tram Company. It gives details as to construction, rates, and remunerativeness of the Java railways, with numerous plates showing types of bridges, rails, locomotives, and plans of stations.

The Amu Darya and its Flotilla (Аму-Дарья и ее флотилия). By Col. V. I. Treteski. 57 pp. 8vo. Charjui, 1906. K. M. Baranov. 8d.

A concise account of the small flotilla of steamers and barges which the Russian Government maintains on the Amu Darya (Oxus River) with the dual object of supplying a means of communication to and from the military posts on that river, and of facilitating the transit of passengers and private goods through Southern Bokhara.

The author, who is the Commandant of the flotilla, prefaces his work by stating that his object in publishing it is to emphasise the commercial rather than the strategical importance of the flotilla, in the hope that the attention of the public may thus be drawn to the advantages which might accrue from an extension of its capabilities.

The subject is divided into the following headings, viz.:-

- (i) Historical sketch of the origin and development of the flotilla.
- (ii) Its strength and composition.
- (iii) Brief description of the Amu Darya, and notes on its navigability.
- (iv) Details of construction and carrying capacity of vessels.
- (v) Ports and landing-stages on the Amu Darya.
- (vi) Commercial significance of the flotilla.
- (vii) General *raison d'être* of the flotilla.
- (viii) The climate of the Amu Darya.
- (ix) Graphic table showing rise and fall of the Amu Darya by months during the period 1886-1905.

German East Africa: Land and People (Deutsch-Ost-Afrika. III. Land und Leute). By Capt. H. Fonck. 116 pp., 51 illustrations. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Vossische Buchhandlung. 2/-.

Chapter I. contains a few general impressions of the Protectorate, and an account of the author's journey to it. Chapter II. gives a more detailed description of the various districts passed through, and Chapter III. an account of the natives, their customs, religion, etc.

Pocket Book of South-West Africa, 1908 (Taschenbuch für Südwest-Afrika, 1908). By Dr. Kuhn and Captain Schwabe. 1st edition. 351 pp. 12mo. Leipzig, 1908. Weicher, 3/6.

A useful little book containing a calendar for 1908 and information as to climate, weights and measures, coinage, military and civil government departments, trade, railways, agriculture, sport, laws, natives, etc., of the German South-West African Protectorate.

Wanderings in Arabia. By C. M. Doughty. 2 vols. 606 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Duckworth. 16/-.

This is an abridgment (arranged with an introduction by Edward Garnett), of Doughty's classic "Travels in Arabian Deserts," the original edition of which is now un procurable.

The chief omissions in the abridgment are the account of the journey of the Haj through Edom and Arabian Petrae; secondly, Doughty's account of his wanderings upon the Harra with the Moahib after he had left Zeid and the Feir Beduins; thirdly, the last chapter describing his passage to Jeddah. The chapters also that deal with Kheibar and Aneiza have been much abridged.

The Portuguese Colonies (Les Colonies Portugaises). By A. de Almada Negreiros. 368 pp., 45 illustrations. 8vo. Paris, 1906. Challamel. 4/2.

The author has already published several works dealing individually with the more important of the Portuguese colonies, and the present volume, which treats of these colonies collectively, shows the result of his studies in a condensed form. He gives a brief account of Portuguese colonial policy, followed by various trade statistics referring chiefly to local products, and concludes with a vigorous protest against accusations which had been made in the foreign press relative to the alleged ill-treatment of natives.

The work contains much that is of interest regarding territories to which public attention is seldom drawn, and forms a useful book of reference.

Chile. By G. F. Scott Elliot. 363 pp., 33 illustrations, 6 plans and diagrams, and a map. 8vo. London, 1907. Fisher Unwin. 10/6.

This work deals fully with the development, natural features, products, and commerce of Chile, and gives a clear description of the present condition of the country. It contains some useful statistics, and a short introduction by Martin Hume adds to its interest.

The Marches of Hindustan: The Record of a Journey. By David Fraser. 516 pp., with map and illustrations. 8vo. London, 1907. Blackwood. 21/-.

The first six chapters tell the story of a journey to Tibet, in the course of which the author attended the progress of the Tashi Lama on his return from India to Shigatse, and returned to Sikkim by a previously unexplored route.

Chapter 7 contains some interesting remarks on the strategic and economic relations of Tibet to India.

Chapters 8 to 14 relate the march across the Himalayas and the Karakoram from Simla to Chinese Turkistan, and graphically describe the difficulties of the route.

Chapters 15 to 25 deal with Chinese Turkistan, and give an interesting review of British relations with Kashgaria.

Chapters 26 to 32 relate the traveller's experiences in Russian Turkistan, with an instructive chapter upon the Russian military position.

Chapters 33 to 41 describe a hurried journey through Persia via Mashhad and Tehran to the Caspian Sea. The author arrived in Tehran at the critical period preceding the death of the late Shah, and attended the meeting of the National Assembly at which the terms of the New Constitution as signed by the present Shah were announced. He writes of the Reform Movement, of recent events in Persia, and of the relations of Russia, Great Britain, and Germany with Persia, prior to the signing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

The volume concludes with a well-written summary, entitled, "Britain and Russia in Central Asia."

The book is profusely illustrated, is accompanied by a good map, and is written in a light, humorous style, which makes it very readable, while it is at the same time instructive.

From the Niger to the Nile. By Lieut. Boyd Alexander. 2 vols., about 400 pp. each, with maps and illustrations. 8vo. London, 1907. Arnold. 36/-.

These two volumes contain the record of an exceedingly interesting journey across Africa, which, as an exhibition of endurance and persistence, has not been equalled since the days of the pioneer explorers. The chief fact which emerges is that it is possible, or rather nearly possible, to go across the continent from west to east in

a boat. During a journey which lasted three years, Mr. Alexander was only obliged to carry his boat for 14 days.

As regards the geographical work accomplished, the most important piece of mapping carried out by the expedition is the strip surveyed by the late Captain Cland Alexander and Mr. Talbot between Ibi on the Benue and Lake Chad, a strip about 550 miles long and of varying width. This is a useful addition to the material at our disposal for the formation of maps of N. Nigeria.

Some time was spent in exploring Lake Chad. It appears that the lake was at a lower level than was the case at the time of Captain Tilho's explorations, and Mr. Alexander found it impossible to journey by boat from the western portion of the lake into the eastern. A map of the lake is bound up in the second volume. The map is constructed from traverses carried out by Mr. Boyd Alexander and Mr. Talbot, and is adjusted to four points previously fixed astronomically by the French. It is, indeed, to the French that we owe the bulk of present knowledge of Lake Chad and the work of Tilho, d'Adhemar, Andoin and others of the same nationality should never be forgotten in discussing the shape and character of the lake. It was by the French that the first exact map of Lake Chad was made, and it is chiefly on their fixed points that additional information is adjusted.

The river Bamini (meaning "Plenty Water") was ascended for about 130 miles; it had never been previously explored.

Instead of a five-day march from Yei, a Belgian post, to Rojaf on the Nile, Lieut. Alexander determined to try and find a waterway to the Nile by using the Yei River. Little was known of the river, but it was believed to fall into the Bahr-el-Ghazal at Meshra-el-Rek. The author shows that it is navigable in its lower reaches and could be used to shorten by six days the transport of supplies to our garrisons in the Bahr-el-Ghazal province, which are entirely dependent on Khartoum for their corn. The Yei was found to terminate in marsh and sodd, but Lieut. Alexander believes that if this sodd, and that in the parallel river, the Naam or Rohl, was cut through, the increased water supply to the Nile would greatly improve the irrigation of the Sudan and Egypt.

Though most of this eventful journey was made by water, still, from a strategic and also commercial point of view, this route is useless owing to lack of water in many portions of it for several months in the year. Lieut. Alexander points out that sleeping sickness, which has only of recent years been known in the Lado Enclave, is gradually making its way up to the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

Great credit is due to Lieut. Alexander and his party for the manner in which they dealt with the natives; much of the country passed through was very unsettled and inhabited by most turbulent tribes. In spite of this, there never was any serious trouble, and most useful information was gained of many hitherto almost unknown tribes. It would be difficult to find a better lesson in the treatment of and conduct towards natives than is contained in the pages of these two most interesting volumes

SUPPLY, ETC.

The French Army Service Corps in Peace and in War (Der französische Train im Frieden und im Kriege). By Rittmeister Kolhorn, Kompanie-Chef im Rheinischen Train-Bataillon Nro. 8. 80 pp., numerous sketches, diagrams and illustrations. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Vossische Buchhandlung, Militärverlag. 3/-.

A most useful handbook of the Army Service Corps in France. Though it is short and concise, the author has succeeded in picking out the most interesting and essential points of this important department of the French Army. The diagrams and illustrations are excellent.

The volume is well worth reading, especially for officers of the A.S.C.

Technical Military Supply Handbook (Technisches Hanbuch für militärische Verpflegungsgüter). By Ludwig Tlapk. 400 pp., with 116 illustrations. 8vo. Vienna, 1908. Alfred Holder. 8/6.

This is a very complete handbook on various supply questions, including baking and cooking, both in barracks and in the field, and methods of judging supplies. The author is an instructor at the Austrian supply officers' course.

The Question of Travelling Kitchens (Zur Frage der Feldküchenwagen). By Dr. jur. Josef Kühn. 39 pp. 8vo. Vienna, 1907. Christoph Reissed's Söhne. 1/-.

This pamphlet contains instructions for rapid cooking in travelling kitchens by means of "manometer" kettles (Dr. Kühn's system). The author claims that by means of a travelling kitchen provided with two such kettles meals can be prepared for 550 men in from 25 minutes to 1 hour and 50 minutes, according to the nature of the food. Either wood or coal can be utilized as fuel.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Military Questions of To-day (Questions militaires d'actualité), 2nd series. By General H. Bonnal. 287 pp. 12mō. Paris, 1908. Chaperot. 3/-.

This is a series of short essays on a comprehensive variety of military subjects. The first is a forecast of what will be the strategy and tactics of both belligerents,

but more especially the Germans, in the next Franco-German war. The next two in importance are "The effect of the two years' service law" and "The organization and employment of cavalry." In the former of these a comparison is made of the respective strengths of the military forces of France and Germany.

Among the other subjects dealt with are:—

The duties of the Staff.

The character of Commanders.

Discipline.

A National Army, and

The German Imperial Manoeuvres of 1906.

The Future of the French Army (L'armée évolue). By General Pedoya, formerly G.O.C. the 16th Army Corps. 100 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Chapelot. 2 francs.

This volume is divided into three parts—Discipline—Anti-Militarism—Anti-Patriotism—and is extremely interesting from the clear view which it gives us of the state of feeling now existing in France, and of the attitude taken up by the French people towards the army.

General Pedoya issues a cry of warning against the dangers which are menacing the French army from within; against the fatal cancer of socialism and anti-patriotism. He draws attention to the persistent attempts which are being made to undermine the loyalty of the troops, and to the urgent necessity for the immediate repression of these attempts.

He shows the close connection existing between anti-militarism and anti-patriotism—a lesson which must be remembered in Great Britain; he urges that special attention should be given to the early inculcation of high qualities of moral and patriotism in the minds of the youth of France, and concludes with an appeal for the adoption of prompt and energetic measures for crushing all socialistic propaganda.

Some Neglected Aspects of War. By Capt. A. T. Mahan, United States Navy, H. S. Pritchett, and Julian S. Corbett. 193 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Sampson Low. 6/-.

This book is a reprint of articles and lectures, and contains the following:—

The Power that makes for Peace. By H. S. Pritchett.

The Capture of Private Property at Sea. By Julian Corbett,

and

The Moral Aspect of War;

The Practical Aspect of War;

War from the Christian Standpoint;

The Hague Conference of 1907, and the Question of Immunity for Belligerent

Merchant Shipping;

all by Captain Mahan.

It is unnecessary to commend the writings of Captain Mahan and Mr. Corbett to the officers of the army, they are already sufficiently well known, and Mr. Pritchett appears worthy of his company. The subjects of the essays are sufficiently indicated by their titles, and the object of collecting them under one cover is given by Captain Mahan in the preface as follows:—

"Convinced that the cause of peace is jeopardized by the exaggerations and overstatements of its noisiest followers, I have thought it expedient to collect under one cover a few articles in which the rationale and justification of war and its procedure have been considered under different aspects."

Many points could be noted in these essays which are of interest and value, but it will be enough to say that the high reputation of the authors is well maintained, and the book should be read by all interested in questions of international policy and of arbitration.

The India of the Future. Reprint of articles in the U.S. Magazine by Col. L. J. H. Grey, C.S.I., with a preface by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Edmond R. Elles, G.C.I.E., K.C.B. 52 pp. London, 1907. 1/-.

The author considers that the problem of the defence of India is to be solved by the gradual devolution of administration and of provision of the means of defence upon the Indian chiefs and nobles.

He advocates the extension of the system of Imperial Service Troops, estimating that it would eventually give us an army of 200,000 men. He considers that the natural result would be the transfer of the Imperial Service Troops from the control of the Foreign Office to that of the Commander-in-Chief, but General Elles is of opinion that the Imperial Service Troops should remain generally under the administration of the Native States, and that any transfer to the Commander-in-Chief would be resented by the Chiefs as an unnecessary interference.

Military Training. (As proposed by the National Service League.) An answer to J. A. Farror's "The Moral Cant about Conscription." By Col. R. Elias, late 59th Regt. 14 pp. 8vo. London, 1907. Gale & Polden. 3d.

The nature of this pamphlet is sufficiently indicated by the title. It refutes the statements made by Mr. Farror.

Explosive Materials. By Col. J. P. Wisser, U.S. Army. 152 pp. 12mo. New York, 1907. Van Nostrand. 2/-.

A summary of the classification and constitution of explosives.

Pocket Handbook of the World's Navies (Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten, 1908). B. Weyer. 468 pp., with photos and diagrams. 8vo. Munich, 1908. J. F. Lehmann. 1/6.

Contents. Part I.—Lists of ships of various navies, with diagrams of types. Part II.—Comparisons of the chief navies. Part III.—Artillery. Part IV.—Miscellaneous. Part V.—Tables, etc.

Automobiles and their Motors (Les Automobiles et leurs Moteurs). By Lieut. de Chabot. 355 pp., with 17 figs. 8vo. Paris, 1907. E. Bernard.

This book, which has been well reviewed in France, deals with automobiles for army transport and their employment.

Veterinary Systems and Statistics of Sickness among Horses in the Armies of modern States (Das militär-Veterinärwesen und die Krankheitsstatistik der Armeepferde aller Kulturstaaten). By Dr. Paul Goldbeck. 191 pp., with 9 photographs. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Mittler. 4/1.

The book is in seventeen parts, one of which is devoted to each of the principal military states. The information given in each part deals with the history and development of the existing veterinary system of the army in question; methods adopted for treatment of certain diseases; statistics of sickness and mortality among horses; status and conditions of service of the members of the veterinary corps.

The Hungarian Royal Stud Farms (Les haras royaux hongrois et le domaine d'Hungarian Altenburg). By Veterinary Officer Meuleman, 1st Regiment of Guides, Professor at the Belgian Staff College. 69 pp. 8vo. Brussels, 1908. Revue d'élevage, Chasse et Pêche, 5 and 7, Rue du Marteau. 1/3.

This is an account by M. Meuleman of a visit paid by him in 1905 to the Royal Hungarian stud farms at Mezőhegyes, Kistarcsa, Babolna and Fogaras, and to the domain of Hungarian Altenburg.

The author describes the organization of the stud farms and points out the remarkable interest taken by the Hungarian Government and the very large amount of money spent by it to improve not only the breed of horses, but also that of cattle, sheep and pigs.

The book is illustrated by a number of photographs representing the various breeds in the country.

Active Service Pocket Book. By Second-Lieut. B. Stewart, West Kent Imperial Yeomanry. 3rd edition, enlarged. 911 pp., with plates. 12mo. London, 1907. Clowes. 4/-.

This is the third edition of this pocket book, and a good many additions have been made to it. It contains a large number of extracts from official books, and a good deal of other matter.

PART II.

MAGAZINE ARTICLES.

(For abbreviations see page 604.)

AERIAL NAVIGATION.

Aerial Navigation in War. By Capt. C. de B. Boone, Essex Regiment. U.S.M., January.

War Balloons. Deutsche Rundschau, December.

The Service of Aeronauts in War. Translated from Inj. by Major F. E. G. Skey. R.E.J., March.

ARTILLERY.

Note on an Apparatus for Measuring Angles of Sight. By G. J. Prompt. R.d'A., November.

The Employment of the Artillery allotted to large Bodies of Cavalry. By an Austrian Artillery Officer. K.M., December.

Russian Views as to the Employment of Field Artillery. By Capt. Leopold Wltavsky, No. 3 Fortress Artillery Regiment. M.A.G., December.

The Supposed Failure of Horse Artillery. J.S.M., January.

Questions of Artillery Tactics, with Examples from the Russo-Japanese War. By Col. Bielaiev. (Concluded.) J.S.M., January.

The German Manual of Field Artillery Fire. By Lieut.-Col. H. A. Bethell, R.F.A. U.S.M., January.

Field Gun Trials in Greece. E., January 10th.

Characteristics of a Modern Coast Defence Gun. By Capt. R. Garrone. R.A.G., November and December.

The Russian and Japanese Artilleries, in the first Period of the War, 1904-5. Liaoyang. A.J., November.

Artillery in the Manchurian Campaign. By Capt. B. Vincent, R.F.A. J.U.S.I., January.

The new Drill Regulations for the German Field Artillery. By Col. A. Weigner. M.A.G., January.

The heavy Siege Mortar and its Effects. By Major O. R. Ellison von Nidlef. M.A.G., January.

Field Artillery Tactics in France, America and England. V.T.H., 1908. I.

The Leading and Training of Field Artillery. O.M.Z., February.

The Léon-Björkman Telemeter. By Lieut.-Col. F. Cerón y Cuervo. M.Art., January.

Re-armament of Mountain Artillery. By Capt. J. Nunes Goncalves. R.M.L., January.

The Life of Large-Calibre Gun Barrels. M.A.G., February.

The Latest Developments of Armour Plates and Armour-Piercing Shell. By Capt. M. Kralupper. (Continued.) M.A.G., February.

Tendencies of German Field Artillery. By Capt. J. Challéat. R.d'A., December.

Artillery and Crest Cover. By Capt. P. J. Marie. R.d'A., January.

The Measure of Safety in Indirect Fire. By Capt. H. Farsac. R.d'A., January.

The Method of Bracketing. By Lieut. E. Pagezy. R.d'A., January.

The Employment of Artillery in Sieges. By Col. J. Rouquerol. (To be continued.) J.S.M., 1st March.

The Artillery Question in France and Germany. By Lieut.-Gen. H. Rohne. A.M.B., January.

Concerning the Training of the Artillery. By Lieut.-Gen. H. Rohne. A.M.B., February

CAVALRY.

Cavalry *versus* Infantry. By Capt. A. Joran. R.C. (4), November.

The Horses of the Army under the Revolution and the Empire. By C. A. Bidault, Veterinary Officer at the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. R.C., November.

Notes on the Combat (Cavalry). (To be continued.) R.C., November.

Strategic Reconnaissance, old and new. A military historical study. By Capt. Hugo Kerchnewe, General Staff. (Conclusion.) K.M., December.

The Necessity of Reform in our Winter Training. By Col. Buxbaum. K.M., December.

Oliver Cromwell as a Cavalry Leader. By Major-Gen. Gradinger. (Conclusion.) K.M., December.

Edelsheim's views upon Cavalry Questions. Anonymous. K.M., December.

Questions of Cavalry Training. II. Training in Dismounted Action. By a Regimental Officer. (Conclusion.) K.M., December.

Cavalry: Mounted Infantry. By Friedrich Freiherr von Treuberg. K.M., December.

Mounted Infantry with Cavalry in Advance of an Army. J.S.M., November.

Cavalry during the Campaign 1796-97 in Italy. (To be continued.) A.F., December.

The new British "Cavalry Training." By Lieut.-Col. Berndt. O.M.Z., December.

French Opinions as to the Attachment of Infantry and Cyclist Detachments to Cavalry Divisions. M.W.B. (I), 1908, p. 7.

The Russian Cavalry at Mukden. By Capt. Aubert. K.M., October.

Turkish Cavalry. By Capt. A. Spaits. K.M., October. Another article by Lieut. Belfanti in K.M., January.

Passages of Rivers by Cavalry. By Major-Gen. H. Freiherr von Gemmingen. K.M., October.

The Bitting and Training of Remounts. By Lieut. von Sanden. K.M., October.

Notes on the Battle of Taourirat, October 7th, 1907. Cavalry v. Infantry. By Capt. A. Joran. (To be continued.) R.C., December.

Mounted Infantry Working with Cavalry in Advance of an Army. By Capt. Besset. (To be continued.) J.S.M., July, November, and January 15th.

German and French Views as to the Employment of Cyclists with Cavalry. K.M., January.

Horsebreeding and Remounts. By Franz Count Silva-Tarouco. K.M., January.

Our Winter Training. By Col. L. Koch. K.M., January.

Cavalry Operations in the Russo-Japanese War. By Lieut.-Col. J. C. Gresham. (To be continued.) J.M.S.I., January and February.

The Dismounted Action of Cavalry. By v. Pelet-Narbonne. M.W.B., 18th January.

The Swiss Cavalry. By Lieut.-Col. C. Delmé-Radcliffe, C.M.G. C.J., January.

Cavalry and Horse Artillery. By Col. F. D. V. Wing, C.B. C.J., January.

The Dismounted Action of Cavalry. (Translated from K.M.) C.J., January.

The New Drill Regulations for the Japanese Cavalry. By Lieut.-Col. Berndt. O.M.Z., January.

The Organisation and Instruction of Cavalry, in View of the Requirements of Modern War. (To be continued.) R.C., January, 1908.

Swimming Horses. By Col. E. J. Phipps-Hornby, V.C. P.R.A.I., February.

DEFENCE, HOME AND IMPERIAL

The Colonies and Imperial Defence. By Lieut.-Col. A. Pollock. U.S.M., January.

Is the Two-Power Standard Abandoned? By H. W. Wilson. N.R., February.

Military and Naval Home Defence. By Major W. A. Harrison. R.E.J., February.

Coast Defence. By Major F. Molony, R.E. R.E.J., March.

EMPIRE, THE.

Great Britain and the Baghdad Railway. By Angus Hamilton. U.S.M., January.

The True Imperialism. By Lord Curzon of Kedleston. N.C., January.

Britain and Russia in the Middle East. B.Mag., January.

A plea for a Forth and Clyde Ship Canal. By R. N. N.R., January.

The Anglo-Russian Convention. By Col. C. E. Yate. A.Q.R., January.

The Australian Commonwealth Military Forces. (Lecture at the Indian Staff College.) By Major A. P. R. Luscombe, Australian Permanent Staff. P.U.S.I., January.

Australian and Naval Strategy in the Pacific. By Lieut. A. C. Dewar, R.N. U.S.M., February.

The British Army of To-day. By Major von Heydebreck. V.T.H., 1908. 1. A translation appeared in C.R., March.

The Military Forces of Great Britain in 1907-8. By the French General Staff. R.M.F., February.

Anglo-Afghan Relations. By the Author of *Afghanistan*. (To be continued.) U.S.M., March.

FORTIFICATION AND MILITARY ENGINEERING.

The Influence of the Attacks on Port Arthur on the Construction of Forts. (To be continued.) R. du G., October, November, and December.

Field Fortification. By Major O. Ritter Ellison von Nidlef. M.A.G., January.

Field Fortification in the Russo-Japanese War. By Capt. J. Ritter von Tarnawa-Malczewski. M.A.G., January.

Innovations in Permanent Fortification. O.M.Z., February.

HAGUE CONFERENCE.

The Second Hague Conference. Emp.R., January.

The Hague Conference. Q.R., January.

HISTORICAL.

Leuthen. By Capt. Helmes. K.M., December.

Reflections on the Study of Contemporary History. By Gen. de Jacquelot du Boisrouvray. R.M.G., December.

The War of 1870-71. The Investment of Paris. (To be continued.) A.F., December.

The Battle of Lipan, on the 30th May, 1434. By Lieut.-Gen. Karl von Lang. With 2 sketch maps. O.M.Z., December.

At War. (The 9th Russian Rifle Regiment at the Battle of Mukden.) V.S., October to January.

Napoleon's Diplomacy prior to the Spanish War. By Capt. H. P. Osborne, Middlesex Regiment. U.S.M., January.

The Campaign in Bohemia, 1866. By T. Miller Maguire, LL.D. (Continued.) U.S.M., January.

The Misfortune at St. Cast, 1758. By F. J. Hudleston. U.S.M., January.

Rossbach. By Maj.-Gen. W. von Unger. K.M., October.

The French Army on Campaign: An Account of their Operations in Morocco. By E. Ashmead Bartlett. B.Mag., January.

Napoleon's Marshals. (2) Davout. By Capt. H. M. Davson, R.H.A. P.R.A.I., January.

General von Schmidt's Pursuit after the Battle of Le Mans. By Major von Ruffer. With map. K.M., January.

The Realities of the Battlefield. The 5th Prussian Corps at Wörth. By Commandant Grange. L.R.I., January.

Mishchenko's Raid on Ying-Kou, January, 1905. Translation. By Capt. A. W. F. Knox, 58th Vaughan's Rifles. P.U.S.I., January.

Wars of the Turks with the Germans. By Lieut.-Gen. F. H. Tyrrell. (Continued.) J.U.S.I., January.

Napoleon's Marshals. (3) Ney. By Capt. H. M. Davson, R.H.A. P.R.A.I., February.

INSTRUCTIONAL.

War Games and Military History. By a Battalion Commander. M.W.B. (II.), 1907, p. 3719 *et seq.*, and p. 3754 *et seq.*

MANOEUVRES.

The Grand Manoeuvres of Foreign Armies, 1907. (a) Germany. (b) France. (c) Italy. (d) Russia. Anonymous. With two sketch maps. O.M.Z., December. (b) France. (e) Great Britain. (f) Rumania. (g) Switzerland. O.M.Z., January.

MEDICAL AND SANITARY.

Prevention and Treatment of Mediterranean Fever. By Fleet-Surgeon P. W. Bassett-Smith, R.N. J.R.A.M., January.

Small Incinerators. By Lieut.-Col. H. A. Harris, J.R.A.M., January.
 The Prevention of Malaria in British Possessions, Egypt, and parts of America. By R. Ross, C.B., etc. J.R.A.M., February and March.
 Camp Sanitation. By Capt. R. Tilbury Brown. J.R.A.M., March.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The *Rôle* of Character in War. R.M.G., December.
 The Question of a Service Range-finder. By Capt. Viktor Ritter von Niesiolowski-Gawin, Instructor at the Technical Military Academy and War School. With 12 diagrams. M.A.G., December.
 A New Instrument by means of which Increased Accuracy may be obtained in Rapid Field Sketches. By Capt. Johann von Bézard. With 10 illustrations and a specimen sketch. O.M.Z., December and February.
 Twenty-four Hours on the General Staff of the German Army, 2nd-3rd May, 1809. By Capt. E. Buat. J.S.M., January.
 Recent Improvement in Incandescent Lamps. By Professor J. T. Morris, M.I.E.E. R.E.J., January.
 Some Lessons from the Sad Experience of the Russo-Japanese War. By Gen. Martynov. (Continued.) L.S.M., 1st and 15th January.
 The Use of Small Portable Sandbags. L.R.I. January.
 Compulsory Enlistment and the Professional Army. By Z. Bricito. R.M.I., January.
 The Comparative Value for War of Regular and Irregular Troops. By Lieut. H. B. Arthur, R.H.A. C.J., January.
 International Arbitration. Translated from *Marine Rundschau*. J.U.S.I., January.
 Asia contra Mundum. By Viator. F.Rev., February.
 The Clothing and Equipment of the Troops during the Russo-Japanese War. By J. Schrabok. O.M.Z., January.
 The Realities of War; Heroic Deeds, Panics, Routs, etc. By Gen. Daudignac. L.S.M., 15th January, 1st and 15th February.
 The Question of Movable Kitchens. O.M.Z., February.
 The Hotchkiss Machine Gun of 1907. M.Art., January.
 The Effect of Moral in War. By Gen. Bernard. R.M.G., January and February.
 The Issue of March Orders by Night. M.W.B. I., 1908, p. 617.
 The Gyroscope and its Uses. M.I.E., January.
 Rifle Clubs in France. By Capt. Janet. J.S.M., 1st March.
 The Corps of German Reserve Officers, compared with similar Foreign Organisations and judged by the Foreign Press. I.R., Supplement 108, March.

MOTORS AND MOTOR TRACTION.

A Corps of Motorists. By Capt. L. J. Dubost. L.S.M., 1st and 15th January. 1st and 15th February.
 The Use of Automobiles for Military Purposes. By Major R. Wolf. M.A.G., January.

MUSKETRY.

A Sketch of the History of the Austrian School of Musketry, and of its Development and Functions since its Institution. By Lieut. Franz Binder. With one map. O.M.Z., December.

New Falling Targets for Field Firing. By H. Rohne. M.W.B.(I.) 1908, p. 118.

ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

The New Organisation of the Swiss Army. By Captain Stephan Schattel, General Staff. O.M.Z., December.

The New Military Organisation of the Swiss Confederacy. By Maj.-Gen. A. D. Gradinger. J.D.A.M.(II.), 1907.

The Swiss Military System. By Lieut.-Col. C. Delmé-Radcliffe. J.U.S.I., December.

The Swiss Military System. By A. J. Ireland, N.I.A., February.

The Question of the Supply of Horses in German South-West Africa. V.T.H., 1908, I.

POLITICAL.

The Foreign Policy of William II. By J. Ellis Barker. N.C., January.

Politics and War. (Lecture at the Indian Staff College.) By Capt. J. Charteris, R.E. P.U.S.I., January.

Belgian Opinion on the Congo Question. By B. G. Lorard, C.R., February.

The Problem of Morocco. By J. Delafosse. N.R., February.

Morocco. By P. Leroy-Beaulieu. R.D.D.M., 1st January.

Austria and the Italian Frontier. R.A.G., January.

Great Britain and Turkey. By A. Stead. F.Rev., March.

Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the West Balkans. By Scutus Viator. C.R., March.

Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia. By Commandant de La-costa. L.A.F., November.

Russo-Japanese War. An unpublished page of International Diplomacy. By A. Méril. N.R., March.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Studies of the Russo-Japanese War. From the Ya-lu to Liao-yang Chou. By Lieut.-Col. Bardonnaud. (To be continued.) R.M.G., December, January, and February.

Reflections on the Russo-Japanese War. By Gen. Baron de Heusch, Belgian Army. (To be continued.) J.S.M., December.

The Russo-Japanese War. By the French General Staff. R.M.E., February.

RAILWAYS.

Railways in Warfare. By Lieut. R. A. Esteves. R.M.L., December.

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL.

Machine Guns in France and Abroad. Tactical Employment. L.S.M., 1st December.

The Russo-Japanese War. Tactical Considerations. B.P.B.M., 15th November and 1st December.

Japanese and Russian Infantry Tactics in the late War. B.P.B.M., 15th December.

Co-operation between Infantry and Artillery in the Combat. By Commandant Niessel. L.R.I., November and December.

Questions of Artillery Tactics, with Examples from the Russo-Japanese War. (To be continued.) J.S.M., December.

Tactical Employment of Machine Guns. By Lieut. Aubert. J.S.M. December.

The Conditions for a Good Preparation. By Capitaine Sorb. J.S.M. December.

Tactical Studies on a Campaign of 1806, Jena. (To be continued.) A.F., December.

The Action of Infantry against Shielded Field Guns. By Capt. Alois Vollgruber With 6 diagrams. O.M.Z., December.

The Strategy of the Franco-German War. The Invasion. By A. Grouard. J.S.M., January.

The Fire Action of Cavalry. By Lieut. P. Lichtenstein von Homrodt. K.M., October.

Lessons as to the Employment of Machine Guns learned by the Japanese during the late War. By Capt. H. Sanders. M.W.B.I., 1908, pp. 123, 958.

Strategic Critique of the Franco-German War. The Invasion, August 7th to 12th. By A. Grouard. (To be continued.) J.S.M., January 1st and 15th.

The Napoleonic Battle, Technique of its Preparation. By Lieut. Col. H. Camon. (To be continued.) J.S.M., 1st and 15th January.

The Initiative in National Strategy. By Major C. Ross, D.S.O. (Lecture at the R.A. Institution.) P.R.A.I., January.

Remarks on the Subject of an Offensive which the French Army might have attempted on the Right Bank of the Moselle on August 17th, 1870. By Gen. Lebron. R.M.G., January.

The Use of Entrenchments and Field Fortification in the Attack. By Major H. F. Thuillier, R.E. P.U.S.I., January.

Notes upon Company and Battalion Tactics and the Employment of Artillery in Battle. By Capt. A. Degtyarev. Translated from V.S. J.U.S.I., January and February.

Remarks upon Infantry Reconnaissance and Attack. By Capt. S. von Spiess. O.M.Z., January.

Long-Range Fire. O.M.Z., January.

The Waterloo Campaign. An Appreciation of the Situation from the point of view of a French Staff Officer, June 1st, 1815. By Capt. A. F. Becke, late R.A. U.S.M., February.

Clausewitz on War. Translated by Miss A. M. Maguire, with Notes by T. Miller Maguire, LL.D. (Continued.) U.S.M., February.

Machine Guns in Battle: Their Tactical Employment. By Lieut. Nöel. (Continued.) R.M.B., November and December.

The Attack and the Crisis of the Battle. By Lieut. v. Vogel. M.W.B., 1908, pp. 387 and 416.

Reconnaissance of the Concealed Batteries of a Force on the Defensive. M.W.B., 1908, p. 402.

Studies in Applied Tactics: Cavalry in Battle, 15th and 16th August, 1870. By P. Lehaucourt. Translated from J.S.M. by Major E. Makins, D.S.O. J.U.S.I., February.

Mobility: - Its Influence on Strategy. By Col. F. N. Maude, C.B. J.U.S.I., February.

Infantry Tactics. By Col. Rantzov. L.R.I., 15th February.

The Employment of larger Cavalry Masses in Independent Enterprises against the Flanks or Rear of the Enemy's Army. By Major Freiherr von Holzing-Berstett and Capt. von Serch. K.M., February.

Infantry Tactics: Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. By Capt. Fouquet. J.S.M., 15th February.

The Development of Infantry Tactics. By Lieut.-Col. Dencausse. J.S.M., 15th February and 1st March.

The Modern Theory of the Tactical Offensive-Defensive. By Capt. Huyghé. J.S.M., 15th February.

Before the Battle of Wörth, or Forty Hours of MacMahon's Strategy. By Major de Cugnac. (To be continued.) R.M.G., February.

Mutual Co-operation in War. By Capt. R. Baignol. R.M.G., February.

The Russo-Japanese War: Tactical Considerations. By the Belgian General Staff. (To be continued.) B.P.B.M., 31st January and 15th February.

Petroleum and Strategy. By C. de Thierry. U.S.M., March.

Reconnaissance of the Ground for a Defensive Position. (From the Russian.) By Major F. E. G. Skey, R.E. U.S.M., March.

TELEGRAPHY AND COMMUNICATIONS.

Land Wireless Telegraphy. By Major E. Russell, U.S. Army. U.S.A., November and December.

Communication in the Division. By Capt. J. E. F. d'Apice, R.A. P.R.A.I., January.

Field Signals. By Lieut. G. B. Malavenda. R.M.I., February.

Communication in the Field. By Capt. R. C. Hammond, R.E. R.E.J., March.

The Transmission of Military Intelligence. By Lieut.-Col. G. P. Scriven. (Continued from November.) J.M.S.I., March and April.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

Military Training and Preparatory Instruction at School. By Major Mnisszek-Buzenin. O.M.Z., January.

A Problem in Military Education. By Viscount Esher. U.S.M., February.

Replies to Lord Esher's Article. By a Field Officer, Col. F. N. Maude, C.B., and T. Miller Maguire. U.S.M., March.

Training of Patrols. By Lieut. Eliasséche. L.S.M., 1st and 15th January. 1st and 15th February.

The new Japanese Infantry Regulations. O.M.Z., February.

Infantry Field Firing. By Col. Schoch. M.W.B.(I.), 1908, pp. 435 and 456.

Some more Regimental Opinions. By a Commanding Officer. U.S.M., March.

The new Infantry Regulations in France and Germany. By Gen. Bonnal. *Deutsche Revue*, December.

TRANSPORT.

The new Russian Transport Regulations. Anonymous. O.M.Z., December.

Teams and Harness for Mobilisation Transport. By Lieut.-Col. T. Lanzoni. R.A.G., December.

Mechanical Transport: Its Future Administrative Development. By Lieuts. C. S. Lyon and E. Unwin. A.S.C., January.

PART III.

BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, ETC., WHICH HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED
TO REFERENCE LIBRARIES.

Regulations for Practice for Horse, Field, and Heavy Artillery, 1908.

Extracts from the Annual Report of the School of Gunnery for Horse, Field, and Heavy Artillery, 1907.

Instructions for Practice Seaward.

Handbook of the Land Forces of British Colonies and Protectorates. Part I., Canada.

Supply Service in the Field. v. Francois. Parts II. and III.

Military Report on Cape Colony. Vol. II., Routes.

Report on a Staff Ride held by the Chief of the General Staff, 7th to 12th October, 1907.

Handbook of the Rumanian Army, 1907.

ABBREVIATIONS.

Abbreviation.	Name of Newspaper or Periodical.	Price.	Place of Publication.
A.F.	Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française	M. 2 frs.	Paris.
A.F.H.	Archiv. für Schiffs- und Tropen-Hygiene	1 M. *	Leipzig.
A.H.M.	Annales d'hygiène et de médecine coloniale	M. 3 frs.	Paris.
A.J.	Artilleristick Jurnal	M. *	St. Petersburg.
A.M.B.	Artilleristische Monatshefte	M. m. 2.50	Berlin.
A.M.P.	Archives de médecine et de pharmacie militaires	M. 2 frs.	Paris.
A.Q.R.	Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review	Q. 2/6	Woking.
A.S.C.	Army Service Corps Quarterly	Q. 2/-	Aldershot.
A.S.M.	Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung	W. *	Basle.
B.Mag.	Blackwood's Magazine	M. 2/6	Edinburgh.
B.P.B.M.	Bulletin de la Presse et de la Bibliographie militaires. (Supplement to J.M.O.B.)	F. *	Brussels.
C.J.	Cavalry Journal	Q. 2/6	London.
C.M.G.	Canadian Military Gazette	F. 10 c.	Montreal.
C.O.J.	Colonial Office Journal	Q. 1/6	London.
Con.	Der Continent	M. m. 1.25	Berlin.
C.R.	Contemporary Review	M. 2/6	London.
D.M.Z.	Deutsche militärärztliche Zeitschrift	1 M. *	Berlin.
E.	Engineering	W. 6	London.
Emp. R.	Empire Review	M. 1/-	London.
F. Rev.	Fortnightly Review	M. 2/6	London.
Inj.	Injenierii Jurnal	M. *	St. Petersburg.
I.R.	Internationale Revue (Armeen und Flotten)	M. m. 3.25	Dresden.
J.A.M.S.	The Military Surgeon. Journal of the Assoc. of Military Surgeons	M. 35 c.	Carlisle, Penn.
J.D.A.M.	Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine	M. m. 2.50	Berlin.
J.M.O.B.	Journal militaire Officiel	M. *	Brussels.
J.M.S.I.	Journal of the Military Service Institution	2 M. 50 c.	Governor's Island, N. York.
J.R.A.M.	Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps	M. 2/-	London.
J.S.M.	Journal des Sciences militaires	M. *	Paris.
J.U.S.I.	Journal of the Royal United Service Institution	M. 2/-	London.
K.M.	Kavalleristische Monatshefte	M. k. 2	Vienna.
K.T.Z.	Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift	M. m. 1.50	Berlin.
L.A.F.	Comité de l'Asie française, Bulletin	M. 2.25 frs.	Paris.
L.B.M.	La Belgique militaire	W. 25 c.	Brussels.
L.R.I.	La Revue d'Infanterie	M. 2 frs.	Paris.
L.S.M.	Le Spectateur militaire	F. 2 frs.	Paris.
M.A.G.	Mittn. über Gegenstände des Art.- u. Genie-Wesens	M. *	Vienna.
M. Art.	Memorial de Artilleria	M. *	Madrid.
M.I.E.	Memorial de ingenieros del ejército	M. *	Madrid.
M.W.B.	Militär-Wochenblatt	1 W. 20 pf.	Berlin.
N.C.	Nineteenth Century	M. 2/6	London.
N.I.A.	Nation in Arms	M. 1/8	London.

W., published weekly; F., fortnightly; M., monthly; Q., quarterly.
 * Periodicals which can only be purchased by subscription.

ABBREVIATIONS.—contd.

Abbreviation.	Name of Newspaper or Periodical.	Price.	Place of Publication.
N.R.	National Review	M.	2/6
O.M.Z.	Streifblatt militärische Zeitschrift zugleich, Organ der militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine	M.	*
P.R.A.I.	Journal of the Royal Artillery	M.	2/6
P.U.S.I.	Journal of the United Service Institution of India	Q.	2 Rs.
Q.R.	Quarterly Review....	Q.	6/-
R.A.G.	Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio	M.	*
R.C.	Revue de Cavalerie	M.	*
R. d'A.	Revue d'Artillerie....	M.	*
R.D.D.M.	Revue des Deux Mondes....	M.	3 frs.
R. du G.	Revue du Génie militaire	M.	2.50 fr.
R.E.J.	Royal Engineers' Journal	M.	1/6
R.H.	Revue d'Histoire	M.	2 frs.
R.M.B.	Revue de l'Armée belge	2 M.	*
R.M.E.	Revue militaire des Armées étrangères	M.	1 fr.
R.M.G.	Revue militaire générale	M.	2.50 fr.
R.M.I.	Rivista militare italiana	M.	2 lire
R.M.I.L.	Revista Militar	F.	200 reis.
R.M.S.	Revue militaire suisse	M.	*
U.S.A.	United States Artillery Journal....	2 M.	50 c.
U.S.C.	United States Cavalry Association Journal	Q.	50 c.
U.S.M.	United Service Magazine (Colburn's)	M.	2/-
V.S.	Voyennii Sbornik (Military Journal)	M.	*
V.T.H.	Vierteljahrsshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde	Q.	*
			Berlin.

W., published weekly; F., fortnightly; M., monthly; Q., quarterly.

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
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24th	J. R. Pinson	6,493
27th	H. W. Crippin	6,411
32nd	L. H. King-Harman	6,372
35th	R. B. Pargiter	6,339

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13th	R. C. Money	5,169
27th	C. T. Ellison	4,912
28th	R. C. H. Keenlyside	4,644

CAVALRY.

7th	A. M. Sassoon	3,481
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MILITIA COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION.

OCTOBER, 1907.

CAVALRY.

6th	C. A. L. Green	Yorkshire Dragoons	2,917
8th	Hon. F. C. Montgomerie	Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders	2,885

INFANTRY.

6th	L. D. Daly	Royal Munster Fusiliers	3,472
13th	W. V. Lumiden	Seaforth Highlanders	3,265
17th	M. B. Salby-Smyth	Rifle Brigade	3,246
21st	H. F. P. Hornsby	Cornwall and Devon Miners Artillery	3,220
22nd	F. G. Whinney	Lincolnshire Regiment	3,217
27th	H. E. Hosking	East Surrey Regiment	3,128
30th	A. W. U. Richardson	West Yorkshire Regiment	3,098
32nd	J. D. Gulkison	Cheshire Regiment	3,067

ARMY QUALIFYING, SEPTEMBER, 1907.

THE FOLLOWING PASSED FROM US.

H. S. F. Cossens.	C. Jackson.	M. Alexander.
J. V. Dawson.	S. C. B. Munley.	G. Freechville.
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* Passed in Mathematics I.

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